英國爲何應圈護零售銀行業

The costs imposed by the financial crises that hit western economies in 2007 have been enormous. UK gross domestic product is nearly a fifth smaller than if long-term pre-crisis growth trends had continued. The costs also include huge rises in public debt. In the UK the increase, as a direct and indirect result of the crisis, will be close to 50 per cent of GDP.

2007年重創西方經濟的金融危機造成的代價是巨大的。目前英國國內生產總值(GDP)相比危機前的長期增長趨勢線少了近五分之一。代價還包括公共債務的大幅攀升。在英國，危機直接和間接造成的公共債務增加相當於GDP的近一半。

This is the fourth most costly fiscal event of the past 225 years, after the wars with post-revolutionary France and the first and second world wars. Mismanaged finance imposes fiscal costs that are not far short of world wars.

這是過去225年來代價第四高昂的財政事件，僅次於法國大革命後的英法戰爭、一戰和二戰。金融管理不善造成的財政代價，並不比世界大戰帶來的損失少很多。

This is the background against which to judge predictable complaints that the post-crisis regulatory regime is too onerous and will prevent banks supporting the economy as well as they did when creating the crisis. In the UK particularly strong complaints are directed at the plan to ringfence retail banking from other activities. They often come from people connected to banking. But they would complain, wouldn’t they?

這就是評判一些可預見的抱怨的背景，這些抱怨稱，後危機時代的監管制度負擔過重，將阻止銀行像危機之前那樣出色地支持經濟。在英國，抱怨尤其強烈的是針對將零售銀行業“圈護”(ringfence)起來、與其他活動隔離的計劃。這些抱怨往往來自與銀行業相關的人士。但這些人當然會抱怨，難道不是嗎？

Ringfencing retail banking was one of the proposals of the Independent Commission on Banking, established by the UK government in 2010 (I was a member). The commission’s terms of reference required it to make UK banks safer without undermining global competitiveness. The ICB’s package of proposals also included greater “loss absorbency” — more funding by equity and debt that is readily convertible into equity.

對零售銀行實施圈護是銀行業獨立委員會（Independent Commission on Banking，簡稱：ICB）提出的建議之一，該委員會由英國政府在2010年建立（我是其中的成員）。ICB的權限要求它在不影響英國銀行全球競爭力的情況下使它們更安全。ICB的一攬子提案還包括更強的“虧損吸收能力”——更多股權籌資以及更多隨時可轉換爲股權的債務。

Martin Taylor, former Barclays chief executive, member of the ICB and now Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member, has powerfully elucidated the logic behind ringfencing. It had, he notes, three chief goals.

巴克萊(Barclays)前首席執行官、ICB前成員、現在是英國央行(Bank of England)金融政策委員會成員的馬丁•泰勒(Martin Taylor)，有力地闡明瞭實施圈護背後的邏輯。他指出，這樣做有三個主要目標。

First, it was designed to make resolution of a failing bank easier by allowing the authorities to pluck out the most critical parts of the business. Second, “As long as governments stood behind a bank’s domestic business . . . and as long as that domestic business was mixed in with the investment bank . . . then effectively the taxpayer had no choice but to stand behind the investment bank too.” The ringfence was designed to subvert this “irresponsible business model”.

首先，它旨在通過允許當局挑出業務中最關鍵的部分，使破產銀行的清盤更加容易。第二，“只要政府支持一家銀行的國內業務……只要該行的國內業務與投行業務混合在一起……那麼納稅人實際上就別無選擇，只能也支持投行那一塊。”圈護旨在顛覆這種“不負責任的業務模式”。

Finally, removing the implicit subsidy would make banking as a whole safer. Given the consequences of pre-crisis risk-taking, that had to be desirable.

最後，取消隱性補貼將使銀行業整體更加安全。考慮到危機前冒險行爲產生的後果，這一點必定是可取的。

The ICB did not recommend full separation between retail and investment banking because it saw the advantages of diversified risks. But it was also aware that balance sheets of UK banks were five times GDP, far higher than in comparable countries. The UK had to limit its exposure. Critics make a number of objections. One is that there is no reason to suppose investment banking is riskier than retail banking. That is true. The ICB did not think otherwise. But retail banking is surely more indispensable.

