歐元區值得爲擴張政策冒險

Might the policies of the eurozone result in a robust recovery? My answer is: no. Since the eurozone generated 17 per cent of world output in 2013 (at market prices), that answer has global significance.

歐元區的政策會不會促成強勁復甦？我認爲答案是否定的。鑑於2013年歐元區產出佔世界總產出的17%（以市場價計算），這個否定答案對全世界都有意義。

It is Germany that set the economic strategy of the eurozone. It consists of three elements: structural reform; fiscal discipline; and monetary accommodation. So far, this set of policies has failed to generate adequate demand: in the second quarter of 2014, real demand in the eurozone was 5 per cent smaller than it was in the first quarter of 2008.

制定歐元區經濟策略的是德國。這一策略包含三個部分：結構改革、財政紀律、寬鬆貨幣政策。迄今爲止，這一套政策一直未能創造足夠的需求：2014年第二季度，歐元區實際需求比2008年第一季度少5%。

Both France and Italy are being encouraged to accelerate “structural reforms” as a way to reignite growth in their own economies and so, given their importance, also in the eurozone. These two countries generate 38 per cent of eurozone gross domestic product, against 28 per cent for Germany alone. In both economies, the recommended programmes involve liberalising the labour market. They are both being encouraged to follow Germany’s “Hartz reforms”, introduced between 2003 and 2005, to which the country’s relatively good recent labour market performance is often attributed.

法國和意大利都受到鼓勵要加快“結構改革”，以重啓本國經濟增長，鑑於這兩國的重要性，這也就相當於重啓歐元區經濟增長。這兩個國家的國內生產總值(GDP)之和佔歐元區的38%，而德國一個國家佔28%。在法意兩國，被鼓勵實施的改革計劃都包括放開勞動力市場。法意兩國都被鼓勵效仿德國在2003年至2005年之間推出的“哈爾茨改革”(Hartz reforms)，人們往往將德國近期相對不錯的勞動力市場表現歸功於該項改革。

Yet the one thing those reforms did not do is create dynamic aggregate demand. Between the second quarter of 2004 and the second quarter of 2014, Germany’s real domestic demand grew 11.2 per cent, a compound annual rate of 1 per cent. It could have been worse. But this is hardly the performance of a “locomotive” (see chart).

然而，哈爾茨改革沒有實現的一點是創造活躍的總需求。從2004年第二季度到2014年第二季度，德國實際內需增長了11.2%，相當於1%的複合年化增長率。情況原本還可能更糟。這很難算是“經濟火車頭”應有的表現。

Examination of Germany’s sectoral financial balances – the differences between income and spending of the government, private sector and foreigners – strengthens this point. The response of the German private sector to the reforms of the early 2000s was to increase financial surpluses massively: that is, to spend far less than their incomes. Since the fiscal deficit also shrank, the capital outflow soared. This is striking and significant. In brief, the response of the private sector to the labour market reforms and fiscal tightening was to become increasingly frugal and so accumulate large quantities of (often poor-quality) foreign assets.

查看德國各部門的收支平衡情況，即政府、私人部門和外資的收支差距，就能更明顯地看出這一點。德國私人部門對本世紀頭幾年哈爾茨改革的反應是，大幅增加財務盈餘，即支出大大少於收入。由於政府財政赤字也縮水了，資本外流飆升。這是顯著和突出的。簡而言之，私人部門對勞動力市場改革和財政緊縮的反應是變得越來越節約，從而積攢下數量巨大（但往往質量低下）的海外資產。

In terms of raising private domestic demand, reforms achieved little. On the contrary, Germany became heavily dependent on foreign demand. Similarly, fiscal tightening did not unleash stronger private spending. Expecting similar labour-market reforms to promote demand in France and Italy is likely to prove highly over-optimistic.

在提高私人部門內需方面，改革收效甚微。相反，德國變得嚴重依賴外需。類似的，財政緊縮未能讓私人支出變得更強勁。指望類似的勞動力市場改革能在法國和意大利提升需求，很可能將被證明是過於樂觀。

This does not mean reforms achieved nothing. Germany has low unemployment despite quite weak growth. The UK also has relatively low unemployment despite still weaker post-crisis economic growth. In both cases, the labour reforms encouraged the sharing of a large negative shock across the population via stagnant or even falling real earnings. A symptom of this form of an adjustment is weak productivity. In German industry, productivity has not risen since 2007. Productivity performance has also been poor in the UK. But German unemployment was 4.9 per cent in July and the UK’s only 6 per cent against 10.4 per cent in France.

