不要以經濟後果嚇唬蘇格蘭人

Last week, financial markets began to take seriously the possibility that Scotland might vote Yes to independence. A constitutional change would raise the possibility of three types of market risk: currency risk, government credit risk and the credit risk associated with financial institutions.

上週，金融市場開始認真考慮蘇格蘭公投結果支持獨立的可能性。蘇格蘭身份的改變可能導致三類市場風險：貨幣風險，政府信用風險，與金融機構有關的信用風險。

The position on currency is today a stand-off. The Scottish government has said it will negotiate a currency union and the Westminster government has said it will not enter such negotiation. But Edinburgh cannot unilaterally establish a currency union and the Westminster government cannot unilaterally determine Scotland’s currency. Plainly there must be agreement. However, might this agreement leave people who had made deposits or loans in sterling at risk of being repaid in Scots bawbees of doubtful value?

貨幣問題目前陷入了僵局。蘇格蘭政府已表示，將通過談判與英國其餘地區建立貨幣聯盟，而英國政府已放話將不會參加這樣的談判。但蘇格蘭政府無法單方面建立貨幣聯盟，英國政府也無法單方面決定蘇格蘭採用何種貨幣。顯然雙方必須達成協議。然而，這份協議有沒有可能會讓以英鎊存款或放貸的人面臨這樣的風險：交出去的是英鎊，收回來的卻是大把大把價值有疑問的蘇格蘭半便士(bawbee)？

As the eurozone discovered, establishing a currency union is easy, operating one is hard and unwinding one is hard. You can pass legislation saying all contracts made in drachmas are now payable in euros; but legislation saying contracts made in euros are now payable in drachmas is another matter. To which contracts does the latter apply? However the question is resolved, the answer will hurt many businesses and individuals, and occupy the courts.

如歐元區所發現的那樣，貨幣聯盟是建立起來容易，管理和解散難。你可以立法，宣佈所有以德拉克馬（drachma，希臘在加入歐元區之前使用的貨幣——譯者注）爲貨幣單位訂立的合同如今可用歐元支付；但立法宣佈以歐元訂立的合同現在可用德拉克馬支付就是另一回事了。後一種安排適用於哪些合同？無論這個問題得出何種答案，都將傷及不少企業和個人的利益，並導致大量法律訴訟。

But there is a simple answer in the Scottish case, which is that whatever happens after a new currency is adopted, existing contracts in sterling remain in sterling. This means there is no currency risk ahead of a change. The same answer is not possible for Greece because the point of a Grexit would be to enable the country to default on its debts and effect a large devaluation, a course unnecessary and unwise for Scotland.

但就蘇格蘭的情況而言，有一個簡單的答案，那就是無論採用新貨幣後發生什麼，既有的以英鎊訂立的合同仍將以英鎊結算。這意味着，在蘇格蘭變更身份前不會存在貨幣風險。同樣的答案不可能適用於希臘，原因是希臘退出歐元區的意義，就在於能對其債務違約和使其貨幣大幅貶值，這種做法對蘇格蘭而言則既無必要也不明智。

British government stocks tumbled last week when opinion polls showed the campaigns neck and neck – perhaps because markets did not know what to make of the news, perhaps because of the Scottish government’s threat to renege on its share of UK debt. But, even if the Scots did so, this would add less than 10 per cent to the debt servicing cost of the rest of the UK – which, at about 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product, is hardly unaffordable.

上週民調顯示，蘇格蘭支持和不支持獨立的人數旗鼓相當，英國國債隨之暴跌。這或許是因爲市場不知如何理解這個消息，原因或許是蘇格蘭政府威脅不償還自己承擔的那份英國國債。但即便蘇格蘭人真的這樣幹了，也只不過會讓英國其餘地區的償債成本增加不到10%——相當於國內生產總值(GDP)的約2.5%——這並不是無法負擔的。

There is little justification for believing a Scottish exit, on whatever terms, should affect the credit rating of the remaining UK: what repudiation would do to Scotland’s credit rating is a different matter. It is one thing to start life as a new country debt free, another to do so because you have just reneged on a pro rata share of UK debt of £100bn.

