與FT共進午餐 本伯南克 Ben Bernanke
At the allotted time of 2pm I am sitting at a booth at McCormick & Schmick’s seafood and steak restaurant in Chicago. My mobile phone rings. It is Ben Bernanke’s assistant. It transpires that I am not at the correct location. This is a chain of restaurants. I went to the wrong one.
約好下午2點，我坐在芝加哥麥考密克與施米克(McCormick & Schmick's)海鮮牛排餐廳的卡座上。我的手機響了。來電的是本伯南克(Ben Bernanke)的助理。從電話中，我得知自己等錯了地方。這是一家連鎖餐廳。我去錯了分店。
Fortunately, it takes only five minutes to arrive at the right place. The restaurant is quite empty. Apart from the background music, it is quiet. The decor is heavy and dark.
幸運的是，我只花了五分鐘就來到了正確地點。餐廳裏沒什麼人。除了背景音樂，這裏很安靜。室內裝修風格厚重，色調爲深色。
Bernanke, 61, is waiting for me. He is wearing a plain brown suit and a yellow tie. I have met him oFTen since he became a governor of the US Federal Reserve in 2002. He is always very much the deliberate and precise academic. It was a happy chance that this scholar, known for his work on the Great Depression, was chairman of the central banking system of the US during the biggest financial crisis since the early 1930s. His new book, The Courage to Act , provides a fascinating account of the effort to save the world from another such catastrophe.
61歲的伯南克正在等我。他穿着一套樸素的棕色西裝，搭配黃色領帶。自從他2002年成爲美聯儲(Fed)理事後，我經常見到他。他一直是一副謹慎、一絲不苟的學者的樣子。在上世紀30年代初以來最大的一場金融危機期間執掌美國中央銀行系統的，是這位以《大蕭條》(Great Depression)一書聞名於世的學者，這是件幸事。他的新書《行動的勇氣》(The Courage to Act)生動地記述了其避免全世界再經歷一場大蕭條的努力。
I start by asking him how long the book tour will last. “Pretty much the whole month,” he answers. I suggest he will be delighted when it is over. “Absolutely,” he agrees. And what will he be doing afterwards? He reels off an impressive list of academic lectures. Meanwhile, he is based at the Brookings Institution, a centrist think-tank in Washington. He is doing some consulting. He is also on the speaker circuit.
我的問題以他的新書籤售之旅將持續多久開始。“幾乎是一整月，”他回答說。我說籤售結束後想必他會很高興。“當然，”他贊同道。之後會做什麼？他隨口說出一串令人印象深刻的學術講座。同時，他現在常駐位於華盛頓的中間派智庫布魯金斯學會(Brookings Institution)。他在做一些諮詢工作，也在進行巡迴演講。
The waitress takes our orders. I choose pan-seared swordfish with fingerling potatoes, onions and Brussels sprouts. He selects grilled halibut with green beans, blue cheese and mashed potatoes. I ask him how long he took to recover after leaving the Fed last year. “About 24 hours,” he says. “Relief is a bit of a strong word but I’m very happy to be a civilian again. I follow closely what’s happening in the economy, what’s happening at the Fed. But I no longer have the responsibility to make those tough calls. That was a burden.”
女服務員過來幫我們點餐。我選了煎劍魚配小土豆、洋蔥與孢子甘藍。他選了烤比目魚配青豆、藍奶酪和土豆泥。我問他，去年離開美聯儲之後多長時間才適應。“大概24小時，”他說。“用解脫一詞形容可能有點過頭，但我很高興又成爲平頭老百姓。我密切關注經濟動態、美聯儲動態。但我不用再負責做出那些艱難的決定。那是一種負擔。”
So, I wonder, does he wish to advise his successors? “No, no. I have a lot of confidence in them and I’m sure that they will make some good calls. But I was involved in that for eight years and that included some very difficult decisions. I’ve more or less exhausted my interest in doing that.”
