歐洲面臨比希臘更大的悲劇

The pilgrimage of Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras to Moscow told a tale of two tragedies. One, perilously close to the denouement, is about Greece’s uncertain place in the family of European nations; the other, still unfolding but with a storyline that foretells a calamitous final act, is about the future not just of the euro but of European integration.

希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)此次莫斯科之行講述了兩個悲劇故事。第一個是關於希臘在歐洲國家大家庭中岌岌可危的地位，這個悲劇眼下正危險地走向結局；第二個悲劇不僅是關於歐元、而且是關於整個歐洲一體化的未來，儘管這個悲劇尚在慢慢展開，但是故事脈絡已經預示了一個災難性的結局。

Predictably enough, the Greek prime minister was feted by Vladimir Putin. The Russian president’s revanchist aggression in Ukraine has left his regime more vulnerable than anyone in the Kremlin would dare admit. Mr Putin badly needs to weaken the EU sanctions regime. Shared Orthodox Christianity, an air of leftist nostalgia in Athens and, above all, Greece’s desperate isolation make it an ideal target for Moscow’s strategy of divide and rule.

不出所料，這位希臘總理受到了弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)的盛情款待。這位俄羅斯總統對烏克蘭展開的報復性攻擊，致使其政權脆弱到了克里姆林宮所有人都不敢承認的地步。普京迫切需要削弱歐盟的制裁當局。共同的宗教信仰——東正教(Orthodox Christianity)，雅典空氣中瀰漫的左翼懷舊主義，以及最重要的——希臘目前絕望的孤立狀態，使希臘成了莫斯科分治之策的理想目標。

It is harder to see what Mr Tsipras gains beyond a few warm words to cheer his supporters at home. The promise of a gas pipeline years hence? Any aid on offer from Moscow would be minuscule relative to funds from the EU and the International Monetary Fund. There is nothing Mr Putin could do that would make leaving the euro any less painful.

除了收到幾句溫暖的問候外，很難看出齊普拉斯還能得到什麼來讓國內的支持者高興起來。對數年後建設一條天然氣管道的承諾？與希臘從歐盟及國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)獲得的資金相比，莫斯科能夠提供的任何援助都會顯得微不足道。無論普京做什麼，也不可能減輕希臘脫離歐元區的痛苦。

The other day I heard Yanis Varoufakis explain how Greece had ended up here. The finance minister’s is a story fluently told — of US backing for the colonels, of the havoc wreaked on industry by the free trade rules of the EU, of the Brussels funding that bankrolled clientelist politics in Athens and of how cheap euros created a ruinous bubble.

有一天，我聽到了亞尼斯•瓦魯法基斯(Yanis Varoufakis)解釋希臘是如何落到如此地步的。在這位希臘財長滔滔不絕的講述中，這是一個關於美國過去支持希臘軍政府、歐盟自由貿易規則導致工業大遭摧毀、歐盟的資金資助了雅典的庇護政治、以及廉價的歐元是如何釀成毀滅性泡沫的故事。

There are elements of truth in this; and Mr Varoufakis is right when he says the present debt burden is unsustain­able. Missing from the narrative, though, is any sense that Greece must make its own choices. That, whatever the sins of others, only Athens can decide whether Greece prospers as a modern democracy or whether it slips back into the shadows of the Balkans.

這其中有些真實的元素；當說起目前的債務負擔難以爲繼時，瓦魯法基斯也沒錯。然而在他的敘述中，絲毫沒有希臘必須自己做出選擇的意思——無論別人有什麼罪惡，只有雅典人才能決定：希臘是作爲一個現代民主國家繁榮昌盛，還是退回到巴爾幹半島的陰影之下。

The omission, and the implicit rebuke to outsiders who do not feel bound by ballots cast by Greeks, is at the heart of what so frustrates Athens’ partners. This is not just about the Germans, even if Wolfgang Schäuble, Berlin’s finance minister, foolishly lends credibility to the idea. Mr Tsipras is isolated among fellow debtors as much as creditors. What unites them is a demand that Athens produce a plausible plan to reform the Greek state — to modernise its administration and politics as much as its economy. Such a plan would transform the mood of negotiations.

這種缺失、以及對那些並不認爲自己受到希臘投票束縛的局外人的隱晦指責，纔是如此困擾希臘的夥伴的問題核心。受困擾的不僅僅是德國人，即便德國財長沃爾夫岡•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)愚蠢地支持這種想法。無論是在同命相連的債務國、還是在債權人當中，齊普拉斯均受到孤立。讓他們團結一致的是，他們都要求雅典出臺一個可行計劃來對希臘整個國家進行改革——讓行政機制、政治以及經濟實現現代化。這樣的計劃將會改變整個談判的氛圍。

Mr Putin’s preference is otherwise. A collapse in Greek living standards would leave it ripe for the coercion and subversion that are Russia’s trademarks in an effort to expand its influence and control in southeastern Europe. The Russian president already has Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban in his breast pocket. His agents are working hard — exploiting Russia’s energy monopoly, buying politicians, bribing officials and taking stakes in financial institutions — to promote instability across the Balkans.

