有關中國,拉丁美洲和環境的10件事情

New book argues Chinese firms'presence in Latin America focuses on the most environmentally-damaging sector

新書談論了拉丁美洲存在的中國公司，而這些公司主要集中在對環境造成最嚴重破壞的部門

Question: when did contemporary political and media debate start on China's "entry" into the Western hemisphere?

問題：當代政治和新聞媒體從何時開始辯論中國“進入”西半球？

Answer: January 1997, when Panama awarded concessions to a Chinese company to operate port facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts at both ends of the Panama Canal, just after having obtained control of it from the US.

回答：是1997年1月，當時巴拿馬把巴拿馬運河在太平洋和大西洋兩端的港口設施交給一家中國公司運營，那時巴拿馬剛剛從美國那裏獲得巴拿馬運河的控制權。

Question: when did Latin America and the Caribbean wake up to its dramatically expanding new relationship with China?

問題：拉丁美洲和加勒比海岸何時開始認識到要和中國大力的發展新關係？

Answer: November 2004, when the then Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba and apparently spoke of the possibility of investing US$100 billion in the region – although the Chinese government later claimed it had been mistranslated and the US$100 billion referred to bilateral trade.

回答：2004年11月，當中國國家主席胡錦濤訪問阿根廷、巴西、智利和古巴時，似乎討論了在這一地區投資1000億美元的可能性——儘管中國政府後來指出這是翻譯失誤，這1000億美元指的是雙邊貿易額。

That, at least, is what Evan Ellis, a researcher at the U.S. Army War College and considered by some to be a leading expert on China-Latin America relations, states in his new book China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the Chinese and Impacts on the Region. Ellis's main argument is that in the last few years the Chinese have started to establish a new, "significant" physical presence in Latin America and the Caribbean – following trade deals, acquisitions, loans and loan-backed construction projects, among other things. As a result, Ellis argues that China now finds itself, for the first time in its 5,000 year history, connected to however many million non-Chinese people in other countries and dependent on the "success and well-being of its commercial representatives in distant parts of the world."While the focus of his book is Chinese acquisitions, loans, other commercial dealings and the challenges these pose for the Chinese government, companies and Chinese people living in Latin America, Ellis has various things to say about the environment. Here are 10 – some of which you may agree with, others you may not – I picked out: Evan Ellis,

美國陸軍學院研究員，是研究中國-拉美關係的知名專家。情況至少像這位專家在它的新書《中國在拉美大陸：中國的挑戰和對拉美的影響》裏說的大抵相同。他的主要觀點是，最近幾年，伴隨着中國在這個區域的一系列的貿易，兼併，貸款和承攬基於貸款的建設工程，中國已經開始在拉美和加勒比地區建立新的“令人矚目”的實際存在，另外還有其他的影響。因此，Ellis認爲中國現在已經意識到，她在5000年的歷史中從未與其他國家的如此衆多非華裔羣體產生過這麼緊密的聯繫，而且依賴於這些遙遠地方的商業代表們的成功和幸福。 雖然這本書的重點是闡述中國在拉美的兼併，貸款和其他商業貿易活動，以及國政府，企業和在拉美生活的中國人面臨的挑戰。但是Ellis對環境問題也談了不少看法。我從中挑出來10條，讓大家可以根據自己的理解去判斷。

1. Chinese companies have focused on developing their physical presence in Latin America in the sectors that are most likely to generate environmental impacts and concerns: petroleum, mining and agriculture. The Chinese presence in petroleum is most significant in Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina, and in mining in Ecuador and Peru.

1.中國企業只專於發展他們在拉美的實際存在，他們關注的領域大部分都可能產生讓人擔憂的環境問題，比如石油，採礦和農業。中國在拉美的石油產業主要分佈在委內瑞拉，厄瓜多爾和阿根廷，而採礦業的重點分佈在厄瓜多爾和祕魯。

2. Resistance from "environmentalists and local communities" is one of the major challenges facing Chinese companies trying to make acquisitions and win contracts in Latin America. To date, projects involving Chinese investors have "often" been "opposed on environmental grounds, or because of their impact on local communities and indigenous groups," writes Ellis, citing the Chone dam project and Mirador mine in Ecuador, the Belo Monte dam in Brazil, the Rio Blanco mine in Peru, the Lupe mine in Mexico, a soy processing facility in Rio Negro in Argentina, the Agua Zarca dam project in Honduras, and the River Magdalena in Colombia as examples.