那麼，我想知道，他希望給繼任者們一些建議嗎？“不，不。我對他們很有信心，我相信他們會做出優秀的決定。但那份工作我做了8年，其職責包括做一些非常艱難的決定。我對它的興趣幾乎已經耗盡。”
I ask him how much he was affected by the populist rage against him — governor Rick Perry of Texas evenaccused Bernanke of treason when the former was seeking the presidential nomination in 2011. “It didn’t affect me much personally,” he replies. “I knew that it was just ‘shooting from the hip’. What did concern me, though, was the possibility that the Fed would come under severe political attack or lose its independence. Personally, I never felt under any threat.”
我問他，民粹主義者的憤怒對他有多大影響——德州州長裏克槧裏(Rick Perry) 2011年競選總統候選人提名資格時甚至曾指責伯南克叛國。“對我本人影響不大，”他回答說，“我知道那只是‘無心之言’。真正讓我擔心的倒是美聯儲可能遭遇嚴重的政治攻擊或失去獨立性。就我個人而言，我從未感覺受到任何威脅。”
Bernanke is married with two children. How much did the hostility affect them? He replies that they had their own lives. “But my wife tried to help me decompress and make sure that I had good food to eat and some time off once in a while. And I tried to look after myself physically.”
伯南克已婚，育有兩個孩子。敵意對他的家人有多大影響？他回答說，他們有自己的生活。“但我的妻子設法幫我解壓，保證我吃好，並抽時間休息。我也盡力照顧好自己的身體。”
I ask him about the hostility to the very idea of a central bank in the US. “Well, it isn’t a unique situation. Switzerland, for example, and a few other countries, have had populist reactions to the crisis. In the United States, we’ve had other episodes: most recently, the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s. I had in my office a piece of wood, which critics mailed to Paul Volcker [then chairman] saying: cut interest rates.
有人反對美聯儲的存在本身，我問他對這種觀點有何看法。“怎麼說呢，這並非一種獨特現象。例如，在瑞士及其他一些國家，都有對危機的民粹主義式反應。在美國，我們也經歷過別樣的情形：最近一次是上世紀80年代初的沃爾克通縮。我辦公室裏曾有一片木頭，是批評者寄給保羅茠爾克（Paul Volcker，時任美聯儲主席）的，上面寫着：降息。”
“One of the Federal Reserve’s key functions is to act quickly and proactively when the legislative process is too slow. And the Federal Reserve was originally set up primarily to address financial panics, not do monetary policy. So it’s part of the job description.
“美聯儲的主要功能之一，是在立法進程過慢時迅速、防患於未然地採取行動。美聯儲成立的初衷主要是爲了應對金融恐慌，而非制定貨幣政策。因此，這是職責的一部分。”
“All that being said, the hostility concerns me. I tried my best to bring our story to the broader public. I wish I could have done more. Perhaps, in retrospect, I should have done more. But I was very much engaged in trying to put out the fire. So I don’t know what to say. It was kind of predictable. The Federal Reserve failed in the 1930s. I think we did much better than in the 1930s.”
“話雖如此，我仍然關注反對的聲音。我盡力讓更廣泛的公衆瞭解我們。我希望我那時做了更多。也許，現在回想起來，我那時本應做得更多。但我那時太忙於滅火了。所以，我不知道說什麼好。可以說那是可預料的。上世紀30年代，美聯儲失敗了。我認爲我們做得比上世紀30年代好得多。”
At this stage, we are eating. My swordfish is firm and juicy. Bernanke eats without comment, focusing on answering the questions.
我們開始用餐。我的劍魚肉質緊實、多汁。伯南克沒有進行評價他的食物，而是專注於回答問題。
Many critics complain that the Fed saved the rich and the bankers but let ordinary people drown. How does he respond? “Rising inequality’s an important issue for the US,” he says, “but it is a long-term trend that goes back at least to the 1970s. And the notion that the Fed has somehow enriched the rich through increasing asset prices doesn’t really hold up, for a couple of reasons: one is that the Fed basically has returned asset prices and the like back to trend; another is that the reason stock prices are high is because returns are low.
