第一大戰爆發100週年 世界不該這麼快遺忘警示

A century has passed since the guns of August 1914 ended the era of European predominance with a deafening bang. Could such a catastrophe recur in our time?

1914年8月，歐洲占主導地位的時代在震耳欲聾的槍炮聲中結束。如今100年時間過去了，此類災難還會在我們的時代重演嗎？

The sequence of events since the Malaysian jet MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine is remarkably similar to the one that followed the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914. Now, as then, the crisis begins with an act of state-sponsored terrorism. Now, as then, Russia sides with the troublemakers. Even the request by the Dutch government for access to the site where so many of their nationals perished is reminiscent of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Now, as then, ownership of a seemingly unimportant region of eastern Europe is disputed.

自馬航MH17航班在烏克蘭東部上空被擊落以來發生的一系列事件，與1914年6月奧地利大公弗朗茨•斐迪南(Franz Ferdinand)被刺殺之後的事件極爲相似。現在和當時一樣，危機始於一場政府支持的恐怖主義行動。現在和當時一樣，俄羅斯與麻煩製造者站在一邊。甚至荷蘭政府提出的進入墜機現場的要求（許多荷蘭公民在此次事件中喪生），也令人想起當年奧地利對塞爾維亞發出的最後通牒。現在和當時一樣，東歐一個貌似不起眼地區的所有權引發了爭議。

In 1914 it was Bosnia-Herzegovina, formerly an Ottoman province, annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908, but claimed by the proponents of a united South Slav state. Today we have not only the annexation of Crimea by Russia but also the potential secession from Ukraine of Donetsk and Lugansk, where pro-Russian separatists have proclaimed independent “people’s republics”.

1914年，引發爭議的地區是波斯尼亞和黑塞哥維那。該地區曾經是奧斯曼帝國的一個省，後來在1908年被奧匈帝國吞併，但統一南斯拉夫國家的支持者卻對該地區宣稱主權。現在，不僅俄羅斯吞併了克里米亞，而且頓涅茨克和盧甘斯克還有可能脫離烏克蘭獨立。在頓涅茨克和盧甘斯克，親俄羅斯的分裂勢力已經宣佈成立獨立的“人民共和國”。

And now, as then, the crisis is escalating. Even before the downing of MH17, Washington had tightened sanctions against Russia. This week both the US and the EU have taken the next step, imposing sanctions on whole sectors of the Russian economy, rather than just individuals and specific firms. The tighter the economic squeeze, the more President Vladimir Putin is cornered. In effect, the west is now confronting him with a choice between capitulation – ending his support for the separatists – or escalation – making sure that they are not crushed by the forces of the Kiev government. For a man like Mr Putin, the first option does not exist.

現在和當時一樣，危機逐步惡化。甚至在馬航MH17航班被擊落之前，華盛頓就加大了對俄羅斯的制裁。上週，美國和歐盟全都採取進一步措施，對俄羅斯經濟中的整個部門施加制裁，而不是僅僅針對個人和特定公司。經濟制裁越嚴厲，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾•普京(Vladimir Putin)就越有可能走投無路。實際上，西方現在正讓普京面臨選擇，是屈從壓力結束對分裂勢力的支持，還是要確保他們不會被烏克蘭政府軍隊擊垮，從而加劇危機惡化。對於普京這樣的人來說，第一個選項是不存在的。

The July crisis of 2014 therefore looks ominous. At the very least, the hope has now been dashed that a post-Soviet Russia could peacefully be integrated into a western world order based on free markets and democracy. At worst, what began as a little local difficulty in eastern Ukraine could be about to explode into a much larger struggle for mastery in Europe.

因此2014年7月的危機看起來是一個不祥之兆。最起碼，蘇聯解體之後的俄羅斯和平融入建立在自由市場和民主基礎之上的西方世界秩序的希望已經落空。而最壞的情況是，最初烏克蘭東部一場小小的地方衝突，可能演變爲一場規模大得多的爭奪歐洲主導權的爭鬥。

So how to explain the relative equanimity of financial markets in the face of this gathering storm? Blame the historians. To those who subscribe to the view that the first world war had its origins in distinctive pathologies of early 20th-century Europe such as imperialism, militarism, nationalism and secret diplomacy, today’s crisis is nothing to worry about. For modern Europeans have renounced imperialism, have all but disarmed themselves, feel embarrassed by nationalism and conduct their diplomacy via Twitter rather than secret telegrams.

