烏克蘭問題上普京魚與熊掌不可兼得

When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Moscow stock market did not crash. That is because there was no Moscow stock market. By contrast, the news that Russian troops have taken effective control of Crimea was greeted, yesterday, by a 10 per cent collapse in shares on the Russian market.

1968年蘇聯入侵捷克斯洛伐克時，莫斯科股市沒有崩盤，這是因爲當時莫斯科根本沒有股市。相比之下，週一俄羅斯軍隊實際控制克里米亞的消息傳出後，俄羅斯股市暴跌了10%。

This contrast between 1968 and now underlines why talk of a new cold war is misleading. The economic and political context of Crimea in 2014 is entirely different from Czechoslovakia in 1968. Russia no longer has an empire extending all the way to Berlin. The pain of that territorial loss is part of the reason why President Vladimir Putin is fighting so hard to keep Ukraine in Moscow’s much-diminished sphere of influence.

1968年與現在的強烈反差，突顯出爲什麼“新冷戰”的說法具有誤導性。2014年克里米亞問題的政治經濟背景與1968年的捷克斯洛伐克問題完全不同。俄羅斯不再是一個疆域一直延伸至柏林的帝國。領土損失帶來的痛苦，是俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)現在拼命把烏克蘭留在莫斯科嚴重縮水的勢力範圍之內的原因之一。

Just as important, the world is no longer divided into two mutually exclusive, and hostile, political and economic systems – a capitalist west and a communist east. After the collapse of the Soviet system, Russia joined the global, capitalist order. The financial, business and social systems of Russia and the west are now deeply intertwined. A new east-west struggle is certainly under way today but it is being fought on entirely different terrain from the cold war – and under different rules.

同樣重要的是，世界不再分爲兩個互相排斥、敵對的政治經濟體系——西方資本主義和東方共產主義。蘇聯體系崩潰後，俄羅斯加入了全球的資本主義秩序。如今，俄羅斯的金融、商業和社會體系與西方深深交織在一起。東西方今天當然正在進行新的爭鬥，但爭鬥的背景與冷戰時期完全不同，規則也不一樣。

The Kremlin may assume that the west’s business dealings with Russia work in its favour. President Putin, the former KGB agent, probably still believes the old Soviet maxim that western foreign policy is dictated by capitalists – who will not allow their financial interests in Russia to be endangered. The west’s supine reaction to the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 may have strengthened this impression. Ben Judah, author of a recent book on Russia, argues that the eagerness of western business people and former politicians to do business with Russia has made Mr Putin “very confident that European elites are more concerned about making money than standing up to him”.

克里姆林宮可能以爲，西方與俄羅斯的商業往來對自己有利。曾任克格勃(KGB)特工的普京可能仍然相信蘇聯時期的格言：西方外交政策由資本家決定，後者不會允許他們在俄羅斯的金融利益受到損害。西方對2008年俄羅斯武裝干涉格魯吉亞的消極迴應可能強化了這種印象。本•朱達(Ben Judah)最近寫了一本關於俄羅斯的書。他辯稱，西方商人和前政客們急切地與俄羅斯做生意，這讓普京“確信，歐洲精英們更關心賺錢而非與他對抗”。

Yet Mr Putin, who is fond of judo, should know that a sudden shift of weight can turn a strength into a weakness. The interdependence of the Russian and western economies means that rogue actions by the Kremlin can inflict an immediate economic cost on Russia. The first part of that price became apparent with the crash on the Moscow stock market after the move on Crimea – with the shares of Gazprom and Sberbank – two big companies closely tied to the Kremlin – falling by about 10 per cent each.

然而，喜愛柔道的普京應該明白，重心的突然轉移可能會化優勢爲劣勢。俄羅斯經濟與西方經濟相互依存意味着，克里姆林宮的無理行動可能會讓俄羅斯立即在經濟上付出代價。這種代價的頭一部分從俄羅斯對克里米亞採取行動後莫斯科股市的暴跌中可以明顯看出來——俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司(Gazprom)和俄羅斯聯邦儲蓄銀行(Sberbank)這兩家與克林姆林宮關係密切的大公司的股價下挫了約10%。

The imposition of formal economic sanctions or visa bans on members of the Russian elite would heighten the pain. Rich Russians now take for granted the right to pop over to London or Paris for the weekend. Billions of dollars of Russian money are stashed away in western banks or invested in European property.

實施正式經濟制裁或者對俄羅斯部分精英人士禁發簽證將加深俄羅斯的痛苦。富裕的俄羅斯人如今將週末去倫敦或巴黎度假視爲理所當然的權利。俄羅斯有數十億美元資金藏匿於西方的銀行或者投資於歐洲的房地產。

The Russian central bank itself has estimated that two-thirds of the $56bn that flowed out of Russia in 2012 might have been the proceeds of crime. Funds that are the fruits of corruption are vulnerable to legal action. The City of London and the Swiss authorities, in particular, have not been noted for their eagerness to question the origins of Russian money. But those questions could now be asked a little more urgently.