許多批評人士抱怨，美聯儲拯救了富人和銀行家，而不顧普通人死活。他如何迴應？“日益加劇的不平等是美國的一個重要問題，”他說，“但這是一種至少可以追溯至上世紀70年代的長期趨勢。認爲美聯儲通過提升資產價格使富人更富的觀點其實佔不住腳，原因有兩點：一是美聯儲基本上已經讓資產價格之類的東西迴歸了趨勢水平；另一個原因是，股價高的原因是回報低。”
“It’s ironic that the same people who criticise the Fed for helping the rich also criticise the Fed for hurting savers. And those two things are inconsistent. But what’s the alternative? Should the Fed not try to support a recovery?”
“具有諷刺意味的是，批評美聯儲幫助富人與批評美聯儲損害儲戶利益的是同一批人。而這兩件事本身是相悖的。但有什麼別的選擇呢？難道美聯儲不該支持復甦？”
He continues, warming to his theme: “If people are unhappy with the effects of low interest rates, they should pressure Congress to do more on the fiscal side, and so have a less unbalanced monetary-fiscal policy mix. This is the fourth or fifth argument against quantitative easing after all the other ones have been proven to be wrong. And this is certainly not an argument for the Fed to do nothing and let unemployment stay at 10 per cent.”
他繼續興致勃勃地闡述自己的觀點：“如果人們對低利率的結果不滿，他們應該向國會施壓，要求它在財政政策方面採取更多措施，從而得到一個不那麼失衡的貨幣-財政政策組合。這是反對量化寬鬆的第4條或第5條理由，前面的那些理由都已被證明是錯誤的。這也當然不是美聯儲應該什麼都不做、聽任失業率保持在10%的理由。”
Other critics argue, I note, that the Fed’s intervention prevented the cathartic effects of a proper depression. He teases me by responding that I have a remarkable ability to keep a straight face while recounting what he clearly considers crazy opinions.
我指出，其他批評者認爲，美聯儲的干預讓一場貨真價實的衰退能夠帶來的疏導效應沒有了。他調侃式地迴應，說我在敘述他明顯認爲瘋狂的觀點時保持一臉嚴肅的本領令人欽佩。
I add that many critics still expect hyperinflation any day now. “Well, we were quite confident from the beginning there would be no inflation problem. And, of course, the greater problem has been getting inflation up to target. As for allowing the economy to go into collapse, this is the Andrew Mellon [US Treasury secretary] argument from the 1930s. And I would think that, certainly among mainstream economists, it has no credibility. A Great Depression is not going to promote innovation, growth and prosperity.”
我補充說，許多批評人士仍認爲如今隨時都可能爆發惡性通脹。“我們從一開始就非常有信心不會出現通脹問題。當然，更大的問題在於讓通脹升至目標值。至於放任經濟走向崩潰，這是安德魯蔠虨（Andrew Mellon，美國前財長）上世紀30年代的觀點。我認爲這種觀點不可信，至少主流經濟學家中的看法肯定是這樣。大蕭條不會推動創新、增長和繁榮。”
I cannot disagree, since I also consider such arguments mad. Nevertheless, I note, we have to recognise that neither he nor the Fed expected the meltdown. Does the blame for these mistakes lie in pre-crisis monetary policy, particularly the targeting of inflation, with which he is closely associated? Had interest rates not been kept too low for too long in the early 2000s?
我無法不同意，因爲我也認爲這些理由瘋了。不過，我提出，我們必須承認，無論他還是美聯儲都沒有預見到這場危機。造成這些錯誤的原因是否在於危機前的貨幣政策，尤其是與他密切相關的通脹目標？在2000年代初，利率難道不是在太長時間裏保持在過低的水平上了嗎？
“The first part of a response is to ask whether monetary policy was, in fact, a major contributor to the housing bubble and all that happened. Serious studies that look at it don’t find that to be the case. People such as Bob Shiller [a Nobel laureate currently serving as a Sterling professor of economics at Yale University], who has a lot of credibility on this topic, says that: it wasn’t monetary policy at all; it came from a mania, a psychological phenomenon, that took off from the tech boom and moved into housing.”
