美歐央行政策差異的挑戰

The European Central Bank eased monetary policy last week, albeit not enough to please markets. But the US Federal Reserve is widely expected to raise short-term rates next week. This divergence between the most important central banks is likely to prove significant. Does this make sense for each in view of their own mandates? And what complications might such a divergence create for the world?

歐洲央行(ECB)最近放鬆了貨幣政策，儘管還不足以取悅市場。但市場普遍預期美聯儲(Fed)即將提高短期利率。全球最重要的這兩家央行的這種政策差異可能被證明意義重大。這對它們各自的使命有道理嗎？這種差異可能給世界帶來哪些複雜局面？

At first glance, the answer to the first question is straightforward: yes. The Fed and the ECB ought to be following different policies because their economies are in such widely different places.

乍看之下，第一個問題的答案顯而易見：有道理。美聯儲和歐洲央行應該出臺不同的政策，因爲它們所在的經濟體處於截然不同的位置。

As Janet Yellen, Fed chair, pointed out last week, the US economy has enjoyed a sustained recovery since the Great Recession. The unemployment rate has declined from a post-crisis peak of 10 per cent to 5 per cent. The annual rate of core consumer price inflation — excluding food and energy — is also close to (though below) the target of 2 per cent. It seems reasonable, given all these facts, to argue that the US economy is both growing at well above potential rate and is close enough to full employment for tightening to begin.

正如美聯儲主席珍妮特耶倫(Janet Yellen)最近指出的那樣，美國經濟自“大衰退”以來持續復甦。失業率從危機後的10%的峯值降至5%。剔除食品和能源的核心消費價格指數(CPI)也接近（儘管低於）2%的目標。鑑於所有這些事實，我們似乎有理由說，美國經濟正以遠高於潛在增長率的速度增長，而且足夠接近充分就業，啓動收緊的條件已經具備。

The eurozone is in a very different place, as Mario Draghi, ECB president noted in another significant speech in New York last week. The eurozone has not enjoyed a strong recovery from the Great Recession and the subsequent eurozone recession. On the contrary, in the second quarter of this year, real domestic demand was still 3.5 per cent lower than pre-crisis. From its peak of 12.1 per cent in early 2013, the unemployment rate has fallen only to 10.8 per cent. As Mr Draghi stressed, the ECB is failing to achieve its mandate of price stability, as it defines it: a rate of CPI “ but close to, 2 per cent”. In October, year-on-year core CPI was just 1.1 per cent and the headline rate just 0.1 per cent. Indeed, year-on-year core inflation in the eurozone has been below 2 per cent since March 2013. (See charts.)

歐元區的情況則截然不同，正如歐洲央行行長馬里奧德拉吉(Mario Draghi)最近在紐約所做的重要演講中指出的那樣。歐元區沒有從“大衰退”以及隨後的歐元區衰退強勁復甦。相反，在今年第二季度，歐元區實際內需水平仍比危機前低3.5%。失業率從2013年初12.1%的峯值僅僅降至10.8%。正如德拉吉強調的那樣，歐洲央行未能實現價格穩定的使命——它對價格穩定的定義是：CPI“低於但接近2%”。今年10月，核心CPI指數同比僅上漲1.1%，整體CPI僅上漲0.1%。實際上，自2013年3月以來，歐元區核心通脹率同比一直低於2%（見圖表）。

To deliver on their mandates the central banks ought to be behaving differently. But this does not mean what they are about to do is right. This is partly their mandates are different. It is also because both are too conservative.

爲了完成各自的使命，這兩家央行應該出臺不同的政策。但這並不意味着它們即將做的事情是正確的。這在一定程度上是因爲它們的使命不同，也因爲它們都過於保守。

First, the Fed. Here are four reasons why the case against raising rates is still strong. First, there is no sign of significant inflationary pressure; the strength of the dollar will also keep inflation in check. Second, if the Fed were pursuing a symmetrical policy, inflation should be above 2 per cent as much as below. In fact, core inflation has been below 2 per cent most of the time since the end of 2008. Third, there is a real risk that the tightening will have a bigger negative effect on the economy than expected, particularly if it is seen as the first of many moves (however gradual). Given this, there is a substantial risk that the interest rate will be brought back hard against the zero lower bound in the next (possibly quite imminent) recession.

先說美聯儲。4個反對加息的理由仍然很充分。首先，沒有跡象表明存在顯著通脹壓力，同時美元強勢也遏制了通脹。第二，如果說美聯儲實施了對稱政策，那麼通脹應該時而高於、時而低於2%。實際上，自2008年末以來的大部分時間裏，核心通脹率一直低於2%。第三，一個切實的風險是，收緊對經濟的負面影響將超過預期，尤其是如果它被視爲多次收緊的第一步（無論怎麼漸進）。鑑於此，一個重大風險是，利率將在下一場衰退（可能很快就會來臨）中猛然下調至零下限。

Last and most important, while unemployment is low, so is the participation rate. There is a good chance that, if the economy is run “hot”, more workers will be pulled into the labour force. It is possible, too, this would accelerate investment and productivity growth, keeping inflation in check. So the risks of tightening exceed those of waiting.

