俄羅斯能夠擺脫普京鐵腕 Russia can break out of Putins thrall
Dealing with Russia has never been simple. In geographical size it is immense. In political culture it is secretive and as tough as nails. “Containment” was the order of the day when Soviet communism held sway. Then the west, seized with the fanciful notion that post-Soviet Russia would blossom into a free-market democracy, with a middle class wedded to peace, property and the rule of law, made an effort to build a “strategic partnership” with Moscow.
和俄羅斯打交道從來都不是件簡單的事情。從地理面積上說，俄羅斯幅員遼闊。在政治文化方面，俄羅斯是隱祕和鐵血無情的。在蘇聯共產黨掌權的時候，“遏制”是西方對俄政策的主旋律。蘇聯解體後，西方產生了一種一廂情願的觀念，認爲俄羅斯會百花齊放，成爲一個信奉自由市場的民主國家，該國的中產階級將注重和平、產權和法治，於是西方努力與莫斯科建立“戰略伙伴關係”。
That effort lies at the bottom of the Black Sea, sunk by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, its military intervention in eastern Ukraine and poorly conceived and executed western policies in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. Now an older theory is back in fashion, which depicts an unbridgeable gap between Russian and western values. It asserts that this gap, though widening under Mr Putin, must in its deepest sense be understood as a reflection of profoundly different historical experiences in modern Russia and the west. On the Russian side, it has stimulated a censorious, anti-western conservatism on social questions. It has sharpened a propensity to use military force against neighbours, notably Georgia and Ukraine. It is suffused with truculence towards Nato states. As a result, the west must be on its guard.
這一努力如今已沉入黑海底部，原因是俄羅斯在2014年3月吞併克里米亞，在烏克蘭東部進行軍事幹預，以及西方對後蘇聯時代的俄羅斯鄰近地區的政策思慮不周，執行糟糕。現在，一種更老的理論再度風行起來，該理論描繪了俄羅斯和西方價值觀之間無法彌合的鴻溝。該理論斷言，儘管這一鴻溝在普京任內擴大，但在最深層意義上，必須將其理解爲反映了現代俄羅斯和西方之間深刻不同的歷史經驗。在俄羅斯這方面，這道鴻溝煽動了在社會問題上苛刻的反西方保守主義，還加強了對鄰國動武的傾向，尤其是格魯吉亞和烏克蘭。這道鴻溝充斥着對北約(Nato)國家的好戰姿態。因此，西方必須加以防範。
This theory has strengths and weaknesses. It rightly emphasises the importance of domestic factors in the way that Russia formulates and conducts its foreign policy. On the other hand, it risks falling into the conceptual error of confusing an authoritarian strongman with an entire society, as if the wills of Mr Putin and 140m-plus Russians are one and the same.
這一理論有其長處和短處。它正確強調了國內因素對俄羅斯外交政策制定和實施的重要性。另一方面，該理論有可能落入概念性錯誤，將一個威權強人與整個社會混爲一談，彷彿普京的意願就是1.4億多俄羅斯人的意願。
The assumption that Mr Putin is hugely popular with the Russian people — who endorse his ever more militaristic foreign policy — deserves more scrutiny than it receives from western political, academic and media circles. First, a system of government that restricts political competition and controls freedom of expression as methodically as in Russia is not a system where popularity means what it does in the west.
對於認爲普京在俄羅斯民間（俄羅斯人支持普京日趨軍國主義的外交政策）人氣極高的假設，西方政治、學術和媒體圈應該加強觀察和研究。首先，在一個像俄羅斯那樣系統性地限制政治競爭、控制言論自由的政體中，人氣的內涵與西方是不同的。
Second, Russians are little different from everyone else in judging their rulers by how they improve or harm the quality of life. What mainly matters is a government’s economic and social record, not its foreign policy adventures, which can be exciting but tend after a while to fade in attractiveness.
第二，在以自己的生活品質得到改善還是受到損害來評判統治者方面，俄羅斯人和其他國家的人民沒什麼不同。真正重要的是政府的經濟和社會功績，而不是外交政策冒險，後者可能令人興奮，但往往會在一段時間後逐漸喪失吸引力。
Russia’s economy suffers from a shrinking labour force, woeful productivity, over-dependence on natural resources, too little investment and innovation, capital flight, ubiquitous corruption and a wretched parody of the rule of law. Measures that might minimise the impact of these deficiencies on Russian living standards are unimaginable, for they would require less confrontation with the west and less stifling domestic political conditions.