“對這個問題的迴應，首先是問一問貨幣政策是不是實際上導致房地產泡沫及所發生一切的主要因素。嚴肅的研究發現並未如此。這一問題的權威專家鮑勃席勒（Bob Shiller，諾貝爾獎獲得者、目前任耶魯大學斯特林(Sterling)經濟學教授）等人說：這根本不是貨幣政策的問題；它源於一種狂熱，一種心理現象——發端於科技熱潮，後轉入房地產。”
Bernanke continues: “The second general argument is that, while I think the Fed had some complicity, it wasn’t so much in monetary policy but, together with the other regulators, in not constraining the bad mortgage lending and excessive risk-taking that was permeating the system. This, together with the structural vulnerabilities in the funding markets, and so on, led to the panic.”
伯南克接着說：“第二個大體而言的理由是，雖然我認爲美聯儲在某種程度上存在過錯，但這過錯並非在貨幣政策上，而是在於它和其他監管機構都沒有對普遍存在於金融系統中的不良抵押貸款和過度冒險進行限制。這兩點，再加上融資市場的結構性弱點以及其他問題，導致了恐慌。”
Thus, lax regulation was to blame. Has the problem been fixed? “I think it’s an ongoing project,” he replies. “You can’t hope to identify all the vulnerabilities in advance. And so anything you can do to make the system more resilient is going to be helpful. I do think, if I had to pick a single change that has moved us in the right direction, it would be the increase in capital in the largest banks, which means they are more likely to withstand whatever the shock may be.”
因此，應該歸咎於鬆散的監管。這一問題解決了嗎？“我認爲這是個持續的進程，”他回答道，“你無法指望提前找出所有漏洞。因此，你所做的任何能使這一系統更具抗壓性的事都是有幫助的。我的確認爲，如果我必須只選出一個讓我們走向正確方向的變化，我的選擇將是，大型銀行提高資本金，這意味着它們更可能經受住任何可能的衝擊。”
The late Hyman Minsky, I point out, argued that “stability destabilises”. So did the very notion of a “great moderation” cause the imprudent behaviour?
我指出，已故的海曼明斯基(Hyman Minsky)認爲“穩定會帶來破壞”。那麼，是否正是“大緩和”(Great Moderation)這個概念導致了魯莽的行爲？
He replies that “individually rational behaviour can be collectively irrational. And that’s why the regulators have to do what they can to constrain individual behaviour, so that it doesn’t lead to collectively irrational outcomes.”
他回答說，“從個人角度來看理性的行爲，從集體角度來看可能是非理性的。這就是爲什麼監管機構必須盡其所能約束個人行爲，以確保不會導致從集體角度來看非理性的結果。”
Some argue that the financial sector is riddled with perverse incentives: limited liability; excessive leverage; “too-big-to-fail” banks; and a range of explicit and implicit guarantees. How far does he agree? “I think that there was, for rational or irrational reasons, an upsurge in risk-taking. And if you’re taking risks, then I have to take the same risks, or else I get left behind.
有人認爲金融行業充斥着不正當的誘因：有限的責任、過度的槓桿、“大到不能倒”的銀行以及一系列公開和隱性擔保。他在多大程度上贊同這些說法？“出於理性或非理性的原因，我認爲冒險行爲在急劇升級。如果你在冒險，那我也不得不冒同樣的風險，否則我就會落後。”
“There’s two ways to get rid of ‘too-big-to-fail’. One is by having a lot of capital. And the other approach is via the liquidation authority in the Dodd-Frank law [whereby the finances of failing banks can be reorganised, without a bailout].” But, he adds, “if you break the firms down to the size of community banks, you lose a lot of functionality. At the same time, you don’t necessarily stop financial panics, because we had financial panics in the 1930s.”
“有兩種途徑可以擺脫“大到不能倒”的局面。其一是擁有大量的資本金。其二是藉助多德-弗蘭克(Dodd-Frank)法案（讓即將破產的銀行可以進行資產重組，而無需紓困）中的清算權。”但他補充說：“如果你將這些公司分拆成社區銀行的規模，就會失去很多功能。同時，你未必能阻止金融恐慌，因爲我們在上世紀30年代就經歷過金融恐慌。”
So how much capital should there be in banks? Some economists — Anat Admati of Stanford University, for example — think it should be 20 per cent of assets or even a third.
