資本主義的悲慘世界裏 誰爲阿根廷的債務哭泣

Not far from the London offices of the Financial Times was the Marshalsea prison where debtors used to be sent. In the 18th century, more than half of London’s prisoners were incarcerated for the undischarged debt. The moral hazard Taliban of the day insisted that such harsh penalties were necessary. Then, in 1869, imprisonment for debt was abolished and bankruptcy introduced. Both economy and society survived.

距離英國《金融時報》倫敦辦公室不遠處就是馬夏爾西監獄，過去欠債的人被送到那裏。18世紀，倫敦所有囚犯中一半以上是因爲債務未償清而入獄的。那時的道德風險“塔利班”堅稱，如此嚴厲的懲罰是必要的。最後，在1869年，因債入獄被廢止，破產機制被引入。經濟和社會都沒有遭殃。

Things sometimes go wrong. Sometimes this is due to bad luck and sometimes to irresponsibility. But society needs a way to allow people to start over again. This is why we have bankruptcy. Indeed, we allow the most important private actors in our economies – companies – to enjoy limited liability. This lets shareholders walk away from their companies’ debts unscathed. That idea, too, was condemned as a licence to irresponsibility when introduced. Limited liability does bring problems, notably in highly-leveraged businesses (such as banking). The ease with which US corporations can walk away from their creditors is breathtaking. But this is better than unlimited liability.

事情有時會變糟糕。有時是因爲背運，有時是因爲不負責任。但社會需要給人一條從頭開始的途徑。這就是爲什麼我們有破產機制。的確，我們允許經濟中最重要的私人部門參與者——公司——承擔有限責任。這使股東們能輕鬆擺脫公司債務。這一制度剛實行時，也曾被譴責爲縱容不負責任。有限責任確實帶來了問題，尤其是在高槓杆的企業（比如銀行）。美國公司擺脫債權人時的那種輕鬆自如令人吃驚。但這總比無限責任好。

A similar logic applies to countries. Sometimes their governments borrow more than they turn out to be able to afford. If they have borrowed in domestic currency, they can inflate their debt away. But if they have borrowed in foreign currency, that possibility disappears. Usually, it is countries with a history of fiscal irresponsibility that find themselves obliged to borrow in foreign currencies. The eurozone has put its members in the same position: for each government, the euro is close to being a foreign currency. When the costs of servicing such debts become too high, then restructuring – default – becomes necessary. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University showed in This Time is Different, this is an old story.

國家也適用同樣的邏輯。有時政府借款過多，最終發現無力償還。如果借入本幣債務，政府可以通過通脹減輕債務負擔。如果借入外幣債務，這麼做就不可能了。通常情況下，正是那些有着財政不負責紀錄的國家，發現自己不得不借入外幣債務。歐元區已將自己的成員國置於同樣境地：對每個政府而言，歐元都近乎是一種外幣。當償債成本過高時，重組，也就是違約，就變得必要了。正如哈佛大學(Harvard University)的卡門•萊因哈特(Carmen Reinhart)和肯尼思•羅格夫(Kenneth Rogoff)在《這次不一樣》(This Time is Different)中所展示的，這是經常發生的事。

As I argued at the time, Argentina found itself in this position at the turn of the century. It was difficult to feel much sympathy for the country, which suffered from chronic mismanagement before its default in December 2001 and was to suffer yet more thereafter. But it had become impossible to service its public debt of $132bn at tolerable cost. Moreover, creditors had been rewarded for the possibility of default. Even at its lowest point, in September 1997, the spread of Argentine dollar bonds over US Treasuries was close to three percentage points. A creditor compensated for the risk of a default cannot be surprised by it. The solution is portfolio diversification.

正如我當時所提出的，阿根廷在世紀之交發現自己處於這種境地。我們很難對這個國家抱有太多同情，在2001年12月違約之前，該國就遭受長期管理不善，之後又遭受更多管理不善。但在當時，阿根廷已經不可能以可容忍的成本承受1320億美元的公債負擔。此外，債權人已經因爲面對違約的可能性而得到回報。阿根廷美元債券對美國國債的利差，即便在1997年9月達到最低點時，也接近3個百分點。已經因爲承擔違約風險而得到補償的債權人，不能對違約感到意外。解決方案是投資組合多元化。

While the principle of sovereign debt restructuring is compelling, in practice it is difficult. No court can seize and then liquidate a country’s entire assets. This legal limbo creates two opposing dangers: the first is that it is too easy for a country to walk away from its debts; the second is that it is too hard. The Argentine story illustrates both: confronted with an intransigent government, holders of 93 per cent of defaulted debt accepted exchanges for debt with a hugely reduced face value; but “holdouts”, who reject such an exchange, have blocked a clean resolution. The mess has lasted more than 12 years from the default.

儘管主權債務重組的原則頗有道理，但實際操作的難度很大。沒有一家法院能夠扣押然後變賣某個主權國家的全部資產。這一法律未決狀態造成了兩個相反的危險：一是一個國家要擺脫其債務太容易了；二是一個國家要擺脫其債務太困難了。阿根廷的經歷證明了這兩點：面對一個堅決賴賬的政府，93%違約債務的持有人同意接受另一種面值劇減的債務；但拒不合作者阻礙了乾淨利落的解決。從違約開始計算，這一亂局延續了12年多。

As first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Anne Krueger advanced a proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in 2002. She argued that the restructuring process could be delayed or blocked if some creditors were able to hold out for full payment.

