中國金融雄心對世界的挑戰

China has been industrious this year in laying the foundations for a Sino-centric financial system. Though the realisation of Beijing’s grand design remains uncertain and far off, the thrust of its strategy is clear. First, it aims to create a renminbi zone to balance the US dollar zone that has dominated the world’s financial system since the end of the second world war. This involves encouraging the use of renminbi as a reserve currency, a unit of settlement for trade and a store of value for investors in securities. Progress on all fronts has been marked. Issuance of offshore renminbi bonds, for instance, rose to a record Rmb451bn in the first nine months of the year, from Rmb376bn in all of 2013, Moody’s, the credit rating agency, said yesterday.

The second plank in Beijing’s plan involves setting up institutions to mirror the multilateral organisations that govern the global development agenda. A decision in July by the Brics group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to establish the New Development Bank and a contingent reserve arrangement creates alternatives to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In October, the inauguration of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, with the backing of 20 countries, set up a rival to the Asian Development Bank. Beijing is also moving ahead with a scheme to create the Development Bank of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a six-country Eurasian political, economic and military grouping.
These four institutions will add to the considerable financial firepower of the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. The latter has in the space of two years doled out about $670bn in credit – eclipsing all of the loans, guarantees and insurance extended by the US ExIm Bank in the previous eight decades.
今年以來，中國一直在忙着爲一個以中國爲中心的金融體系奠定基礎。雖然實現北京的宏偉設計仍然既不明朗又很遙遠，但其戰略的主旨是明確的。首先，它力求創建一個人民幣區，以抗衡自第二次世界大戰結束以來主導世界金融體系的美元區。這包括鼓勵使用人民幣作爲一種儲備貨幣、一種結算貿易的單位、一種證券投資者的價值儲存手段。迄今各方面都取得了顯著進展。例如，信用評級機構穆迪(Moody’s)昨日表示，今年頭九個月離岸人民幣債券發行總量增至創紀錄的4510億元人民幣，高於2013年全年的3760億元人民幣。
北京總體計劃中的第二支柱是，仿照目前主導全球發展議程的多邊組織，推動設立與之對應的機構。7月，金磚集團國家（巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非）決定建立新開發銀行(New Development Bank)和應急儲備安排，由此創建了與世界銀行(World Bank)和國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)相對應的機構。10月，亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank，簡稱AIIF）在20個國家的支持下成立，由此產生了一個與亞洲開發銀行(Asian Development Bank)分庭抗禮的對手。北京還在推進創建上海合作組織開發銀行(Development Bank of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation)的計劃；上合組織是一個由歐亞六個國家組成的政治、經濟和軍事集團。
這四個機構將使中國國家開發銀行(China Development Bank)和中國進出口銀行(Export-Import Bank of China)本已相當可觀的財務火力如虎添翼。中國進出口銀行在短短兩年裏發放了大約6700億美元信貸——超過美國進出口銀行(US ExIm Bank)在之前80年期間提供的貸款、擔保和保險。
Facts such as this underline the credibility of China’s ambitions. But misgivings also abound, mainly because China’s domestic record on governance is compromised by endemic official corruption, institutionalised favouritism shown to state-owned companies over their private counterparts and a lack of transparency in financial dealings.
Some senior figures have expressed their reservations in diplomatic language. Takehiko Nakao, the ADB president, said that while he understood the AIIF he did not welcome it. But other commentators are more blunt. “We want an order based on law, not on crude power, which unfortunately is the case in China right now,” said Akio Takahara, a professor at the University of Tokyo.
此類事實印證了中國雄心的可信度。但疑慮也很多，主要是因爲中國的國內治理記錄被官場腐敗、對國有企業的制度化偏袒、以及財務交易缺乏透明度留下污點。
一些資深人士用外交語言表達了自己的保留意見。亞行行長中尾武彥(Takehiko Nakao)表示，雖然他理解AIIF，但他不歡迎它。其他評論員的語氣更加生硬。“我們要的是基於法律的秩序，而不是基於蠻橫實力的秩序，不幸的是，後者正是中國現在的情況，”東京大學(University of Tokyo)教授高原明生(Akio Takahara)表示。
For its part, China argues that it is not trying to replace the existing financial order but to improve it. It cites estimates of an $8tn shortfall in funding for Asian infrastructure projects to emphasise the need for extra sources of funding beyond what can be provided by the World Bank, IMF, ADB and other existing multilateral organisations.
In addition, it is clear that the new institutions China is helping to establish have been born largely of frustration. The IMF in particular is disliked in much of the developing world, where its rigid adherence to market reforms is suspected of being an instrument to keep poor countries down, not lift them out of poverty.
Thus, existing multilateral organisations will have to change their spots to compete more effectively in an increasingly Sino-centric world. China, meanwhile, may find that, if it does not embrace transparent and exacting governance standards for these new financial institutions, they may wither before they build a reputation to match their funding power.

中國方面則辯稱，它並不是要取代現有的金融秩序，而是要改善現有秩序。它以亞洲基建項目估計存在8萬億美元資金缺口爲例，強調需要額外的資金來源，而不僅僅是依靠世行、IMF、亞行等現有多邊組織。
此外，很明顯的是，中國正推動建立的新機構的誕生在很大程度上源於失望。IMF尤其不受很多發展中國家的歡迎，該機構對市場化改革的剛性堅持，被懷疑是一種壓制窮國（而不是幫助其脫貧）的工具。
因此，現有的多邊機構將不得不對自己進行徹底整改，才能在一個日趨以中國爲中心的世界更有效地開展競爭。與此同時，中國可能會發現，如果這些新的金融機構不實行透明、嚴格的治理標準，它們可能還沒有建立起與自己的資金實力相稱的聲譽就已經走下坡路了。