那麼，銀行應該留有多少資本金呢？有的經濟學家——如斯坦福大學(Stanford University)的阿納特阿德馬蒂(Anat Admati)——認爲應留足資產的20%，甚至三分之一。
“Tim Geithner was very much in favour of more capital,” he responds. “I was certainly in favour of more capital. I think we made a lot of progress. You know, though, that these are international debates and decisions. Other countries were less inclined to add capital. But I wouldn’t do it by an arbitrary number. What I would do is stress test it, because the amount of capital you should hold depends on the kind of assets and the kind of businesses you have. And if it’s a fixed leverage ratio, then you’re going to have every incentive to load up on risk.”
“蒂姆蓋特納(Tim Geithner)當時非常贊成提高資本金，”他回答道，“我當然贊成提高資本金。我認爲，我們取得了很大的進步。不過，你知道，這是國際性的爭論和決定。其他國家不太傾向於提高資本金。但我不會隨意決定一個數字。我想做的是進行壓力測試，因爲你應該持有的資本金數額取決於你持有的資產和經營的業務的類型。如果設定固定的槓桿比率，那麼你會有無數動機去冒更大風險。”
I ask him whether he is confident that the improvement in the resilience of the banks is adequate. “It’s a fool’s game to predict that everything is going to be fine, because either it is fine, in which case nobody remembers your prediction, or something happens, and then...” They remember your prediction, I interject.
我問他是否認爲銀行的抗壓性得到了足夠的提高。“預測一切會變好是愚蠢的，因爲要麼就是情況真的變好，這種情況下不會有人記得你的預測，要麼就是發生了糟糕的事情，然後……”他們會記得你的預測，我插話道。
Bernanke continues: “My mentor, Dale Jorgenson [of Harvard], used to say — and Larry Summers used to say this, too — that, ‘If you never miss a plane, you’re spending too much time in airports.’ If you absolutely rule out any possibility of any kind of financial crisis, then probably you’re reducing risk too much, in terms of the growth and innovation in the economy.”
伯南克繼續說：“我的導師、（哈佛大學的）戴爾吠根森(Dale Jorgenson)曾說過——拉里薩默斯(Larry Summers)也曾經這樣說——‘如果你從未誤過飛機，那麼你在機場花的時間就太多了’。如果你杜絕了發生任何形式金融危機的可能性，那麼從經濟增長和創新的角度而言，你很可能將風險降得太低了。”
The waitress asks us if we would like anything more. I order a double espresso. Bernanke asks for tea. By now, our time is coming to an end. But I push a little harder on the costs of financial liberalisation. He agrees that, in light of the economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, “I don’t think you could rule out the possibility that a more repressed financial system would give you a better trade-off of safety and dynamism.”
女侍者問我們還要不要再點些什麼。我點了一杯雙份意式濃縮咖啡。伯南克要了一杯茶。至此，約定的採訪時間已快要到了。但是我又稍微問了一下金融自由化的代價問題。他認爲，考慮到上世紀五、六十年代的經濟表現，“我認爲不可能排除這樣的可能性，即一種受到更大約束的金融體系會帶來安全與活力之間更好的平衡。”
What about the idea that if the central banks are going to expand their balance sheets so much, it would be more effective just to hand the money directly over to the people rather than operate via asset markets?
那麼，他如何看待這樣一種觀點，即假如央行要如此大規模地擴張資產負債表，那麼幹脆直接把錢發到人們手上、而不是通過資本市場操作，豈不是更有效？
Having gained the nickname “Helicopter Ben” for suggesting just such a policy, he is very much aware of this idea. But he responds by saying, “Well, it doesn’t have to be put in such an off-putting form. I think a combination of tax cuts and quantitative easing is very close to being the same thing.” This is theoretically correct, provided the QE is deemed permanent.