作爲國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)第一副總裁，安妮•克魯格(Anne Krueger)於2002年提出了一份有關主權債務重組機制的建議。她提出，如果部分債權人能一直堅持要求獲得全額償付，那麼重組過程可能被延遲或阻止。

Her ideas were more supranational than governments – above all, the US – could bear. But “collective action clauses” were at least introduced. Yet such clauses might not have prevented the success of holdouts over Argentina, led by Paul Singer of Elliott Management. As the IMF recently noted , these clauses “typically only bind holders of the same issuance”. A holdout creditor can “neutralise the operation of such clauses” if they secure a blocking position, normally more than 25 per cent.

她的超國家觀點超過了各國政府（特別是美國政府）所能容忍的限度。但起碼引入了“集體行動條款”。但這樣的條款可能無法阻止以埃利奧特資本管理公司(Elliott Management)的保羅•辛格(Paul Singer)爲首的不合作者打贏官司。正如IMF最近所指出的，此類條款“典型情況下只能約束同一只債券的持有人”。不合作的債權人如果爭取到阻擋頭寸（通常是高於25%的持有比例），就可以“令這樣的條款失效”。

Moreover, adds the IMF, US courts have interpreted a “boiler plate provision” of these contracts (the so-called pari passu clause) as requiring a sovereign debtor to make full payment on a defaulted claim if it makes any payments on restructured bonds. In addition, the US courts will force financial intermediaries to help creditors obtain hold of the sovereign’s assets. All this will make restructurings harder. Why should creditors accept an exchange for instruments with reduced value in future?

另外，IMF補充，美國法院已把這些合同的一項標準條款，即所謂的“同等權益條款”(pari passu clause)解讀爲，一個主權債務人只要對重組後債券作出任何償付，就必須全額支付違約索賠金額。此外，美國法院將迫使金融中介機構幫助債權人留置主權資產。這一切都將使重組更難執行。未來的債權人爲何要同意把原有債券置換爲另一種貶值的債券？

I am no lawyer, but to me the idea of equal treatment means treating like cases in the same way. Yet creditors who have accepted exchanges and holdouts are not like cases. To force debtors to treat them equally seems wrong. Moreover, the argument that holdouts are helping Argentines by punishing government corruption is absurd. It is up to Argentines to choose the government they desire. Worse, if Argentina is forced to pay holdouts in full, the price will be borne by Argentines. This is extortion backed by the US judiciary.

我不是律師，但我認爲，同等對待的理念意味着，以相同方式處理相似個案。但接受了置換的債權人和不合作者不屬於相似個案。強迫債務人平等對待兩者似乎是錯誤的。另外，有種觀點認爲不合作者懲罰阿根廷政府的腐敗是在幫助阿根廷民衆，這也是荒謬的。應當由阿根廷人選擇自己想要的政府。更糟糕的是，如果阿根廷被迫向不合作的債權人全額償債，那麼其代價將由阿根廷民衆來承擔。這正是美國司法體系所支持的敲詐勒索。

The immediate issue is how Argentina might settle these cases. The options – paying the holdouts, reaching a deal with them, transferring restructured debt into domestic law and outright default – look costly, humiliating, difficult or damaging. Worse are the longer-term implications for debt restructurings.

當前緊要的問題是阿根廷可能如何處理這些個案。各種選項——對不合作者償債、與他們達成協議，把重組後債務轉歸國內法律管轄，以及完全違約——看來都代價高昂、令人恥辱、很難實現，或有破壞性。對於債務重組的長期影響就更糟糕了。

One possibility is to eliminate the pari passu clause. Another is to introduce stronger collective action clauses, particularly ones that cover all outstanding instruments. Another is to shift issuance from New York. But all three would apply only in future. Another possibility would be to amend US law. A final possibility, as José Antonio Ocampo of Columbia University notes, is to revive the idea of a global mechanism. These last two options look very unlikely.

一種可能性是取消同等權益條款。另一個是引入更強大的集體行動條款，尤其是使其覆蓋所有未償清債務工具。再有就是將發行地點從紐約轉移到別處。但這三種可能性只適用於未來。還有一個可能，就是修訂美國法律。最後一種可能是按照美國哥倫比亞大學(Columbia University)何塞•安東尼奧•奧坎波(José Antonio Ocampo)的提議，重提建立一種全球機制的想法。最後兩個選項看來不太可能。

Yet in a world of global capital flows, a workable mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt is not an optional extra. It is possible that Argentina is an exceptional case. It is more likely that the interpretation of the pari passu clause and the ability to pursue assets will now make it more difficult to restructure debt. A world in which the choice for sovereigns and their creditors is between full payment and absolute non-payment would be as bad as one in which debtors had to choose between starvation and prison. A better way must now be found.

但在一個資本全球流動的世界裏，一套可行的主權債務重組機制並不是可有可無的。可能阿根廷是一個特例。更有可能的是，法院對同等權益條款的解讀、以及查扣資產的能力，將加大債務重組的難度。主權國家及其債權人面臨要麼全額償付、要麼徹底賴賬的世界，跟債務人要麼餓死、要麼入獄的世界一樣糟糕。必須找到更好的出路。