俄羅斯央行自己估計，在2012年流出俄羅斯的560億美元中，三分之二的資金可能是非法所得。源於腐敗的資金很容易受到法律行動的追索。尤其要指出的是，倫敦金融城(City of London)和瑞士當局並不以熱衷追問俄羅斯資金的來源而聞名。但現在，它們可以抓緊詢問這些問題。

President Putin himself has long been rumoured to have billions salted away in the west. Presumably, not all of that money is the product of savings from his Kremlin salary. If western intelligence agencies have done their job, they will presumably know where this money is.

長期以來一直有傳言稱，俄羅斯總統普京本人在西方擁有數十億的存款。可以想見，這些存款並非全部來自他在克里姆林宮任職的薪酬。如果西方情報機構盡到了責任，他們大概會查到普京的錢存在什麼地方。

Visa bans on a widened circle of Russian leaders, implicated in the military intervention in Ukraine, are certainly feasible – which would stop them enjoying the properties and funds they have accumulated in Europe. America’s “Magnitsky list” – imposing visa bans on Russian officials implicated in the killing of the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky – has already established the precedent.

對更多參與軍事幹涉烏克蘭的俄羅斯領導人禁發籤證，無疑是一種可行的對策。這將讓他們無法享受自己在歐洲積攢下的房產和金錢。美國的“馬格尼茨基名單”（Magnitsky list，名單上列出的俄羅斯官員被禁發籤證，因爲他們牽涉律師謝爾蓋•馬格尼茨基(Sergei Magnitsky)被殺一事）已爲此確立了先例。

Of course, the economic damage inflicted would flow both ways. The most obvious western vulnerability is Europe’s reliance on Russian energy. The image of western householders shivering because the Russian gas tap has been turned off will worry European leaders. Yet even here, Europe’s vulnerability – and Russia’s willingness to use the energy weapon – can be overstated.

當然，雙方都將因此在經濟上受損。西方最明顯的軟肋在於，歐洲依賴俄羅斯的能源。如果俄羅斯關上天然氣開關，西方家庭將在嚴冬裏瑟瑟發抖，這樣的情景讓歐洲領導人擔心不已。但即便在這一點上，歐洲的脆弱性和俄羅斯使用能源武器的意願也可能被高估了。

Russia needs to sell energy abroad. It gets some 70 per cent of its export revenues from oil and gas. The importance of such revenues to the Russian state ensured that energy sales to Europe were continued even during the height of the cold war.

俄羅斯需要出口能源。該國約70%的出口收入來源於石油和天然氣。由於能源出口收入如此之重要，因此甚至在冷戰形勢最嚴峻之時，俄羅斯對歐洲的能源出口都沒有中斷過。

Meanwhile, European demand for Russian gas has fallen during the past decade as renewable energy comes on to the market. American shale gas could also provide an alternative source.

另一方面，過去十年裏，隨着可再生能源進入市場，歐洲對俄羅斯天然氣的需求已有所減少。美國頁岩氣也可作爲一種備選的天然氣來源。

With luck, the Russian government will, even now, think better of the course on which it has embarked. There is clearly scope for a diplomatic solution involving the pullback of Russian troops matched by guarantees for the cultural and political rights of Russian speakers.

幸運的話，即便是現在，俄羅斯政府也會反思其已經踏上的道路並回心轉意。顯而易見，烏克蘭局勢尚有外交解決的空間——即俄羅斯撤回軍隊，而說俄語的烏克蘭人獲得文化與政治權利方面的保證。

For the moment, however, it seems more likely that Russia is determined to hang on to Crimea – and perhaps also to grab bits of eastern Ukraine.

但目前來看，俄羅斯似乎更有可能執意抓住克里米亞不放——或許還會搶佔東烏克蘭的部分地區。

President Barack Obama and the leaders of the EU have been swift to rule out a military response, and they are right to do so. But the west still has plenty of economic tools with which to make life difficult for Russia.

美國總統巴拉克•奧巴馬(Barack Obama)和歐盟領導人迅速排除了軍事迴應的選項，他們這麼做是正確的。但是，西方仍擁有很多經濟手段，足以讓俄羅斯的日子不好過。

For the past decade, Mr Putin and his entourage have often used the rhetoric of the cold war while enjoying the fruits of globalisation. Now they may need to be faced with a choice. They can have a new cold war. Or they can have access to the riches of the west. They cannot have both.

過去十年，普京及其幕僚一面享受着全球化的碩果，一面不時使用冷戰論調。如今，他們可能必須要做出選擇了——要麼面對新冷戰，要麼享受西方的財富，不能二者兼得。