中國金融改革陣痛不可避免
At the beginning of July, a mix of the most thoughtful Chinese and foreign policy makers, academics and market practitioners gathered in Shanghai for the annual Lujiazui financial forum. The economic backdrop wasn't great. Europe continues at the edge of the precipice while the US has lost momentum and emerging markets are also slowing. The world still hasn't recovered from the global financial crisis made in the US and swiftly exported to much of the world.
7月初，一批卓有見地的中外政策制定者、學者以及市場從業者齊聚上海，參加一年一度的陸家嘴金融論壇。其時，經濟形勢並不樂觀。歐洲仍在懸崖邊徘徊，美國經濟增長乏力，新興市場增長也在放緩。世界經濟仍未從全球金融危機中恢復。這場危機發端於美國，隨後迅速波及世界大多數國家。Meanwhile, hopes that China will save the planet look increasingly forlorn. Exports, a lagging indicator, came in at a relatively strong 11.4 per cent while far weaker imports, a leading indicator, at just over 6 per cent, suggest as much.
與其同時，中國拯救世界的希望日趨渺茫，其進口和出口數據都表明了這一點。經濟運行的滯後指標——出口增長強勁，增長率達到11.4%；而經濟運行的先行指標——進口則表現得疲軟得多，增長率僅略高於6%。One of the lessons that China learnt from the global financial crisis is that the west doesn't have much to teach it when it comes to building a financial system. Yet China is outgrowing the system that served it well up to now. So change is inevitably coming and the Communist party, obsessed with control, may not be able to control the process. No matter what the pace or degree of change, it is likely to be a painful process for the beneficiaries of today's system, and also likely to present painful trade-offs for those in charge of the process.
中國在全球金融危機中學到的一點是，西方金融體系建設經驗的借鑑價值不高。但不斷增長的中國實體經濟正逐漸超出其金融體系的承載能力，雖然迄今爲止，該體系仍能夠較好地滿足中國的金融需求。因此，改革不可避免，而控制慾極強的中國政府可能無法掌控改革的過程。對目前體系的既得利益者來說，不論改革的速度或程度如何，這可能都將是一個痛苦的過程，也可能令掌控改革進程者面臨痛苦的抉擇。
Meanwhile, much of the discussion in Shanghai was dedicated to the hottest topics on the reform agenda; the liberalisation of interest rates, the gradual dismantling of capital controls and the expanding international use of the renminbi.
與此同時，陸家嘴論壇上很多討論都圍繞金融體系改革議程表上最熱的一些議題展開，比如利率自由化、逐步放開資本管制、以及推進人民幣國際化。For example, in recently adjusting interest rates in the hope of sparking more demand for loans in China's slowing economy, the changes have been asymmetrical. For the first time, Beijing cut the interest rates on loans more than on deposits while leaving the banks with some discretion to raise the return on deposits. With inflation down to 2.2 per cent, real rates are no longer negative. The numbers are small but they represent a big change in the template.
比如說，中國央行最近的調息就是不對稱的。在經濟增長放緩的背景下，調息的目的是刺激貸款需求。貸款基準利率的下調幅度首次超過存款基準利率，同時，銀行首次獲得了一定範圍內的利率自由浮動權限。由於通脹率已降至2.2%，實際利率不再爲負。雖然實際利率水平仍然很低，但這反映了利率形成模式的一個巨大變化。Still, Beijing was being far more reactive than proactive in introducing this departure. Regulators were responding to changes in the market that they haven't been able to control. For one thing, banks matter less. Many people and companies are putting their money in trust company products with far better returns than those on offer at the banks. And even at the banks, as much as half of all new deposits are going into wealth management products, according to Fitch Ratings, while there have been no new net corporate deposits at all in five years. If the authorities hadn't acted, they would merely have accelerated the flight out of deposits and out of the banks. That "amounts to de facto interest rate liberalisation", notes Chris Wood of CLSA in Hong Kong.