俄羅斯經濟受到多種問題的困擾：勞動力人數萎縮、生產率堪憂、過於依賴自然資源、投資和創新太少、資本外逃、腐敗猖獗，以及對法治的拙劣模仿。難以想象該國會採取有望減少這些不足之處對俄羅斯人生活水平影響的措施，因爲這些措施要求減少與西方的對抗，放鬆國內政治環境。
Since Mr Putin’s managed re-election in 2012, the president and his increasingly narrow circle of courtiers have tightened their grip on power by cracking down on internal dissent and pursuing an anti-western foreign policy. The prospects for economic reform are correspondingly dim, with all that implies for lower living standards and the longer-term stability of Putinism.
2012年普京藉助受操控的選舉再次上臺後，這位總統及其越來越狹窄的親信圈子收緊了對權力的掌控，打擊內部異見，實行反西方外交政策。與此對應的是，經濟改革前景暗淡，一切都意味着更低的生活水平和普京主義的更長期穩定。
Crimea’s annexation went down well with millions of Russians, even more so than the August 2008 war with Georgia. In March 2014, some 58 per cent of people questioned in a Levada-Center survey (the organisation is Russia’s most reputable pollster) supported annexing parts of neighbouring countries with ethnic Russian minorities. By last March, however, this figure had fallen to 34 per cent. Meanwhile, 64 per cent of Russians — up from 56 per cent in 2009 — opposed the use of any means, including force, to keep former Soviet republics under Moscow’s control.
俄羅斯吞併克里米亞時，數以百萬計的俄羅斯人熱烈擁護，甚至比2008年8月俄羅斯對格魯吉亞動武的支持度更高。2014年3月，接受列瓦達中心（Levada-Center，俄羅斯最有聲望的民意調查機構）調查的人中，約有58%的人支持吞併有俄羅斯族少數民族居住的鄰國部分地區。然而到了今年3月，這一數字已降至34%。與此同時，64%的俄羅斯人——高於2009年的56%——反對使用包括武力在內的任何手段將前蘇聯加盟共和國置於莫斯科的控制之下。
Such surveys show that the Russian public does not blindly follow the Kremlin in all respects. Much opinion appears receptive to the western concept of international relations as a civil and commercial sphere as much as a political and military arena. The west should encourage this outlook by keeping channels open to Russian society.
這些調查表明，俄羅斯公衆並非在所有方面都盲目跟從克里姆林宮。許多輿論似乎能夠接受西方的國際關係理念——國際關係既是政治和軍事的舞臺，也是民間和商業往來的領域。西方應該保持與俄羅斯社會連通的渠道暢通，以鼓勵這種看法。
We must be realistic. Mr Putin and his entourage are not beholden to a freely elected legislature or to public opinion in the manner of a western government. They have travelled so far down the road of internal and external confrontation that it will be hard to pull back. Fixed on burnishing Russia’s global prestige, smashing their domestic critics and reaping the private rewards of public office, they will serve us, for the time being, the same dreary propaganda diet about a hostile, degenerate west and its fifth columnist stooges.
我們必須現實一些。普京和他的親信們不像西方政府那樣，受到自由選舉產生的議會或公衆輿論的問責。他們在對內和對外對峙的道路上已經走得很遠，難以收回。他們念念不忘提高俄羅斯的國際威望、打擊國內批評者、以公權謀私利，因此就眼下而言，他們將繼續給世人端上令人厭惡的老調宣傳“大餐”——有關一個敵對的、墮落的西方及其“第五縱隊”走狗。
Western governments must persist with a mix of firmness, unity of purpose towards Moscow and a long-term effort to make a successful state of Ukraine. They should avoid playing into Mr Putin’s hands by interpreting today’s troubles with Russia as evidence of some mortal contest between rival models of civilisation.
西方各國政府必須堅持對莫斯科態度堅定，目標一致，同時付出長期努力將烏克蘭打造成一個成功國家。它們應該避免落入普京的圈套，將當下與俄羅斯的不和解讀爲對立文明模式之間的殊死較量。
Moscow and the west are at odds not because they are two irreconcilable value systems and types of people, but mainly because an unusually malignant power apparatus controls the Kremlin. The west must be patient and keep its political antennas alert for the day — remote as it may seem while Mr Putin is in power — when Russia’s evolving internal conditions create the space to reduce international tensions.
莫斯科與西方不和，不是因爲它們是兩種無法調和的價值體系或人羣，而主要是因爲一個異常惡劣的權力機構把持着克里姆林宮。西方必須有耐心，爲俄羅斯內部狀況變化帶來減輕國際緊張的空間的這一天的到來保持政治警覺——儘管在普京當政期間，這一天或許看起來還很遙遠。
