中國在亞洲展開投資攻勢

China’s new charm offensive in Asia – using infrastructure development to garner soft power at the expense of rivals US and Japan – has reached new heights in recent weeks. Multi-billion US dollar deals with strategic partners such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan aside, even countries with reservations about China’s rise have begun taking a more pragmatic view toward using China’s huge foreign exchange reserves to their benefit.

中國在亞洲展開的新魅力攻勢——利用基礎設施開發來積累軟實力，從而打擊其競爭對手美國和日本——在最近幾周達到新的高點。除了與斯里蘭卡、巴基斯坦等戰略合作伙伴簽署數十億美元的協議以外，即便對中國崛起持保留態度的國家也開始採取更爲務實的態度，樂意利用前者的鉅額外匯儲備來造福本國。

Earlier this month, Indonesian leaders travelled to Beijing seeking to tap financing for power and transport projects, notwithstanding the new administration’s strong emphasis on both national and maritime security. Chinese companies are challenging Japanese bids for high speed rail contracts in Malaysia and Thailand. This week, a team from Indian Railways flew to Beijing to discuss a potential Delhi-Chennai high speed rail link.

不久前，印尼領導人來到北京尋求獲取電力和交通項目的融資，雖然新政府大力強調國家和海洋安全。中國公司正在與日本競爭馬來西亞和泰國的高鐵合同。上週，一個來自印度鐵路公司(Indian Railways)的團隊飛到北京，討論修建德里至欽奈高鐵的可能性。

Yet in spite of the huge stashes of money available in Beijing, Chinese financing for existing energy projects in Vietnam – an economy with high dependency on China – has been all but frozen as a result of bilateral tensions over the South China Sea, according to research by Asean Confidential, a research service at the Financial Times.

然而，英國《金融時報》旗下研究服務機構《東盟投資參考》(Asean Confidential)的研究表明，儘管北京方面有鉅額資金儲備可以使用，但由於中越兩國圍繞南中國海的緊張局勢，中國爲越南現有能源項目提供的融資幾乎都處於停滯狀態。越南在經濟上嚴重依賴中國。

Power grip

電力控制

Outwardly, tensions have been temporarily patched up. Government officials on both sides have agreed to paper over mutual differences. Official bilateral trade has grown 15 per cent year on year, and in late September a new Asia Development Bank-funded expressway connecting Hanoi, Vietnam’s capital, with the Chinese border at Lao Cai was formerly inaugurated.

表面看來，緊張局勢暫時得到了修補。兩國政府官員同意暫時擱置分歧。兩國正式的雙邊貿易額同比增長15%。今年9月末，由亞洲開發銀行(ADB)出資、從越南首都河內至與中國邊境接壤的老街的高速公路正式舉行了通車典禮。

But since May’s anti-China riots, Chinese lenders have effectively frozen credit lines to many Vietnamese engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts, leaving a number of projects in limbo and having forced some into restructuring. Unless this changes, Vietnam will have to rely heavily on South Korean and Japanese financing and subcontracting to fill the void.

但自今年5月越南國內爆發反華騷亂以來，中國的各家銀行事實上凍結了對許多越南工程、採購和建設(EPC)合同的信貸額度，導致大量項目陷入癱瘓，並迫使一些項目重組。除非形勢發生變化，否則越南將極其依賴韓國和日本的融資和分包來填補空缺。

What remains unclear, however, is whether South Korea and Japan are either willing or able to finance a planned 55 GW build-out between 2014 and 2030, with 29.5 GW of coal-fired generation targeted by 2020 alone (see map). The exposure of both countries to Vietnam is already high, potentially making them wary of further ratcheting up involvement.

然而，目前尚不清楚的是，韓國和日本是否願意或是否有能力爲2014年到2030年的5500萬千瓦電廠建設計劃提供融資，而僅僅到2020年的目標就要建成2950萬千瓦的火力發電廠（見圖表）。這兩個國家對越南的投資敞口已經很高了，很可能不願意進一步加大投資。

Many of these projects are already into their first phase of development, and are heavily invested by Japanese and Korean companies – which account for roughly 60 per cent of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, with companies such as Marubeni, Sojitz, Kepco, Daelim, and Hyundai Heavy Industries taking the lead backed by Japanese official development assistance.

