美國對歐洲綏靖主義漸失耐心

Appeasement is an age-old tactic of diplomacy. It can be a defensible one, but not as a frame of mind for an entire continent. Yet no word captures the general mood of Europe better than appeasement.

綏靖政策是一種古老的外交策略。它可以是防禦性的，但不能成爲整塊大陸的思維框架。然而，沒有什麼詞比綏靖更能體現歐洲當前的普遍心態。

Europeans, it has been said, cherish freedom but do not want to sacrifice anything for it. Only about half a dozen of Nato’s 28 members spend 2 per cent of output on defence, the alliance’s guideline level. When Vladimir Putin’s Russia undermined the strategic state of Ukraine, they stood and watched.

據說，歐洲人珍視自由，但卻不願爲自由做出任何犧牲。北約(NATO) 28個成員國中僅有6個左右的國家國防開支佔到GDP的2%——該組織的指導水平。當弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)領導下的俄羅斯破壞烏克蘭的戰略地位時，他們只是袖手旁觀。

This is of a piece with the EU’s inability to deal with its own economic difficulties. Whatever they may claim, each member follows its own national interest without asking what is best for Europe. Decades into the project, there is still no chill-up-your-spine loyalty to Europe. There is simply no larger purpose and nothing to fight for, other than providing for the good life under welfare state conditions.

這與歐盟無力應對自身的經濟困難有關。無論主張什麼，每個成員國只追求自己的國家利益，而不考慮怎樣做最有利於歐洲。歐洲一體化歷經幾十年，但仍沒有形成對歐洲發自內心的忠誠。除了提供福利國家條件下的美好生活之外，更大的、值得爲之而戰的目標已不存在。

Europe has been reduced over the decades to a regulatory regime. Yet a rules-based order, however much it protects the rights of the individual, is not a replacement for conviction: rather, it must evolve out of a healthy and determined national purpose. A supranational purpose might exists in Brussels but not on the European street.

過去幾十年，歐洲已降格爲一個管理式政權。不過，基於規則的秩序——即使它能在很大程度上保護個人權利——並非信念的替代品：相反，信念必須脫胎於明智而堅定的國家目標。超國家的目標可能會存在於布魯塞爾，但不存在於歐洲的街頭巷尾。

Because of their anaemic sense of national purpose, European elites have in several countries ceded measurable ground to the far right or the far left, resulting in a lumpen and populist form of nationalism. Elites are often stranded in the middle, seeking ways to appease both Mr Putin and their own, homegrown extremists. Lumpen nationalism, defeatism and a latent anti-Semitism all flow together.

由於缺乏國家目標的意識，多個國家的歐洲精英已向極右或極左做出了明顯的讓步，導致民族主義出現底層民粹主義形式。精英們常常被困其中，試圖同時安撫普京和本國的極端分子。底層民族主義、失敗主義和潛在的反猶太主義浪潮同時在涌動。

Europe’s elites are post-historical. Living in history means living in a world of constant threat where there is no nightwatchman to keep the peace among nations, so nations must keep the peace themselves by maintaining a balance of power. But for 70 years Europe has relied on the US to do exactly that: guarantee its security, so that Europe can spend relatively little on defence and relatively much on providing for the good life. Seventy years is much longer than the distance between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war; or between the end of that conflict and the outbreak of the first world war.

歐洲的精英們是“後歷史”的。生活在歷史中意味着生活在一個威脅不斷的世界裏——在這個世界裏，沒有守夜人保持各國之間的和平，因此各國必須自己通過保持實力均衡來維護和平。但70年來，歐洲一直依賴美國來維護和平，保證其安全，好讓歐洲投入到防務上的支出可以相對較少，投入到美好生活上的支出相對較多。從拿破崙戰爭結束到普法戰爭爆發，或者從普法戰爭結束到一戰爆發，都遠遠不到70年。

This American security umbrella will not stay up for ever. Barack Obama’s alleged lack of resolve in dealing with Mr Putin may say less about the US president’s own foreign policy than about a gradual shift in US opinion. Why should America defend a continent that will not defend itself?

美國提供的這種安全傘將不會永遠存在。巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)在與普京打交道時的所謂缺乏決斷，與其說反映了他自己的外交政策，還不如說反映了美國觀念的逐步轉變。美國爲什麼應該爲一個不自我捍衛的大陸提供防務？

The last of America’s second world war veterans will soon be dead. The European-oriented elites that have influenced foreign and defence policy in Washington are gradually being replaced by bright young men and women — many of them the offspring of immigrants from Asia and Latin America — who bring with them different family histories and emotional priorities. This coincides with the security challenges and opportunities that America encounters outside Europe, particularly in Asia, where American allies are willing to maintain robust, deployable militaries.

美國最後的二戰老兵將會很快去世。在華盛頓影響外交和防務政策的以歐洲爲導向的精英們，現在逐漸被才華橫溢的年輕人所取代，其中許多人是亞洲和拉美移民的後代，他們帶來了不同的家族歷史和情感傾向。與此同時，美國在歐洲以外遇到了安全方面的挑戰和機遇，尤其是在亞洲，那裏的美國盟友願意保持強大、部署性強的軍隊。

Or take Israel, a country with which the American public has for more than half a century been stubbornly sympathetic, whatever its often-misguided politicians do to inconvenience US policy. This is (among other things) the result of Israel’s stiff national resolve and gutsy, demonstrated willingness to defend itself.

以以色列爲例。美國公衆在半個多世紀的時間裏一直執着地對以色列抱以同情，無論其常常犯糊塗的政客們做什麼來妨礙美國的政策。這是因爲以色列有堅決的國家意志，並展現出捍衛自己的勇敢意願（當然還有其他因素）。

Gutsy is not a word one would use to describe Europe’s political class. And unless that changes, no US president will be as committed to Europe as his predecessors were during the cold war.

人們不會用勇敢描述歐洲的政治階層。除非這種情況有所改變，否則哪個美國總統都不會像其冷戰期間的前任那樣致力於歐洲防務。

The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security

本文作者是新美國安全中心(Center for a New American Security)的高級研究員