這不是說哈爾茨改革沒有取得任何成果。儘管增長非常疲弱，但德國實現了低失業率。英國儘管在金融危機後經濟增長仍然疲弱，但失業率也較低。在這兩個例子裏，勞動力市場改革都通過實際收入的停滯甚至下降，將大規模的負面衝擊分散至整個人口。這種調整的特徵之一就是低生產率。在德國工業中，生產率自2007年起就沒有再提高過。英國的生產率表現也一直不理想。但德國7月失業率爲4.9%，英國僅6%，而法國爲10.4%。

The upshot is that labour market reforms do little if anything to promote demand; in Germany’s case, much of the demand has come from abroad. What might this mean for the eurozone as a whole? A theoretical possibility is that the eurozone would seek to generate a current account surplus that is as big relative to GDP as Germany’s. This would mean a surplus not of $300bn, as in 2013, but of $900bn.

結果是，勞動力市場改革對促進需求毫無作用、或作用很小。在德國的例子中，很大一部分需求來自國外。這對整個歐元區意味着什麼？在理論上，一個可能性是歐元區將尋求創造與德國一樣高的經常賬戶盈餘與GDP比率。這意味着歐元區的經常賬戶盈餘必須從2013年的3000億美元增至9000億美元。

This could never be sustained: the rest of the world would not absorb it and an appreciation of the euro is likely to defeat it. The proper complement to structural reform is additional demand inside the eurozone. That is needed, in any case, to eliminate the difficulties being created by ultra-low inflation and the possibility of deflation. German core inflation of only 1.2 per cent is too low to let adjustment work satisfactorily.

這種狀況絕不可能持續：世界其餘地區無法吸收歐元區這樣大的經常賬戶盈餘，歐元的升值也很可能使之挫敗。能夠對結構改革形成合理補充的措施是，在歐元區內部創造額外需求。無論如何，這樣的措施對克服超低通脹以及通縮可能性造成的困難都是必需的。德國僅1.2%的核心通脹率太低，無法讓調整產生令人滿意的效果。

With conventional monetary policy at its limits, the choices are between unconventional monetary policy or expansionary fiscal policy. Germany is extremely uncomfortable with both.

鑑於常規貨幣政策已到達極限，我們只能選擇非常規貨幣政策或擴張性財政政策——這兩種政策在德國看來都是下策。

Yet, partly because of its haven status, Germany is also able to borrow at extraordinarily favourable interest rates. The 30-year Bund is now yielding 1.8 per cent. If one assumes the European Central Bank will meet its inflation target, this means a long-term real interest rate of zero. Such negligible costs of borrowing must transform views of the costs of fiscal deficits. Germany should both refinance its debt at such rates and borrow to finance additional public investment. Focusing on deficits and debts, without noticing the interest rate, makes no sense. In the same way, the focus on whether the French deficit breaks the rules is absurd. Even French 10-year bonds are yielding 1.1 per cent. The markets are screaming: borrow.

然而，部分緣於其避險地的地位，德國還能夠以極爲優惠的利率借款。30年期德國國債眼下的收益率爲1.8%。如果假設歐洲央行(ECB)能夠實現其通脹目標，這意味着長期實際利率爲零。借款成本低得可忽略不計，必然會改變人們對財政赤字成本的看法。德國應該以這樣的利率對其債務進行再融資，並增加借債爲額外的公共投資提供資金。拋開利率關注赤字和債務是不合理的。同樣，關注法國的赤字水平是否超標也是荒謬的。就連法國的10年期債券收益率都爲1.1%。各個市場都在尖叫：多借錢！

The big challenge for the eurozone is not to create institutions, but to promote adjustment and restore growth. The people of the eurozone cannot be expected to remain patient forever. Indeed, the dangers of continuing economic stagnation are obvious.

歐元區面臨的巨大難題不在於創造制度，而在於促進調整、恢復增長。我們不能期望歐元區人民能永遠保持耐心。事實上，經濟停滯持續下去會帶來哪些風險是顯而易見的。

Germany is right that euro states need much long-term reform. But Germany is wrong to believe that this might, on its own, generate strong growth. The evidence from its experience with reforms is decisive on this point: it will not do so.

德國稱歐元區國家必須進行大量長期改革，這話沒錯。但德國認爲改革本身就能創造強勁的增長，這是錯誤的。在這一點上，德國本身在改革方面的經驗就能一舉證明：改革本身無法做到這一點。

Nor does it make sense to rely on ever-greater external surpluses, instead. A policy that may work for Germany alone (a debatable proposition) cannot work for an economy more than three times as big as Germany’s.

另外，依賴於越來越大的順差也是不合理的。能夠在德國一個國家身上起作用（是否起了作用還有爭議）的政策，無法在一個逾三倍於德國的經濟體身上起作用。

The eurozone needs to reach a bargain between more reform and extra demand. In doing so, it must recognise that persistent stagnation is a big threat to stability. The eurozone should risk expansion. That is now the safer course.

歐元區必須在加大改革和增加需求之間實現平衡。在這個過程中，它必須認識到持續的停滯對穩定是個巨大的威脅。歐元區應該冒險採取擴張政策。眼下擴張是條更安全的道路。