普京想要的就是另外一回事了。希臘的生活水平一旦崩潰，將使之成爲脅迫和顛覆的合適對象——爲了達到在歐洲東南部擴大影響力及增加控制的目的，這是俄羅斯慣用的伎倆。這位俄羅斯總統已經把匈牙利的維克托•歐爾班(Viktor Orban)收入囊中。普京手下的特工也在努力在巴爾幹半島增加不穩定性——利用俄羅斯的能源壟斷、收買政客、賄賂官員並在金融機構中投資入股。

Yet talk to finance ministers and central bankers across the rest of Europe and the mood is one of fatalism. They will tell you that the eurozone would withstand Greece’s departure. This is not 2008, or even 2012, they say. Governments have put in place the mechanisms to deal with crises. Some sound as if they believe that, freed from the vicissitudes of Greek politics, the euro would be stronger in the long run.

不過，如果跟歐洲其他國家的財長和央行行長聊聊，他們的感覺是聽天由命。他們會告訴你，歐元區能經受起希臘離開。他們說，如今的情形不是2008年，也不是2012年。各國政府已經出臺了處理危機的機制。擺脫了希臘變化無常的政治，從長遠來看歐元會更加堅挺——有些人聽起來似乎對此深信不疑。

In a narrow sense they may be right, though I would not bet on it. But Greece is a distorting prism. Its sequential crises have bred complacency by distracting from the profound structural flaws and political challenges that still imperil the euro. Making monetary union work demands more than proficient crisis management.

從狹義上講，他們可能是對的，雖然我不會對此下注。但是希臘是一塊扭曲的棱鏡。其接二連三的危機已經導致了掉以輕心，因爲它們分散了人們的注意力，使人們忽視了目前仍然威脅着歐元的深層次結構缺陷及政治挑戰。讓貨幣聯盟運轉，需要的不僅僅是熟練的危機管理。

Spring has seen a burst of sunshine in the European economy. The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing is having an effect. Growth has picked up a little. Yet it is a delusion to think that the euro is in Asafe harbour. Fiscal and financial union are at best half-completed, and the political threat to the euro continues to grow.

今年春天歐洲經濟已經迎來了一縷陽光。歐洲央行(ECB)的量化寬鬆政策正在起到作用。增長略見起色。不過，如果就此認爲歐元已經抵達安全港，那只是錯覺。財政和金融聯盟最多隻完成了一半，而歐元面對的政治威脅還在持續增加。

National politicians refuse to admit the supranational imperatives of the project they are pledged to safeguard. And a return to growth rates of 1 or even 2 per cent will not be enough to restore the euro’s legitimacy among the angry voters who are turning to populist movements of right and left.

各國政客有義務捍衛歐洲一體化，可他們拒不承認超國家的義務。增長率重回1%、甚至2%，在憤怒的選民們當中將不足以恢復歐元的合法性，這些人正轉向右翼和左翼民粹運動。

In 2012, European leaders defied the markets by summoning up the political resolve needed to save the single currency. They have since lost the will to sustain it. Greece may not bring down the euro; the existential threat lies in the more generalised failure of nerve and leadership.

2012年，歐洲領導人挑戰了市場，拿出了拯救歐元單一貨幣的必要政治決心。自那以來，他們就失去了維持這一決心的意願。希臘或許不會拖垮歐元；生死攸關的威脅存在於更普遍的勇氣喪失與領導失敗。

So it is, too, in the relationship with Moscow. The biggest danger to Europe comes not from the forays of Mr Putin’s rusting aircraft carrier, or his cold war-vintage nuclear bombers, or from Soviet-style subversion in some of the darker corners of the continent.

所以，對俄羅斯關係也是如此。歐洲面臨的最大危險並不來自普京那些生鏽航空母艦的突襲，或者他那些冷戰時期的古董核轟炸機，或者他在這個大洲某些更黑暗角落裏蘇聯式的顛覆活動。

No, the real weakness lies in a European mindset that prefers to temporise and equivocate than to confront Mr Putin head on. Mr Tsipras’s visit may have held up a mirror to Greece’s troubles. But it also offered a reflection of diffidence and division across Europe. If Greece does fall out of the euro it will also fall out of Europe. And the failure of the euro would mark the failure of Europe. What unites these twin tragedies is the stubborn reluctance of the authors to rewrite the endings.

不是，歐洲真正的弱點在於歐洲人的觀念，他們對普京更願意妥協拖延和含糊其辭，而不願正面對抗。齊普拉斯的訪問或許折射了希臘的麻煩，但也折射出整個歐洲的缺乏自信和意見分歧。如果希臘確實會在歐元區掉隊，那麼它也將在歐洲掉隊。歐元的失敗也將標誌着歐洲的失敗。這兩個悲劇的共同之處在於，作者們堅決不願重寫結局。