其中許多項目已經進入第一期開發階段，主要由日本和韓國公司投資——這些投資佔到該國累計外國直接投資存量的約60%，丸紅(Marubeni)、雙日株式會社(Sojitz)、關西電力(Kepco)、大林(Daelim)和現代重工業株式會社(Hyundai Heavy Industries)等公司在日本官方發展援助的支持下扮演着主要角色。

The problem, however, is that the EPC contracts for many of these projects have been sub-contracted to state-owned Chinese consortiums, with sometimes up to 95 per cent of the total EPC value going to Chinese firms. These sub-contractors are in turn financed by export credits and concessional loans from Chinese policy lenders such as the China Ex-Im Bank – thus creating the vulnerability to a freeze in Chinese finance.

然而，問題在於，其中許多項目的EPC合約被分包給了中國國有財團，有時這一分包比例達到EPC合同價值的95%。這些分包商的融資又來自中國進出口銀行(China Ex-Im Bank)等中資政策銀行提供的出口信貸和優惠貸款，從而很容易受到中國融資凍結的影響。

How far can diversification go?

多樣化的空間

In the meantime Vietnam is seeking to rapidly diversify both its investment partners and its energy mix. Recently concluded or announced power deals include participation by not only Japanese and Korean companies, but also those from Thailand, Malaysia, India and Russia.

與此同時，越南正尋求迅速多樣化其投資合作伙伴和能源組合。最近締結或宣佈的電力協議不僅包括日本和韓國公司的參與，而且還有來自泰國、馬來西亞、印度和俄羅斯的公司。

Perhaps of even greater significance – although still inconclusive – is the revived momentum in negotiations with ExxonMobil over a long-delayed $10bn gas extraction deal, which would include onshore gas-fired power plants. With Asia’s fourth largest reserves of natural gas, independent estimates suggest that gas fields in undisputed waters off south Vietnam alone could generate an additional 20GW in coming decades.

或許更加重要的（不過仍然不是決定性的）是，與埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)關於拖延已久的100億美元天然氣開採協議的談判恢復了動力——該協議將包括建設陸地天然氣發電廠。越南擁有亞洲第四大天然氣儲藏，獨立機構進行的評估表明，僅僅是越南南部無爭議海域中的天然氣田就可能在未來幾十年額外帶來2000萬千瓦的電力。

This dovetails with the government’s push to reduce its dependency on refined fuel imports, resulting in a recent foreign investment boom in new refineries (on paper, a minimum $12bn in new investments through 2020), driving the share prices of PetroVietnam Gas – which accounts for almost 20 per cent of the Vietnamese stock market capitalization – to astronomical heights this year. Nuclear plants are also envisioned in the much longer term, attracting interest from Western, Japanese and Korean industry participants.

這符合越南政府降低對精煉燃料進口依賴的努力，這一努力導致最近針對新煉油廠的外國投資大幅增長（從賬面來看，在2020年前最少有120億美元的新投資），這推動越南國家石油公司(Petrovietnam)旗下天然氣公司——Petrovietnam Gas的股價今年上漲至令人不可思議的高點——該公司市值佔到越南股市的近20%。越南還有意在更長時期內建設核電站，吸引了來自西方、日本和韓國公司的興趣。

Nevertheless, while Vietnam could manage to diversify its key investment relationships, it may not be able to substitute for its northern neighbour entirely. As Vietnam gears towards the upcoming Congress of the Communist Party in 2016 – requiring incumbent Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to step down – the issue of how to manage the China relationship and Chinese financing of Vietnam’s infrastructure development, will become a paramount issue within Vietnam’s political circles.