那麼如何解釋金融市場在風暴來臨之際的相對平靜呢？這要怪歷史學家。有些人認爲，一戰的根源是20世紀初歐洲獨有的諸多弊病，如帝國主義、軍國主義、民族主義和祕密外交，對這些人來說，如今的危機沒什麼可擔心的。因爲現代歐洲人已經放棄了帝國主義，差不多解除了武裝，對民族主義感到尷尬，並且通過Twitter而不是祕密電報來開展外交。

Even more complacent are those who insist on laying all the blame for 1914 on Germany. Today’s Germans prefer winning world cups to losing world wars. In almost every respect, Angela Merkel, their chancellor, is the historical antithesis of Kaiser Wilhelm II: female, democratically elected, supremely cautious and almost comically circumspect when asked what makes her feel proud to be German. (“Our well-sealed windows,” she once told Bild newspaper.)

那些將1914年戰爭全都歸咎於德國的人甚至更加滿不在乎。如今的德國更喜歡贏得世界盃，而不是輸掉世界戰爭。從幾乎所有方面來說，德國總理安格拉•默克爾(Angela Merkel)就是德皇威廉二世(Kaiser Wilhelm II)的歷史對立面：默克爾是女性、經由民主選舉上臺、極爲謹慎，在被問及什麼讓她對身爲德國人感到自豪的時候，她謹慎得近乎好笑——她曾經向《圖片報》(Bild)表示：“是我們密封良好的窗戶。”

Yet the narratives woven by historians over the past 100 years must be treated with caution. Whether they blame “isms” or Germans, the majority of academic explanations of the first world war suffer from a fundamental flaw. The deep-seated causes they posit seem largely to have been missed by contemporaries, for whom – with very few exceptions – the war came as a complete surprise.

然而我們必須謹慎對待歷史學家對過去100年編織的故事。無論他們是怪罪於“主義”還是德國，對於一戰的多數學術解釋存在根本性的缺陷。他們假想的深層次原因似乎基本沒有被他們同時代的人注意到，對後者來說（只有極少數人例外），一戰完全是個意外。

As the year 1914 began, The New York Times looked forward to a “growing rapprochement between Germany, France and England” over the Balkans. “The British horizon in the direction of Germany seems to be clearing,” the Times also reported. In Germany “all signs” pointed to “numerous conflicts between the government . . . and the Social-Democratic party during the coming year”. Plans were afoot for an international conference in New York to celebrate “100 years of peace among English-speaking peoples”.

在進入1914年之際，《紐約時報》(The New York Times)預計“德國、法國和英國（圍繞巴爾幹地區）的爭執會日趨緩和”。《泰晤士報》(The Times)還報道稱，“從英國向德國方向看，視野似乎正變得清晰”。在德國，“所有跡象”都表明“政府……與社民黨(Social-Democratic party)來年將衝突不斷”。人們正計劃在紐約舉行國際大會，慶祝“講英語國家的人民實現100年的和平”。

Among the best informed people in 1914 were the bankers of the City of London, who certainly stood to lose a lot of money in the event of a world war.

1914年消息最爲靈通的人包括倫敦金融城(City of London)的銀行家們——一旦爆發戰爭，這些人必然會損失許多錢。

Yet the correspondence of the Rothschilds, then the most powerful financial dynasty, reveals an almost total failure to anticipate the scale of the conflagration.

然而，從當時最爲強大的金融王國——羅斯柴爾德(Rothschild)家族的信件來看，他們幾乎完全未能預見到那次戰火的規模。

As the Economist reported, it was only on July 31 – by which time fighting had begun – that the financial world saw “the meaning of war . . . in a flash”.