他曾因提出與這一模一樣的政策而得了個“直升機本”(Helicopter Ben)的綽號，因此他非常清楚這個想法。但他迴應說，“這麼說吧，沒有必要採取這樣一種乏味的形式。我認爲減稅結合量化寬鬆政策跟那幾乎是同一回事。”這在理論上是正確的，假如量化寬鬆政策被認爲是永久性的話。
While paying the bill I ask whether, given the weight he places on regulation, he believes it is really possible to regulate today’s complex global megabanks. “Yes,” he responds. “The Federal Reserve moved recently in the direction of enhancing its oversight of foreign subsidiaries and foreign banks that are located in the United States. So there is some movement towards so-called national treatment.
買單時，我問道，考慮到他對監管的重視，他是否相信監管當今複雜的全球大銀行真的有可能。“是的，”他回答道，“美聯儲最近在採取行動，期望逐步加強對設立在美國的外國分支機構和外國銀行的監管。因此，在朝所謂國民待遇邁進方面有一些行動。
“Banks complain that that’s going to Balkanise the capital markets. But, as Mervyn King [former governor of the Bank of England] said so beautifully, banks live globally and die locally. So, for that reason if no other, there’s some case for having regulators look at the subsidiaries of foreign firms, as well as their own domestic firms.”
“銀行抱怨這將使資本市場四分五裂。但是，默文金（Mervyn King，英國前央行行長）說得好，銀行在全球發展可以生存，固守本地則會倒閉。因此，如果沒有其他的原因，監管機構監督外國公司的分支機構以及他們自己國內的公司不無理由。”
I turn, finally, to perhaps the biggest question about the crisis. Could they have avoided the failure of Lehman in September 2008? “No,” he responds firmly. “It was completely unavoidable. Without a buyer, there was no one to guarantee their liabilities. So no one would lend to them. There was a complete run of all the creditors, all of the counterparties, all of the customers. And if we had lent them the money and somehow conjured up some fake collateral, in violation of the law, we would have ended up owning the firm, and it would have been a non-viable firm.”
最後，我轉向了也許是關於金融危機的最大問題。他們是否原本有可能避免雷曼(Lehman)在2008年9月倒閉？“不，”他堅定地回答，“完全不可避免。沒有買家，就沒有機構爲他們的負債提供擔保。所以，沒有人會借錢給他們。所有債權人、所有的交易方以及所有的客戶都跑了。如果我們違反法律借給他們錢，搞出一些假的抵押品，我們最終將接手這家公司，而這家公司是無法生存的。”
I add that it was only because of Lehman’s failure that they finally got the needed bailout authority from Congress (via the “Tarp” or Troubled Asset Relief Program). “Ultimately, something was going to go,” he agrees.
我補充說，正是因爲雷曼的倒閉，他們才終於從國會那裏——經由“問題資產救助計劃”(Troubled Assets Relief Program, Tarp)——得到了所需的緊急紓困授權。“歸根到底，該走的還是會走，”他同意道。
Under Bernanke’s chairmanship, the Fed, whatever its pre-crisis mistakes, helped save the US and the world from a disaster. Humanity should be grateful, I thought on leaving. Humanity, being human, mostly is not.
在主席伯南克的領導下，美聯儲（無論它在危機前犯過什麼樣的錯誤）幫忙把美國和世界從一場災難中拯救了出來。在離開餐廳時，我想，人類應該感激它。但大多數人並不，這就是人性。
Martin Wolf is the FT’s chief economics commentator
馬丁茠爾夫(Martin Wolf)是英國《金融時報》首席經濟評論員
Illustration by James Ferguson
插圖：詹姆斯弗格森(James Ferguson)
Seafood restaurant
麥考密克與施米克海鮮餐館
McCormick & Schmick’s 1 E Upper Wacker Drive, Chicago, IL
地址：美國伊利諾伊州芝加哥上瓦克街(Upper Wacker Drive) 1E
Swordfish and fingerling potatoes $22.99
劍魚配小土豆 22.99美元
Alaskan halibut with blue cheese and mashed potatoes $27.74
大比目魚配藍奶酪與土豆泥 27.74美元
Double espresso $6.99
雙份意式濃縮咖啡 6.99美元
Tea $3.50
茶 3.50美元
Total (inc service) $82.65
總費用（含服務費） 82.65美元
