如何補償民粹主義導致的全球化輸家
The rise in political populism in 2016 has forced macro-economists profoundly to re-assess their attitude towards the basic causes of the new politics, which are usually identified to be globalisation and technology.
2016年政治民粹主義的興起促使宏觀經濟學家們反思應該如何對待導致這股新政治浪潮的基本原因——通常認爲是全球化和技術。
The consensus on the appropriate policy response to these major issues – particularly the former – seems to be changing dramatically and, as Gavin Kelly persuasively argues, probably not before time.
對這些重大問題（尤其是全球化）合適政策迴應的共識似乎正在發生極大變化，而且正如加文.克利(Gavin Kelly)很有說服力地辯稱的那樣，或許早該如此。
Unless economists can develop a rational response to these revolutionary changes, political impatience will take matters completely out of their hands, and the outcome could be catastrophic.
除非經濟學家們能夠對這些革命性變化找出理性迴應方式，否則政界就會失去耐心，讓問題完全失控，結果可能是災難性的。
Unfortunately, while the nature of the problem is coming into sharper focus, the nature of a solution that makes economic sense while also being politically feasible remains embryonic at best (see Danny Leipziger).
遺憾的是，儘管問題的本質日漸清晰，但要找出經濟上合理、政治上也可行的解決方案，從根本上來說依然是不成熟的（見丹尼.萊比錫(Danny Leipziger)）。
Until very recently, the mainstream attitude of economists towards globalisation was straightforward.
不久以前，經濟學家對全球化的主流態度還是直接明瞭的。
Free trade was overwhelmingly believed to increase productivity and overall economic welfare, both in developed economies and emerging economies.
他們堅信自由貿易可以提高生產率和整體經濟福祉，無論是在發達經濟體還是在新興經濟體。
Therefore, it was argued that barriers to trade and international capital movements should be reduced as rapidly as possible, wherever they existed.
因此，人們認爲，應該儘快廢除貿易和國際資本流動壁壘，無論它們存在於哪裏。
While it was recognised that there could be losers from free trade in the developed economies, these losers were thought to be few and temporary, compared to the gainers, who were many and permanent.
儘管人們認識到，發達世界中可能會有自由貿易的輸家，但他們認爲這些輸家很少，而且是暫時的，相比之下，受益者有許多，而且是永久性的。
The political upheavals of 2016 have forced economists to reconsider.
2016年的政治動盪促使經濟學家們進行反思。
The final shape of what is now called populism is not yet entirely clear.
如今稱做民粹主義的東西的最終形態我們仍未完全清楚。
It does not seem to fit easily on the traditional right/left, or liberal/conservative, spectrum.
它似乎不能輕易歸入傳統的左右翼或者自由/保守主義範疇。
This is why two of the most obvious benefits of the political revolution, Theresa May and Donald Trump, are hard to categorize in this regard [1].
這就是很難對這場政治革命的兩個最明顯受益者——特里薩.梅(Theresa May)和唐納德.特朗普(Donald Trump)進行歸類的原因。
There does, however, seem to be one unifying theme and that is a resurgence in economic nationalism, with a collapse in support for internationalism or globalisation.
然而，這裏的確有一個統一的主題，那就是經濟民族主義的復興，伴隨着對國際主義或全球化的支持大幅下降。
Since the elites are seen as the main beneficiaries of globalisation in the developed economies, this has gone hand in hand with anti-elitism and a rejection of advice from experts.
既然發達經濟體的精英們被視爲是全球化的主要受益者，那麼就會出現反精英主義以及拒絕專家建議。
The latter could easily develop into anti-rationalism, which would surely prove disastrous in the long term.
後者可能輕易地發展爲反理性主義，長期而言這當然是災難性的。
Economists have now recognised these dangers, and a new consensus has started to emerge.
經濟學家已經認識到這些風險，新的共識開始浮現。
There has been (almost) no change in the overwhelming belief that free trade and globalisation are good things for society as a whole.
