中國貶值人民幣意在自保 China devaluation raises spectre of currency wars
All currency wars are self-defeating for their combatants. When a country slashes the value of its currency to boost exports, it inevitably triggers competitive devaluations by its trading partners, thereby robbing the first mover of its initial advantage. Thus it is unlikely that China, which in effect devalued the renminbi by 2 per cent yesterday, was intending to whip up currency skirmishes among its trade partners into a full-scale war.
所有的貨幣戰爭都會對參戰方自身造成損害。當一國大幅壓低其貨幣幣值以提振出口時，不可避免地會引發其貿易伙伴國的競爭性貶值，從而令率先貶值的國家喪失其最初的優勢。因此，中國昨天在實質上將人民幣貶值2%的行爲，其用意不太可能是把貿易伙伴國之間在匯率上的小衝突激化爲一場全面貨幣戰爭。
But intentions are one thing, consequences another. China’s position as the world’s largest trading power ensures that its action will distribute deflationary pressures throughout its global supply chain, while intensifying pressure on competitors to seek their own currency depreciations. Such pressures will only grow if yesterday’s action signals a sustained trend of weakening, as many analysts expect.
不過，動機是一回事，結果卻是另一回事。中國作爲全球最大貿易國的地位，導致它的這一舉措必然會通過其全球供應鏈對外傳導通縮壓力，並加大與其競爭的國家尋求將本幣貶值的壓力。正如許多分析師所預期的，如果昨天的舉措預示着人民幣持續走弱的趨勢，這種壓力只會不斷上升。
In its most crucial sense, the impetus for China’s devaluation, which represented the renminbi’s biggest drop since 1993, was self-defence. It is not just that exports have been dismal so far this year and tumbled again in July by 8.3 per cent. It is also that China is suffering from a chain reaction of structural economic ills that threatens to run out of control. As ever, China’s true predicament is obscured by official statistics. The official gross domestic product growth rate was 7 per cent in the second quarter, but several independent analysts estimate that in reality it may be closer to 4 per cent.
從最重要的意義上來說，人民幣貶值的動機是自保。這次貶值是1993年以來人民幣匯率的最大幅度下調。中國政府會這麼做，不僅僅是因爲今年迄今出口一直低迷、7月份又同比重挫8.3%，還因爲中國正在遭遇結構性經濟問題引發的連鎖反應，而這種連鎖反應有失控的危險。和往常一樣，從官方統計數字中很難看出中國的真實情況到底有多糟。比如，今年第二季度中國國內生產總值(GDP)增長率的官方數字爲7%，然而據多名獨立分析師估計，中國的實際GDP增長率可能更接近4%。
A similar situation exists with investment, an important growth driver. Official numbers put fixed asset investment growth in the first half at 11.4 per cent, but a cleaner measure of how much companies are investing to boost their productive capacities — gross fixed capital formation — is running at an estimated 4 to 5 per cent, from 6.6 per cent in 2014, according to Dragonomics, a research firm. Allowing for the depreciation of existing plant and machinery, it is possible that China has already ceased adding to its productive capacity, Dragonomics estimates.
對於另一個重要的增長引擎——投資——來說，也存在類似的局面。官方數據顯示，今年上半年中國民間固定資產投資同比增長11.4%。然而，根據研究公司龍洲經訊(Dragonomics)的數據，中國固定資本形成總額增長率估計爲4%到5%，低於2014年的6.6%。而對於企業投資了多少資金用於提升產能，固定資本形成總額是個更純粹的衡量指標。龍洲經訊估計，考慮到現有廠房和機器的折舊，中國可能已停止增加產能。
Against this background, the renminbi’s devaluation stands as an expression of distress. Certainly, Beijing did not wish it. Li Keqiang, premier, told the Financial Times in March: “We don’t want to see a further devaluation of the Chinese currency because we can’t rely on devaluing our own currency to boost exports.”
在這樣的背景下，人民幣的貶值是壓力的表現。可以肯定的是，中國政府並不希望人民幣貶值。今年3月，中國總理李克強曾向英國《金融時報》表示：“我不希望看到人民幣繼續貶值，因爲我們不能靠貶值來刺激出口。”
He added that a scenario in which major economies “trip over themselves to devalue their currencies” would lead to a currency war.
他還補充說，主要經濟體“貨幣競相貶值”的狀態會導致貨幣大戰。
The timing of the U-turn may derive from three main influences. The US Federal Reserve’s signal that it may raise interest rates as early as this autumn could have added to the appeal of pre-emptive action. The renminbi’s 10.3 per cent appreciation against all currencies since the start of 2014 (on a trade weighted and inflation-adjusted basis) may have reinforced perceptions that the redback was overvalued. Lastly, China’s campaign to win acceptance for the renminbi into the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights (SDR) basket of currencies in December may have persuaded Beijing to show that it is embracing a more flexible currency regime, one of the conditions for SDR entry.
中國匯率政策急轉彎之所以出現在這個時候，也許主要受到了三個方面的影響。美聯儲(Fed)發出信號，表示最早可能會在今年秋天加息。這一信號可能增加了中國搶先採取措施的動力。自2014年初以來，中國兌所有貨幣的（經貿易加權和通脹調整後的）匯率上升了10.3%，這可能也強化了人民幣幣值被高估的印象。最後，中國一直在爭取讓人民幣在今年12月被國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)納入特別提款權(SDR)貨幣籃子。這可能也促使中國政府向外界展示自己正採用更加靈活的匯率制度（這是加入SDR的條件之一）。
But the devaluation could yet have unwelcome effects. It looks likely to amplify China’s export of deflation by making Chinese goods cheaper. This is of concern because the producer price index, which measures aggregate prices at the factory gate, fell in July for the 40th straight month to minus 5.4 per cent. This, coupled with the impact of potential competitive devaluations, looks likely to lead the world into another phase of slower growth.
然而，這次貶值也許還會產生一些不受歡迎的影響。貶值讓中國商品更便宜，從而可能會放大中國對外的通縮輸出。這一點之所以令人擔心，是因爲作爲衡量總體出廠價格的指標，中國工業生產者出廠價格指數(PPI)今年7月同比下跌了5.4%，爲連續第40個月下跌。這一點再加上可能出現的各國競爭性貶值的影響，看起來很可能導致全球進入增長更加緩慢的新階段。