2.來自環保人士和當地社區的抗議是中國企業在拉美開展併購和承攬項目時，面臨的最大挑戰。迄今爲止，涉及中國資本的項目經常遭遇擱淺，要麼因爲環境原因遭到反對，要麼由於對當地社區和土著羣體產生了不利影響。Ellis在書中援引了下面的幾個項目：厄瓜多爾的Chone水壩工程和米拉多爾採礦工程，巴西的貝洛蒙特水壩工程，祕魯的里約布蘭科採礦工程，墨西哥的盧佩採礦工程，阿根廷的尼格羅大豆加工廠工程，洪都拉斯Agua Zarca水壩工程以及哥倫比亞的馬格達萊納河工程。

3. Opposition to Chinese projects on environmental grounds is "likely to expand in the future because of the number of potential projects. . . that involve environmentally sensitive areas." These include plans to develop Goat Island, Jamaica, into an "international shipping hub" and the exploitation of the Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini (ITT) oil fields in the far east of the Yasuní National Park in Ecuador where Ellis says the “Chinese corporations who have already done the exploratory drilling are the leading contenders" to win contracts. Indeed, Ellis states that although "no official link” exists between ITT and the construction of a new refinery on Ecuador's Pacific coast, "a senior Ecuadorian source speaking off-the-record suggested that the granting of the rights for ITT may be a condition pursued by the Chinese for the funding of the Refinery. . . which would be fed by the petroleum extracted there."

3.涉及自然保護區的潛在項目有很多，因而中國承攬的項目因爲環境原因遭到反對的情況很在未來會越來越普遍。潛在的項目包括牙買加公羊島國際航運中心項目和厄瓜多爾亞蘇尼國家公園遠東ITT（Ishpingo, Tambococha and Tiputini ）油田項目。關於後者，Ellis提到，一家中國企業已經實施可行性鑽探，並且是項目的主要競爭者。事實上，Ellis說，儘管ITT 和在厄瓜多爾海岸新建煉油廠之間不存在官方聯繫，但是一位厄瓜多爾高層人士曾非正式表示，中國可能會根據ITT油田項目的中標情況來決定是否給這個煉油廠出資，而在將來這個煉油廠的用油將會來自ITT油田。

4. Environmental concerns are a major challenge for Chinese companies not because they are "inherently less respectful of the environment" than others, but "because of a confluence of factors" including the high environmental impacts of the sectors they are focusing on, a "cultural distance" between Chinese and Latin American people, and Chinese companies' lack of experience in the region. One example: “Chinese executives and managers often presume that local authorities will be able to force local residents to comply with decisions to relocate their homes. . . and may mistakenly presume that, as long as they have reached an agreement with the appropriate government authorities, the local communities and other actors will comply with the decisions."

4.環境問題成爲中國企業的最大挑戰並不是因爲中國“一貫忽視環境保護”而是由於一系列其它因素共同決定的，比如，這些項目本身就是高污染產業，中國人和拉美人之間存在文化差異，以及中國公司在本地的經驗不足。舉個例子：中國企業的高管經常認爲，官方能強制讓當地人搬遷，並且錯誤的認爲擺平了政府官員，當地的社區和其它人士就會乖乖就範。

5. "Environmental complaints" have already been made about various ongoing Chinese projects. These include the Marcona mine in Peru run by the company Shougang, the Cerro Maimon mine in the Dominican Republic, and the Sierra Grande mine in Argentina.

5.各種各樣的中國在建項目都會遭到環保方面的投訴，比如首鋼在祕魯馬爾科納的採礦項目，多明尼亞的Cerro Maimon採礦項目以及阿根廷的賽拉格蘭德採礦項目。

6. Chinese companies "have made efforts to improve their environmental practices where they have felt it necessary to do so, in order to avoid problems with governments and communities." Ellis cites new technology by company Bosai to address dust problems caused by bauxite mining in Guyana as one example, and ten "environmental protection projects oriented toward wastewater, dust and air pollution" at the Marcona mine in Peru as another.