自由貿易和全球化整體而言對社會有利，這種絕對信念（幾乎）沒有任何改變。
But it is now much more widely accepted that the losers from these changes can be more numerous, more long lasting and more politically assertive than previously thought.
但現在人們更廣泛地接受了一點：與人們以前所以爲的相比，這些改變導致的輸家數量可能更多、持續時間更長而且在政治上更自信。
The new consensus holds that the gains from globalisation can only be defended and extended if the losers are compensated by the winners.
新的共識認爲，只有輸家獲得贏家所給予的補償，全球化的益處纔可以得到維護和擴大。
Otherwise, pockets of political resistance to the process of globalisation will begin to overwhelm the gainers, even though the latter remain in the majority [2].
否則，一些對全球化過程的政治抵制將會壓垮受益者，即便後者依然佔多數。
While the compensation principle seems clear enough, the complexity of actually getting it done is much greater.
儘管補償原則似乎足夠清晰，但如何補償要複雜得多。
As Jared Bernstein says, the rust belt needs help, but it is not clear how to help the rust belt.
正如賈裏德.伯恩斯坦(Jared Bernstein)所言，鏽帶需要幫助，但如何幫助尚不清楚。
Nor is it at all obvious that there would be a political or economic consensus supporting some of the most obvious measures that could be adopted, at least on the scale that would be needed to make a noticeable difference.
同樣還不清楚的是，人們是否會形成一種政治或經濟共識，支持採取一些有可能採取的最明顯舉措，至少其力度能夠帶來可以察覺的改變。
The main gainers from globalisation have been twofold: unskilled labour in the emerging world, and those at the upper end of the income scale in the developed economies.
全球化的主要贏家可以分爲兩類：新興世界的低技能勞動力以及發達經濟體中的較高收入階層。
The main losers have been industrial workers in the developed world.
主要輸家是發達世界的產業工人（馬克.卡尼(Mark Carney)就該話題提出令人信服的證據）。
(See Mark Carney for some compelling evidence on this topic.) The most direct solutions to the problem would presumably be to take measures that would reverse these changes in income distribution, either globally or within the boundaries of the developed world.
可想而知，這個問題最直接的解決方案是採取措施扭轉收入分配的這些變化，或者是在全球範圍內，或者是在發達世界內部。
This is why President-elect Trump has focused protectionist proposals on imports from Mexico and China, which are clearly the most important threats to the manufacturing sector in the United States.
這就是爲何當選總統特朗普對來自墨西哥和中國的進口商品提出保護主義動議的原因，它們顯然是對美國製造業部門最重要的威脅。
Unfortunately, tariffs on manufactured imports from these two countries are likely to displace production to other emerging economies, not to the industrialized regions of America.
遺憾的是，對這兩個國家的製造業產品徵收進口關稅可能讓生產轉移至其他新興經濟體，而不是美國工業地區。
Furthermore, a more general restriction on all manufactured imports into the US would raise prices to American consumers, cause disruptions to domestic output as key imported components became scarce, and worsen the productivity crisis that is already serious enough anyway.
此外，更全面地限制所有制造產品進入美國將會讓美國消費者面臨價格上漲的局面，導致國內生產中斷，因爲關鍵進口部件稀缺，從而加劇本就嚴重的生產力危機。
This would also redistribute income away from workers in the emerging world, who are still low paid by global standards.
它還會導致新興經濟體中的工人們收入減少，按全球標準來看他們仍然工資微薄。
That would not deserve to command general consent in the political process, but there is a rising danger that it could happen anyway.
這種做法在政治上不應獲得廣泛贊同，但它發生的風險越來越高。
What about compensating the losers by redistributing income away from those who have gained inside the developed economies, mainly at the upper end of the income scale? That approach might be seen to respect the principles of natural justice, since it would reverse the windfall redistribution in income and wealth caused by free trade.
將收入從那些發達經濟體內的受益人（主要是處於收入分配高端區間的人）轉移出來、補償輸家怎麼樣？這種做法可能被視爲尊重自然公正原則，因爲它將逆轉自由貿易導致的收入和財富的橫財再分配。
It does, however, run into very familiar difficulties with a generalized redistribution of this type.