然而，儘管越南可能會成功地多樣化其關鍵的投資關係，這也不能完全取代其與北方鄰國的關係。隨着越南着手準備於2016年召開越共全國代表大會——要求現任越南總理阮晉勇(Nguyen Tan Dung)下臺——如何管理中越關係以及中國對越基礎設施開發融資將成爲越南政界的頭等大事。

Similar, different risks in the Philippines

菲律賓與越南處境類似，卻也有不同的風險

Like Vietnam, the Philippines – which also disputes China’s claims in the South China Sea – has largely been left behind by China’s international largesse.

與越南一樣，菲律賓基本上被排除在中國海外投資的範圍之外——菲中在南中國海上也有領土糾紛。

Itself witnessing a boom in power generation (an expected power deficit next year notwithstanding), the country has however traditionally been less reliant on Chinese financing, in part due to the lack of government support for infrastructure projects. Its macro economy likewise is less China-centric, and has suffered only marginally as a result of a recent slump in Chinese packaged tours to the island resort of Boracay and imports of key products such as timber and fruit.

菲律賓自身的發電量大幅增長（雖然預計明年將出現電力供應缺口），該國傳統上對中國資金的依賴程度較低，這在一定程度上歸因於缺乏政府對基礎設施項目的支持。該國宏觀經濟同樣不是以中國爲中心，只是因最近前往長灘島的中國旅遊團數量銳減以及木材和水果等關鍵產品對華出口大幅下降而受到輕微的影響。

Nevertheless, China’s State Grid Corp has a 40 per cent equity stake in, and provides technical support and equipment to the Philippines’ National Grid Corp (NGCP), the country’s sole power grid operator. There are concerns in Manila that a Chinese stake in the country’s grid constitutes a risk to its operations and management.

然而，中國國家電網公司(State Grid Corp)在菲律賓國家電網公司(NGCP)擁有40%的股權，並向後者提供技術支持和設備——菲律賓國家電網公司是該國唯一一家電網運營商。馬尼拉有人擔心，中國公司在該國電網中的持股可能對其運營和管理造成威脅。

NGCP’s cooperation is urgently needed at a time when growing power integration will require greater levels of interconnection across the country’s sprawling archipelago, including between Visayas and Mindanao, between Negros Island and Batangas, and an upgrade of the existing Luzon – Visayas grid. Elsewhere, a Chinese quasi-government wealth fund owns a controlling stake in 2GO Group, which operates nationwide ferry services, an expansive network of warehouses, and as a result manages roughly 50 per cent of domestic Philippine freight.

菲律賓要加強電網整合，將需要該國雜亂無序的羣島之間加大互聯水平——包括維薩亞斯羣島(Visayas)和棉蘭老島(Mindanao)之間、內格羅斯島(Negros Island)和八打雁(Batangas)之間——並對現有的呂宋島-維薩亞斯電網進行升級改造，在此之際菲律賓國家電網公司亟需合作。在其他領域，中國一家準政府財富基金持有2GO Group的控股權——2GO Group運營着菲律賓全國範圍內的擺渡服務，以及一個龐大的倉庫網絡，從而管理着國內大約50%的貨運。

Of course, both are single equity investments by technocratic, commercially driven companies, and have been highly profitable in both cases due to their effective monopolies in respective sectors. In that sense, the levels of attached political risk may to some extent be overblown.

當然，這兩個案例都是由技術型商業公司做出的單一股權投資，並且都因爲在各自領域佔據實際壟斷地位而獲得豐厚利潤。從這個意義上來說，其中的政治風險可能在某種程度上被誇大了。

Nevertheless, the Philippines, like Vietnam, is likely to turn towards its other investment partners at a time when Beijing is shunning the two countries in favour of other infrastructure-deficient countries in the region. Indeed, the scale of China’s largesse everywhere else in the region serves in part as a subtle reminder that both countries have much to lose by refusing to accept China’s new role in regional order.

然而，與越南一樣，在北京方面避開這兩個國家，支持該地區其他基礎設施不足的國家之際，菲律賓也可能轉向其他投資夥伴。實際上，中國在亞洲其他所有地區大舉投資一定程度上也隱晦地表明，這兩個國家拒絕接受中國在地區秩序中的新角色會失去很多東西。