ICB並未建議將零售銀行業和投行業完全分離，因爲它看到了風險分散化的優勢。但它也意識到，英國各銀行的資產負債表總規模達到國內生產總值(GDP)的5倍，遠高於其他可比國家。英國作爲一個國家必須限制自己的敞口。批評者提出許多反對意見。其中之一是，沒有理由假設投行業比零售銀行業務風險更高。這話沒錯。ICB也這樣認爲。但零售銀行業無疑是更加不可或缺的。

Another gripe is that the ringfence makes British banks uncompetitive in global banking. But if other governments wish to subsidise investment banking, that is their choice; it is not an argument for the UK to do so, too.

也有人抱怨稱，圈護政策使英國的銀行在全球銀行業失去競爭力。但是，如果其他國家的政府希望補貼投行，那是他們的選擇；這不是英國也要這樣做的理由。

Others say the ring­fence will force UK banks abroad. Reference is made to announcements that HSBC is reconsidering its UK domicile. HSBC might indeed wish to escape the costly (and hard to justify) levy on bank balance sheets introduced in 2011. But it cannot escape the ringfence by leaving since its UK retail bank must remain subject to UK law. Thus, the ringfence cannot be a justification for doing so.

還有人說，圈護要求將迫使英國的銀行遷往海外。他們提到匯豐(HSBC)宣佈重新考慮總部選址。匯豐可能的確希望逃避2011年出臺的針對銀行資產負債表的高額（且很難證明合理）徵費。但它無法通過搬遷總部來逃避圈護，因爲英國的零售銀行仍必須遵守英國法律。因此，圈護不能成爲這樣做的理由。

A more powerful argument is that the loss absorbency of banks is now such that the additional safety provided by ringfencing is redundant. One response is that the internationally agreed levels of loss absorbency is in line with the proposals of the ICB. The other is that banks remain highly leveraged. Last year the ratio of total assets to equity of UK banks was between 20 and 30 to one. It would take modest losses to wipe out these banks’ equity.

更有力的論據是，如今銀行的虧損吸收能力已經相當大，圈護所提供的額外安全度是冗餘的。對此的迴應之一是，國際間同意的虧損吸收能力水平與ICB的建議相符。另一個迴應是，英國的銀行仍保持着高槓杆率。去年，英國各銀行總資產與股本的比率介於20至30比1之間。不需要發生太大的虧損，就會抹掉這些銀行的股本。

A further objection is that we are now able to resolve troubled banks easily by converting loss-absorbing debt into equity or even winding them up. Improvements have indeed been made. But the idea that these processes would work smoothly if a crisis again engulfed the system is unproven, if not optimistic. Ringfencing would at least give any future government more options.

還有一個反對意見是，我們現在能夠通過將吸收虧損的債務轉化成股權，或者甚至對其清盤，很容易地清算陷入困境的銀行。確實取得了一些進步。但是，那種認爲如果危機再次席捲這一體系，這些過程將順利運轉的想法並未被證實，如果還算不上過於樂觀的話。圈護至少將給未來的政府更多選項。

If anything is to be reconsidered it is not ringfencing but the UK’s bank levy, which is simply a heavy tax. I would have no objection to making the boundary of the ringfence more flexible for retail banks in return for higher equity capital. More broadly, if the capital of banks were greatly increased, the case for ringfencing would weaken. But that is not where we now are. So ignore the whingeing.

如果有任何事需要被重新考慮的話，那不是圈護政策，而是英國的銀行徵費，它就是一項沉重的稅種。我不反對讓零售銀行的圈護範圍變得更加靈活，以換取更高的股權資本。更廣義上說，如果銀行的資本大大增加，圈護的理由將被削弱。但這不是我們現在面臨的問題。所以，別在意這些抱怨。