正如《經濟學人》(The Economist)報道的那樣，直到7月31日（那時戰爭已經爆發），金融世界才“瞬間……認識到戰爭的意義”。

It has become a commonplace idea that today’s frothy financial markets are oblivious to the stream of bad news from eastern Europe, not to mention the Middle East. But that does not mean the news is not really bad at all. New York and London were equally blasé about the origins of the first world war. It was not until three weeks after the Sarajevo assassination that the London Times even mentioned the possibility that a European political crisis might lead to financial instability. Nine days later the stock exchange closed its doors, overwhelmed by panic selling as investors suddenly woke up to the reality of world war. Let no one reassure you that this crisis has somehow been “priced in”. No one priced in the guns of August 1914.

如今膚淺的金融市場毫不關心來自東歐（更別提中東）的一系列壞消息，這一點人們已經見怪不怪。但這並不意味着這些消息真的一點兒也不糟糕。紐約和倫敦同樣不關心一戰的起源。直至薩拉熱窩刺殺事件發生3個星期之後，《泰晤士報》才提到歐洲政治危機導致金融動盪的可能性。9天后股市由於不堪恐慌性拋售的重負而關門，因爲投資者突然意識到世界大戰爆發的現實。別相信任何人向你保證的市場已在某種程度上將此次危機的影響“考慮在內”。當年沒有人把1914年8月的槍炮“考慮在內”。

This should give not only historians pause. If great historical events can sometimes have causes that are too small for contemporaries to notice, might not a comparable crisis be in the making today? What exactly makes our July crisis different? Is it because we now have the UN and other international institutions? Hardly: with Russia a permanent member of the UN Security Council, that institution has been gridlocked over Ukraine. Is it because we now have the EU? Certainly, that eliminates the risk that any west European state might overtly take Russia’s side, as France and Britain did in 1914, but it has not stopped EU members with significant energy imports from Russia fighting tooth and nail against tougher sanctions.

這不僅僅應該讓歷史學家停下來思考。如果重大歷史事件的根源有時候過於微小，從而讓同時代的人注意不到，那麼如今一場類似的危機不是也有可能在醞釀之中嗎？到底有什麼能讓我們7月的危機不同以往？就憑我們現在有聯合國(UN)和其他國際組織？很難這樣說：由於俄羅斯是聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)常任理事國，聯合國在烏克蘭問題上陷入癱瘓。就憑我們現在有了歐盟？當然，這消除了西歐國家公然站在俄羅斯一邊（就像法國和英國在1914年做的那樣）的風險，但它沒有阻止從俄羅斯大量進口能源的歐盟成員國極力反對實施更嚴厲的制裁。

What about the role of globalisation in diffusing international conflict? Sorry, you could have made the same argument 100 years ago (indeed, Norman Angell did, in his book The Great Illusion). Very high levels of economic interdependence do not always inoculate countries against going to war with each other.

全球化在緩解國際衝突中發揮的作用呢？很遺憾，100年前你就可以提出這種觀點了（事實上，諾曼•安傑爾(Norman Angell)就曾在自己的著作《大幻覺》(The Great Illusion)中闡述過這樣的觀點）。但是，經濟的高度依存也無法永遠阻止國家之間的戰爭。

Often I am told that it is the existence of nuclear weapons that has reduced the probability of a world war in our time. But even if that were true it surely does not apply here. In making their calculations about sanctions, European leaders did not give a moment’s thought to Russia’s vast superiority in missiles and warheads.

也常常有人告訴我，在我們這個時代，是核武器的存在降低了世界戰爭的可能性。但是，即使這個觀點是正確的，也無法適用於當前情況。在爲制裁深思熟慮的時候，歐洲的領導人絲毫沒有想過俄羅斯在導彈和彈頭方面擁有的巨大優勢。

A better answer relates to the balance of conventional forces – and the balance of the will to use them. Since the end of the cold war, by any meaningful measure, Europeans have disarmed themselves and are incapable of fighting wars unassisted by the US. More importantly, European peoples have lost their stomach for fighting.

一個更好的答案與常規力量的平衡、以及使用這些力量的意願的平衡相關。自冷戰結束以來，從任何有意義的標準來講，歐洲人都可以說自我解除了武裝，以至於沒有美國的幫助就無法作戰。更重要的是，歐洲人失去了戰鬥的慾望。

A century ago the overwhelming majority of Britons supported the government’s argument that the German violation of Belgian neutrality was a legitimate casus belli – including my grandfather, who rushed to enlist.