然而，這種類型的一般再分配會遇到的常見困難，這裏也不例外。
It would be difficult to distinguish between those who have lost from globalization, and those who have hit upon hard times for other reasons, including the results of their own choices.
它很難將那些全球化輸家和那些碰巧因其他原因（包括自我選擇造成的）生活艱難的人區分開。
And it would undermine economic incentives to take risk and promote expansion.
它會破壞促使人們冒險和推動擴張的經濟激勵。
The principle of compensation for loss already operates through the tax and benefits system, and it could be argued that this already provides the safety net that society has seen as optimal in the past.
這種爲失敗提供補償的原則已經通過稅收和福利體系進行，而且可以說，它已經提供了過去被社會視爲理想的社會保障網。
Why does this new source of loss merit a new and larger form of compensation than previously provided against other economic shocks, like recessions and shifts in the composition of demand away from certain types of production?
與過去其他經濟衝擊（比如衰退以及對特定類型的生產需求變少）下提供的補償相比，這種新的失敗來源值得提供新的更多補償嗎？
One answer to this question is that the losers from globalization tend to be concentrated in particular regions, like the American rust belt and Northern England.
這個問題的答案是，全球化輸家往往集中於特定地區，比如美國鏽帶地區和英格蘭北部。
It is particularly hard for people in these regions to recover.
那些地區的人尤其難以東山再起。
This would argue for regional transfers, away from more successful regions like the coastal states in America, and London in the UK.
這將支持地區轉移的觀點，從美國沿海各州和英國倫敦等更爲成功的地區轉移給艱難地區。
These ideas have been tried in the past, without any great success, even when implemented in large scale, such as the transfers made to East Germany after the Berlin Wall came down (see Paul Krugman).
人們在過去嘗試了這些想法，並未取得巨大成功，甚至在大規模實施的時候也是如此，比如在柏林牆倒塌之後對東德的轉移（見保羅.克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)）。
Is this a counsel of despair? No, but it does warn of great difficulties ahead, and of the dangers (entirely ignored by candidate Trump) of raising false hopes in the afflicted regions.
這是讓人們知難而退嗎？並非如此，但它的確警告了我們今後面臨的巨大困難以及給受影響地區製造虛幻希望的危險（特朗普在競選時完全忽視了這些風險）。
Some progress is certainly being made.
當然現在也有了一些進展。
Lawrence Summers calls for responsible nationalism.
勞倫斯.薩默斯(Lawrence Summers)呼籲負責任的民族主義。
Maurice Obstfeld, the outstanding Chief Economist at the IMF, has outlined a long list of appropriate policy measures, including programmes of retraining for the unemployment, regional infrastructure spending, etc.
國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)傑出的首席經濟學家莫里斯.奧布斯菲爾德(Maurice Obstfeld)列出了長長的合適政策措施清單，包括爲失業者提供再培訓項目和地區基礎設施支出等等。
But while he calls for trampoline policies that offer a springboard to new jobs, rather than safety net policies, these interventions are rather familiar to Obama-style liberals.
但是，儘管他呼籲推行幫助人們獲得新工作的蹦牀政策、而非社保政策，但對奧巴馬風格的自由主義者來說，這些干預舉措相當熟悉。
Meanwhile the Republicans in the US and the Conservatives in Britain seem to have decided to go down a very different path.
與此同時，美國共和黨人和英國保守黨人似乎決定走上一條截然不同的路。
Liberal economic solutions, while attractive to the IMF, have the wrong set of politicians in power.
自由主義的經濟解決方案儘管對IMF頗具吸引力，但是不適合一羣掌權的政客。
If we cast our minds back 12 months, no one predicted Brexit or Donald Trump’s victory.
如果我們回想12個月前，那個時候沒有人預料到英國會退歐、唐納德.特朗普會贏得美國大選。
Politics is moving fast, and economics needs to catch up.
政治快速變化，經濟需要跟進。
How to compensate the losers from globalisation will be the big story in macro in 2017.
如何補償全球化輸家將是2017年宏觀層面的大問題。
