美聯儲看來要犯嚴重錯誤 The Fed looks set to make a dangerous mistake

Will the Federal Reserve’s September meeting see US interest rates go up for the first time since 2006? Officials have held out the prospect that it might, and have suggested that — barring major unforeseen developments — rates will probably be increased by the end of the year. Conditions could change, and the Fed has been careful to avoid outright commitments. But a reasonable assessment of current conditions suggest that raising rates in the near future would be a serious error that would threaten all three of the Fed’s major objectives — price stability, full employment and financial stability.

在美聯儲(Fed)今年9月的會議上，我們將看到美國利率自2006年以來的第一次上升嗎？官員們堅稱這種可能性是存在的，並暗示，除非發生重大的不可預知事件，否則今年年底前很可能加息。狀況可能變化，美聯儲(Fed)一直小心翼翼地避免做出直截了當的承諾。但對當前狀況作出的合理評估似乎表明，在最近的將來加息將是一個嚴重的錯誤，它將危及美聯儲的所有三大目標：物價穩定、充分就業和金融穩定。

Like most major central banks, the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice by adopting a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this — a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy. More than half the components of the consumer price index have declined in the past six months — the first time this has happened in more than a decade. CPI inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices and difficult-to-measure housing, is less than 1 per cent. Market-based measures of expectations suggest that, over the next 10 years, inflation will be well under 2 per cent. If the currencies of China and other emerging markets depreciate further, US inflation will be even more subdued.

像大多數主要央行一樣，美聯儲爲了實現價格穩定目標，把通脹率目標定爲2%。目前最大的風險就是通脹率將低於這一水平，收緊貨幣政策將會加劇此風險。過去6個月裏，消費價格指數(CPI)中的逾半數成分都有所下跌，這是10多年來首次出現這種情況。剔除能源、食品和難以衡量的住房的CPI目前低於1%。基於市場的預期指標顯示，未來10年，通脹率將遠低於2%。如果中國等新興市場的貨幣進一步貶值，美國的通脹將更加低迷。

Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels because higher interest rates make holding on to cash more attractive than investing it. Higher interest rates will also increase the value of the dollar, making US producers less competitive and pressuring the economies of our trading partners.

收緊貨幣政策將對就業水平構成負面影響，因爲利率升高會讓保留現金比投資現金更有吸引力。利率升高也將推高美元匯率，降低美國生產企業的競爭力，也給我國貿易伙伴的經濟體帶來壓力。

This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality. Studies of periods of tight labour markets like the late 1990s and 1960s make it clear that the best social programme for disadvantaged workers is an economy where employers are struggling to fill vacancies.

這在不平等程度上升之際尤其麻煩。對1990年代末和1960年代等勞動力緊張時期的研究表明，對弱勢工人而言，最好的社會方案是打造僱主競相填補崗位空缺的經濟。

There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago, as low interest rates were encouraging investors to take more risks and businesses to borrow money and engage in financial engineering. At the time, I believed that the economic costs of a rate increase exceeded the financial stability benefits, but there were grounds for concern. That debate is now moot. With credit becoming more expensive, the outlook for the Chinese economy clouded at best, emerging markets submerging, the US stock market in a correction, widespread concerns about liquidity, and expected volatility having increased at a near-record rate, markets are themselves dampening any euphoria or overconfidence. The Fed does not have to do the job. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping some part of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.

若是在6個月或9個月之前加息，或許還能祭出金融穩定方面的理由，因爲那時低利率正鼓勵投資者承擔更多風險，鼓勵企業借入更多資金從事金融工程。當時，我認爲加息的經濟代價大於維持金融穩定方面的收益，但各方有理由感到擔憂。現在這場辯論已無關緊要了。隨着信貸變得更昂貴，中國經濟前景即使往好了說也是烏雲密佈，新興市場正在沉沒，美國股市陷入回調，市場普遍擔憂流動性，以及預期波動率以接近創紀錄的速度加大，市場本身正在抑制狂熱氛圍或者過度樂觀情緒。美聯儲不需要出手。在當下市場脆弱之時加息，可能會把金融體系的某些部分推入危機，帶來難以預料的危險後果。

Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates were now 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from a sense that the economy has substantially normalised during six years of recovery, and so the extraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn. There has been much talk of “headwinds” that require low interest rates now but this will abate before long, allowing for normal growth and normal interest rates.

那麼，爲什麼有這麼多人認爲有必要加息呢？如果目前利率爲4%，加息壓力還會很大嗎？我對此表示懷疑。壓力來自一種觀點，即美國經濟經過6年的復甦已基本正常化，因此異常的零利率刺激應該退場了。很多人在說，眼下有一些“逆風”需要低利率，但惡劣天氣很快會過去，爲正常增長和正常利率創造條件。

Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach the seventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think of economic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds. Fiscal drag is over. Banks are well capitalised. Corporations are flush with cash. Household balance sheets are substantially repaired.

無論這一觀點在幾年前有什麼道理，在我們就要迎來雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒閉七週年之際，它的可信度已遠遠不如當初。現在，我們不再能夠輕易把經濟狀況可信地視爲暫時的“逆風”。財政拖累結束了。銀行的資本充足了。企業坐擁大量現金。家庭資產負債表基本上已修復。

Much more plausible is the view that, for reasons rooted in technological and demographic change and reinforced by greater regulation of the financial sector, the global economy has difficulty generating demand for all that can be produced. This is the “secular stagnation” diagnosis, or the very similar idea that Ben Bernanke, former Fed chairman, has urged of a “savings glut”. Satisfactory growth, if it can be achieved, requires very low interest rates that historically we have only seen during economic crises. This is why long term bond markets are telling us that real interest rates are expected to be close to zero in the industrialised world over the next decade.

可信得多的觀點是，出於一些源自技術與人口結構變化、而且被金融行業更嚴厲監管強化的原因，全球經濟無法爲所有可以生產出來的產品創造出需求。這是一種“長期停滯”的診斷，非常類似於美聯儲前主席本伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在呼籲消除“儲蓄過剩”時提出的觀點。令人滿意的增長——如果可以實現的話——需要實行歷史上僅僅在經濟危機期間看到的極低利率。這就是爲什麼長期債券市場告訴我們，預計未來10年裏工業化國家的實際利率會接近於零。

New conditions require new policies. There is much that should be done, such as steps to promote public and private investment so as to raise the level of real interest rates consistent with full employment. Unless these new policies are implemented, inflation sharply accelerates, or euphoria in markets breaks out, there is no case for the Fed to adjust policy interest rates.

新的狀況要求新的政策。目前應當採取很多措施，比如促進公共和私人部門的投資，以提升實際利率，使其達到與充分就業相稱的水平。除非實施了這些新政策，除非通脹大幅加速上升，或者市場狂熱爆發，否則美聯儲就沒有理由調整政策利率。

The writer is the Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary

本文作者是哈佛大學查爾斯圠縠斂祵大學教授(Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard)，曾任美國財政部長