一個世紀以前，英國政府認爲德國侵犯比利時的中立性是一個合理的開戰理由，支持政府的英國人佔壓倒性多數。其中也包括我的祖父，他當時立刻應徵入伍。

And today? Even after the downing of MH17, just one in 10 British voters would favour deploying western troops to defend Ukraine against Russia. The fundamental asymmetry in the Ukrainian crisis is that the Kremlin is able and willing to use military force; Europeans – and Americans, for that matter – want to go no further than economic sanctions.

今天又怎樣呢？即使在MH17航班被擊落後，也僅有十分之一的英國選民支持在烏克蘭部署西方的軍隊，以抵禦俄羅斯。烏克蘭危機中根本性的不對等就是，克里姆林宮有能力而且也願意使用武力；而在這件事上，歐洲人和美國人都不願意在經濟制裁以外更進一步。

And yet there is another and still better way of explaining the difference between 1914 and 2014 – and that is to recognise that what happened 100 years ago was itself a very improbable disaster, which required a whole succession of diplomatic and military miscalculations to happen. One way of making this point is to use computer simulations to re-run the 1914 crisis, something which is now possible thanks to the sophisticated strategy game Making History: The Great War.

要解釋1914年和2014年情況的不同，還有一種更好的辦法，那就是認識到100年前發生的事件原本是一個不大可能發生的災難，是一連串外交和軍事誤判的結果。要說明這個觀點，一種方法是使用計算機模擬技術，重演1914年的危機。歸功於精良的戰略遊戲《創造歷史：一戰》(Making History: The Great War)，我們已經可能做到這一點。

Like Muzzy Lane’s earlier War of the World game, which allowed players to replay the events of the second world war, this game makes it clear that decision makers are not in the grip of vast, impersonal forces but have meaningful strategic choices. It is perfectly possible to re-run the July 1914 crisis multiple times and not end up with a world war.

Muzzy Lane開發的前作《創造歷史2：世界大戰》(Making History II: The War of the World )讓玩家可以重新玩一遍第二次世界大戰的事件。類似於前作，《創造歷史：一戰》中的決策者並不受強大的、非人力因素的支配，而是可以選擇採取各種意義深遠的戰略。玩家完全有可能把1914年7月的危機重演許多次，並且不讓遊戲以世界大戰告終。

The real lesson of history is that a relatively small crisis over a chunk of third-rate eastern European real estate will produce a global conflict only if decision makers make a series of blunders.

歷史給我們留下的真正教訓是，只要決策者犯下一系列錯誤，即使是圍繞一大片東歐三流房地產發生的相對較小的危機，也能演變成全球衝突。

As it happens, I think it is a blunder to use sanctions to give President Putin no choice but folding or fighting. But – assuming there are no more MH17s – the price for that blunder will be paid mainly by the people of Ukraine. The blunders of a century ago led to the deaths of more than 10m people, mostly young men, drawn from all over the world.

事實上，我認爲用制裁將俄羅斯總統普京逼得除了屈服或者戰鬥以外別無選擇，就是一個錯誤。然而，如果我們假定不會有更多類似馬航MH17航班這樣的事件，這個錯誤的代價就主要是由烏克蘭人來承擔的。而一個世紀以前犯下的那些錯誤導致超過1000萬人喪生，其中絕大多數是由世界各地徵召而來的年輕人。

As we commemorate the outbreak of the first world war, let no one swallow the old but tenacious lie that their “sacrifice” was a necessary and noble one. On the contrary, the war is best understood as the greatest error of modern history. That is a harsh truth that many historians still find unpalatable. But then, as AJP Taylor once observed, most people who study history only “learn from the mistakes of the past how to make new ones”.

當我們紀念第一次世界大戰爆發100週年的時候，不要讓任何人聽信陳舊但卻一直持續的謊言，即他們的“犧牲”是必要而且高尚的。相反，這場戰爭最好應該被理解爲現代歷史上最嚴重的錯誤。這是一個殘酷的事實，許多歷史學家依然覺得難以接受。然而，正如A•J•P•泰勒(AJP Taylor)曾經做出的論斷，大多數研究歷史的人只是“從過去的錯誤中學到如何犯下新的錯誤”。