6.中國公司不想和當地政府和社區產生糾葛，開始意識到有必要做出改變，他們已經正在環境保護方面進行努力。Ellis舉了2個例子，中國的博賽公司就採用了一項新的技術來控制圭亞那一家鋁土礦場產生的灰塵污染。而在祕魯馬爾康那礦廠，針對其產生的廢水，塵土和空氣污染，興建了10個環保項目。

7. Offshore drilling by Chinese companies in Latin America and the Caribbean is particularly risky in terms of environmental impacts because “they are relatively new to producing and using deepwater drilling technology." Ellis argues that Chinese operations are "arguably even more vulnerable to such risks" than was BP before the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico blowout in 2010.

7.中國企業在拉美和加勒比地區的近海鑽探隊環境帶來的影響更令人擔心，Ellis說，因爲他們還是最近纔開始使用這樣的深水鑽探技術，英國石油公司承接的墨西哥灣深水地平線工程在2010年出現大面積泄露，而中國企業的操作事實上比之前英國石油公司的做法更加冒險。

8. Although "many [Chinese companies in Latin America] do behave badly" – either "due to a combination of willful imposition of Chinese norms and practices that do not function well in the new context, or accidentally, due to a lack of knowledge regarding local norms" – they "do not inherently behave worse than their Western counterparts" (Ellis's italics).

8.儘管許多中國的企業在拉美的表現差強人意，或是因爲中國這種任性專橫的觀念和做法在新的大陸水土不服，或是偶爾地對當地的法律法規不甚瞭解，但是他們本質並不比西方同行的公司做得差。

9. A "significant portion" of the new Chinese presence in Latin America is in the renewable energy sector where companies "have been a key force in the “green revolution" transforming the energy generation mix" and "slowly moving the electricity infrastructure of the region away from fossil fuels." Ellis states that "of the many projects and acquisitions by Chinese firms in the electricity generation sector. . . only a very small number have involved traditional fossil fuel power generation facilities", with a focus instead on hydroelectric and what Ellis calls a "wave of new solar and wind power projects" across Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico.

9.很大一部分中國企業在拉美從事可再生能源領域的項目，這些企業是本地開展“綠色改革”的關鍵力量，他們在此發展混合能源發電，使本區域內電力基礎設施逐步擺脫對化石能源的依賴，Ellis說，在中國企業在電力領域的許多項目和併購中更加專注於建設水電，以及他口中所說的一系列新型太陽能和風能發電項目，只有很小一部分涉及傳統化石燃料發電。新的能源項目廣泛分佈在阿根廷，巴西，智利，哥斯達黎加，厄瓜多爾和墨西哥。

10. What better way to end than with one particularly emblematic example and startling claim? Despite a January 2014 announcement that work would begin on a canal through Nicaragua by the end of this year or early 2015, "as this book went to press, a public announcement regarding the route to be taken by the canal had not been made, nor had any information been made public regarding environmental impact" (my italics, this time). Indeed, a report published in September by the Alexander von Humboldt Studies Centre in Nicaragua states that "technical information of environmental character generated during the design, construction and operation of the Great Canal and associated projects will remain confidential,” under the terms of the concession agreement. Von Humboldt calls the canal – due to be built by the Hong Kong-based HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company – and associated infrastructure the biggest environmental threat to the country in its history.

10.那麼什麼樣的極具代表的例子或者發人深省的陳詞可以作爲結束語呢？恐怕只有這個2014年1月發佈公告了，其中聲明尼加拉瓜運河將要在本年末或是2015年初開工。直到我的新書發往出版社時，有關運河路線以及環境影響評估的官方聲明還沒出爐。事實上，亞歷山大•馮•洪堡研究中心已經在9月公佈了一個報告。報告稱，大運河和附屬工程在設計，施工和運營過程中會對環境特徵產生影響，而這些技術信息在特許協議的約束下將會處於保密狀態。洪堡研究中心稱，這條由香港尼加拉瓜運河發展投資公司承建的大運河以及運河相關基礎設施將會對尼加拉瓜的環境產生前所未有的巨大威脅。