但中國政府引入這一改革在很大程度上仍是被動之舉，而非主動爲之。監管機構引入改革是在對它們一直控制不了的市場變化做出應對。市場變化之一是，銀行的重要性下降。許多個人和公司正在將資金投入信託產品，所獲收益遠高於銀行所能提供的回報。而惠譽評級(Fitch Ratings)數據顯示，即使在銀行系統內，多達一半的新增存款來自對理財產品的認購，而近五年來淨企業儲蓄沒有任何增加。如果當局未採取行動，個人和企業只會加快取出存款並將資金從銀行抽出的步伐。香港里昂證券(CLSA)分析師克里斯?伍德(Chris Wood)指出，這“事實上相當於利率自由化”。
But such liberalisation is a double-edged sword. The banks have thrived on the large gap between the rates at which they lend and what they pay out on deposits but now that is gap is narrowing. That is extremely inconvenient. Banks will need more capital to help them deal with bad debts from the last round of fiscal stimulus, which is always done through the banks.
但利率自由化是一柄雙刃劍。存貸款高利差爲銀行帶來了豐厚的利潤，而如今利差正在降低，這將引發各種問題。銀行將需要更多資本金，幫助它們消化上一輪財政刺激遺留下來的壞賬。在中國，財政刺激總是通過銀行來完成。China continues to move toward capital account liberalisation as well. In the past, much of the demand for renminbi from the rest of the world was rooted in the expectation that the currency would appreciate. Now such expectations have vanished but demand remains in part because of a dollar shortage, especially in Asia.
中國也在繼續推進資本賬戶自由化。在過去，海外人民幣需求絕大部分來自人民幣升值預期。如今這種預期已經消失，但海外人民幣需求依然存在（尤其是在亞洲地區），部分原因在於美元短缺。Beijing wishes to control the level of the renminbi. In the past, when Beijing relied more heavily on exports to support economic growth, controls kept the renminbi from appreciating too much. But times have changed. In trade-weighted terms, the renminbi has already appreciated a lot and many hedge fund managers think today the currency is about where it should be.
中國政府希望控制人民幣匯率水平。在過去、中國政府更加依賴出口來支撐經濟增長時，管制避免了人民幣大幅升值。但如今情況變了。人民幣貿易加權匯率的升值幅度已經較大，許多對衝基金經理認爲，目前人民幣幣值基本處於合理水平。Now, in a reversal of fears of undue appreciation, there are whispers in the capital as well as on the sidelines of the forum in Shanghai about a potential flight of capital, whether just out of the banks or, more alarmingly, out of the country altogether. The trigger could be benign, such as a rally in the stock market, which has been in the doldrums for years, attracting funds away from the banks. Or it could be something darker, such as riots in the streets.
如今，在北京以及上海陸家嘴論壇的非正式討論中，風向逆轉了。人們不再擔心人民幣過度升值，大傢俬下里議論的是出現資本外逃的可能性，無論資金是僅僅逃出銀行系統，還是乾脆逃離中國。其中，後一種情形是更令人擔心的。觸發資本外逃的導火索可能是好事，比如持續多年低迷的股市止跌回升（這會吸引資金從銀行系統中流出），也可能是壞事，比如騷亂事件。
Fears of capital flight are one factor that keeps Beijing from lifting capital controls.
對資本外逃的擔憂是中國政府目前尚不敢放開資本管制的原因之一。But those who set the policy agenda have their own agendas as well. In Indonesia, after all, one reason that the rupiah went from about 2,500 to the dollar to almost 20,000 without any effort to impose measures to halt the outflows during the Asian financial crisis almost 15 years ago was because the elite wanted to get their own money out. Self-interest also influences outcomes.
但政策議程的制定者們也有自己的議程表。在約15年前的亞洲金融危機中，印尼盾兌美元匯率從1美元兌2500印尼盾跌至1美元兌近20000印尼盾，而印尼政府未採取任何措施來阻止資本外流，其原因就在於，精英階層想把自己的資金挪到海外。私利也會影響政策結果。