我們幾乎找不到什麼理由認爲，蘇格蘭獨立（無論以何種條件獨立）會影響英國其餘地區的信用評級；至於賴債會對蘇格蘭的信用評級造成何種影響，那就是另一回事了。作爲一個新國家，以無債務負擔的狀態開始新生活是一回事，靠拒不償還按比例應承擔的1000億英鎊英國國債而達到這種狀態，則是另一回事。

The third risk associated with independence is a change in the credit risk attached to financial institutions. Banks and other companies can operate in the EU through branches of their home business, or by establishing local subsidiaries in other member states. Sweden’s Handelsbanken uses branches; the Spanish Santander takes deposits in Scotland into its English subsidiary. If a bank fails, the saver has a claim on the appropriate deposit protection scheme – that of the country in which the regulated entity is located. As in Santander’s case, that might be neither the country where you made the deposit nor the one where the bank’s head office is located.

伴隨獨立出現的第三類風險是，金融機構相關信用風險的改變。銀行和其他企業可通過開設隸屬於母國業務的分支機構、或通過在歐盟(EU)其他成員國設立當地子公司，來在歐盟市場運營。瑞典Handelsbanken銀行採用的是開設分行的辦法；西班牙桑坦德銀行(Santander)則是將其在蘇格蘭吸收的存款轉至在英格蘭的子公司。如果銀行倒閉，儲戶就對相應的存款保險機制——受監管實體所在國家的存款保險機制——擁有求償權。就桑坦德銀行的例子而言，這個“國家”可能既不是儲戶存款時所在的國家，也不是該行總部所在的國家。

The “lender of last resort” facility provides liquidity support if there is a run on a bank. Last week’s interrogation of Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of England, at Westminster’s Treasury select committee confused that issue with a quite separate one: the reserves needed to sustain a currency peg; and the resources needed to provide liquidity support to the banking system. The scale of modern speculative capital flows is such that there is probably no currency reserve large enough to sustain the price of a clearly overvalued currency. Meanwhile, the availability of liquidity support to solvent institutions depends not on the reserves available but on the credit rating of the provider of such support – whether another bank, a government or a central bank.

“最後貸款人”安排會在銀行遭遇擠兌時提供流動性支持。上週英國央行(BoE)行長馬克•卡尼(Mark Carney)在英國議會下院財政特別委員會(Treasury select committee)接受質詢時，混淆了兩個截然不同的問題：維持貨幣掛鉤所需的外匯儲備；向銀行業體系提供流動性支持所需的資源。當代投機資金流的規模極其龐大，可能沒有任何一個國家的外匯儲備大到足以維持一種明顯被高估的貨幣的幣值。另一方面，能否向有償付能力的金融機構提供流動性支持並非取決於有多少外匯儲備，而是取決於提供者（無論是另一家銀行，還是政府或央行）的信用評級。

But since the global financial crisis the term “lender of last resort” has routinely been used in wider and ill defined sense: to identify who (if anyone) will make whole the creditors of any failed financial institution or recapitalise any bank, wherever based, no longer able to raise equity from its shareholders. The only sensible answer – for Scotland and perhaps for other countries – is “not us”.

但自全球金融危機爆發以來，“最後貸款人”這個詞常常應用在更廣的範圍內，定義也往往比較模糊：可指替任何倒閉的金融機構向債主償債的人，或向任何無法再從股東那裏籌集股本的銀行（無論其總部位於何處）注資的人——假如存在這樣的人的話。唯一明智的回答是，這個詞指的“不是我們”——對蘇格蘭而言是如此，或許對其他國家而言也是如此。

The present debate is demeaned by posturing and scaremongering on both sides. Scotland has prospered as part of a United Kingdom and could prosper as an independent country. Which course is more appropriate is a question of identity and values, not economics. And whatever outcome is declared on Friday morning, sensible people will work together to ensure that outcome produces the best possible economic result.

當前的辯論已淪爲辯論雙方擺姿態和危言聳聽的遊戲。蘇格蘭作爲英國的一部分實現了繁榮，作爲一個獨立國家也可實現繁榮。選擇哪條道路更合適，是一個身份認同和價值觀問題，而非經濟問題。而且，無論週五早上宣佈的公投結果如何，明智之士都會共同努力，確保這一結果能產生儘可能好的經濟結果。