最後也是最重要的是，儘管失業率保持低位，但參與率同樣不高。如果讓經濟在“高溫”下運行，更多工人很可能被拉到勞動力大軍裏。同樣可能的是，這將加速投資和生產率增長，遏制通脹。因此收緊的風險超過等一等的風險。

Some will argue that delay risks further destabilising the financial system. This view is problematic. If the monetary policy that stabilises supply and demand in the real economy destabilises the financial system, the problem lies in the latter. It must be dealt with forcibly and directly.

一些人將會辯稱，推遲加息有可能進一步破壞金融體系的穩定。這種觀點存在問題。如果穩定實體經濟供需的貨幣政策破壞了金融體系的穩定，那麼問題出在後者。必須有力而直接地解決這個問題。

The ECB, meanwhile, disappointed the markets. This is not of itself important; its job is not to please markets but to stabilise the eurozone economy. Still, it merely lowered the deposit rate 10 basis points, extending quantitative easing at an unchanged 60bn a month, by six months, to March 2017. This simply does not qualify as decisive action.

與此同時，歐洲央行讓市場感到失望。這本身並不重要；歐洲央行的工作不是取悅市場，而是穩定歐元區經濟。話雖如此，歐洲央行只是將存款利率下調10個基點，將每月600億歐元的量化寬鬆計劃延長6個月，至2017年3月，但規模不變。這確實算不上果斷的行動。

In his New York speech, Mr Draghi seemed to recognise this. He made three fundamental points. Today’s aggressive policies are working; the loosening last week was significant; and “There cannot be any limit to how far we are willing to deploy our instruments, within our mandate, and to achieve our mandate.” The points are reasonable. Even so, the ECB should have announced it will continue with QE until it hits its inflation goal. The unnecessary weakness of the eurozone economy has gone on too long.

德拉吉在紐約的演講中似乎認識到了這一點。他提出3個根本觀點：如今的激進政策正在見效；最近的政策放鬆規模可觀；以及“我們在使命範圍內動用政策工具以履行使命的意願是沒有限度的”。這些觀點是合理的。即便如此，歐洲央行本應宣佈將繼續量化寬鬆直至達到通脹目標。歐元區經濟的不必要疲弱已經持續太久了。

Whatever the drawbacks of the decisions of the two central banks, the big picture is clear. The US is years ahead of the eurozone in its recovery and is, in consequence, at a different stage of the monetary policy cycle. It is likely the divergence will increase modestly in the next few years. The Fed is also likely to diverge increasingly from the Bank of Japan, which will remain ultra-loose, and the People’s Bank of China, which is loosening (albeit from a tighter starting point). To return to the question of the potential complications of such a divergence, it is likely to reinforce the strength of the dollar, which in turn, would worsen the difficulties of dollar-denominated borrowers. Yet it would also be risky to extrapolate the divergence too confidently. The Fed may find the US economy is not as strong as it believes, particularly given the strength of the dollar. If so, the tightening might be small and brief.

無論這兩家央行的決定有什麼不足，大格局是顯而易見的。美國在復甦軌道上超前歐元區幾年，因而處於貨幣政策週期的不同階段。這種差異很可能在今後幾年溫和加大。美聯儲與日本央行(BoJ)和中國央行的政策分歧也可能越來越大——日本央行將保持超級寬鬆政策，而中國央行正在放鬆政策（儘管是從偏緊的起點開始）。回到上面的問題，即這種差異可能帶來哪些複雜局面，它可能讓美元更加強勢，進而加劇以美元計價的借款人的困難。然而，過於自信地外推這種差異也是有風險的。美聯儲可能發現美國經濟不像其認爲的那麼強勁，尤其是考慮到美元的強勢。若果真如此，美國的收緊可能是小幅和短暫的。

While good reasons do exist for the divergence, experience reminds us of the danger of overconfidence. The BoJ has now had near-zero short-term rates for two decades. It also raised rates, modestly, in 2000 and in 2006 and 2007. It was forced to reverse. The Fed should note this sobering precedent.

儘管美國和歐元區的政策差異的確有很好的理由，但經驗提醒我們，自信過頭是有危險的。日本央行實行接近於零的短期利率已有近20年。它也曾在2000年、2006年和2007年溫和加息，隨後被迫逆轉政策。美聯儲應該留意這種令人警醒的先例。