新加坡、韓國爲“五眼”間諜聯盟夥伴國 協助監聽亞洲海底通訊電纜

Singapore and South Korea are playing key roles helping the United States and Australia tap undersea telecommunications links across Asia, according to top secret documents leaked by former US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden. New details have also been revealed about the involvement of Australia and New Zealand in the interception of global satellite communications.

A top secret United States National Security Agency map shows that the US and its “Five Eyes” intelligence partners tap high speed fibre optic cables at 20 locations worldwide. The interception operation involves cooperation with local governments and telecommunications companies or else through “covert, clandestine” operations.

The undersea cable interception operations are part of a global web that in the words of another leaked NSA planning document enables the “Five Eyes” partners – the US, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand - to trace “anyone, anywhere, anytime” in what is described as “the golden age” signals intelligence.

The NSA map, published by Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad overnight, shows that the United States maintains a stranglehold on trans-Pacific communications channels with interception facilities on the West coast of the United States and at Hawaii and Guam, tapping all cable traffic across the Pacific Ocean as well as links between Australia and Japan.

The map confirms that Singapore, one of the world's most significant telecommunications hubs, is a key “third party” working with the “Five Eyes” intelligence partners.

In August Fairfax Media reported that Australia's electronic espionage agency, the Defence Signals Directorate, is in a partnership with Singaporean intelligence to tap the SEA-ME-WE-3 cable that runs from Japan, via Singapore, Djibouti, Suez and the Straits of Gibraltar to Northern Germany.

Australian intelligence sources told Fairfax that the highly secretive Security and Intelligence Division of Singapore's Ministry of Defence co-operates with DSD in accessing and sharing communications carried by the SEA-ME-WE-3 cable as well as the SEA-ME-WE-4 cable that runs from Singapore to the south of France.

Access to this major international telecommunications channel, facilitated by Singapore's government-owned operator SingTel, has been a key element in an expansion of Australian-Singaporean intelligence and defence ties over the past 15 years.

Majority owned by Temask Holdings, the investment arm of the Singapore Government, SingTel has close relations with Singapore's intelligence agencies. The Singapore Government is represented on the company's board by the head of Singapore's civil service, Peter Ong, who was previously responsible for national security and intelligence co-ordination in the Singapore Prime Minister's office.

Australian intelligence expert, Australian National University Professor Des Ball has described Singapore's signal's intelligence capability as “probably the most advanced” in South East Asia, having first been developed in cooperation with Australia in the mid-1970s and subsequently leveraging Singapore's position as a regional telecommunications hub.

Indonesia and Malaysia have been key targets for Australian and Singaporean intelligence collaboration since the 1970s. Much of Indonesia's telecommunications and Internet traffic is routed through Singapore.

The leaked NSA map also shows South Korea is another key interception point with cable landings at Pusan providing access to the external communications of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

South Korea's National Intelligence Service has long been a close collaborator with the US Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA, as well as the Australian intelligence agencies. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation recently engaged in legal action in an unsuccessful effort to prevent publication of details of South Korean espionage in Australia. ASIO Director-General David Irvine told the Federal Court that Australian and South Korean intelligence agencies had been cooperating for “over 30 years” and that any public disclose of NIS activities would be “detrimental” to Australia's national security.

The NSA map and other documents leaked by Mr Snowden and published by the Brazilian O Globo newspaper also reveal new detail on the integration of Australian and New Zealand signals intelligence facilities in the interception of satellite communications traffic by the “Five Eyes” partners.

For the first time it is revealed that the DSD satellite interception facility at Kojarena near Geraldton in Western Australia is codenamed “STELLAR”. The New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau facility at Waihopai on New Zealand's South Island is codenamed “IRONSAND”. The codename for DSD's facility at Shoal Bay near Darwin is not identified. However all three facilities are listed by the NSA as “primary FORNSAT (foreign satellite communications) collection operations”.

Coverage of satellite communications across Asia and the Middle East is also supported by NSA facilities at the United States Air Force base at Misawa in Japan, US diplomatic premises in Thailand and India, and British Government Communications Headquarters facilities in Oman, Nairobi in Kenya and at the British military base in Cyprus.

The leaked NSA map also shows that undersea cables are accessed by the NSA and the British GCHQ through military facilities in Djibouti and Oman, thereby ensuring maximum coverage of Middle East and South Asian communications.據澳大利亞《悉尼先驅晨報》11月25日報道，美國國家安全局（NSA）前僱員愛德華•斯諾登最新公佈的一份機密文件顯示，新加坡和韓國是美國主導的“五眼”（Five Eyes）間諜聯盟在亞洲的夥伴國，在協助美國和澳大利亞在亞洲鋪設海底通訊電纜一事上立下“汗馬功勞”。

***美國攥住跨太平洋通訊命脈

24日晚，荷蘭《新鹿特丹商報》登載了一張美國國安局的絕密地圖，地圖上清楚標明美國及其“五眼”間諜聯盟夥伴國在世界各地鋪設了20處高速光纖電纜。至於其信息攔截行動，則需尋求電纜所在地的政府和通訊公司提供“隱蔽的、偷偷摸摸的”幫助。

根據斯諾登此前披露的文件，“五眼”間諜聯盟即美國、英國、加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭。該聯盟將全球劃分爲五大監聽區域，五國分別監聽並資源共享，以實現在“任何時間、任何地點、（追蹤）任何人”的目標。有人認爲，“五眼”間諜聯盟創造了通信情報界的“黃金時代”。

而海底電纜攔截信息行動是“五眼”間諜聯盟構建的全球監聽網絡的一個重要組成部分。這張地圖顯示，通過在該國西海岸、夏威夷島和關島設立攔截設施、竊聽太平洋底所有通訊電纜以及連接澳大利亞和日本的電纜，美國已把跨太平洋的通訊渠道牢牢攥在手中。

***新加坡爲“五眼”聯盟合作方

與此同時，該地圖還證實，作爲世界上最爲重要的通信樞紐之一，新加坡也被美國收歸麾下，成爲與“五眼”間諜聯盟緊密合作的“第三方”。

今年8月，有媒體報道稱，澳大利亞電子間諜機構國防信號局（DSD）與新加坡情報機構展開合作，共同竊聽SEA-ME-WE-3電纜。該電纜始於日本，經新加坡、吉布提、埃及蘇伊士、直布羅陀海峽通往德國北部，是一條極其重要的國際電信通道，由新加坡國有運營商新加坡電信（SingTel）協助鋪設。

另有澳大利亞情報人士透露，連接新加坡和法國南部的SEA-ME-WE-4電纜同爲新加坡和澳大利亞兩國情報機構監聽的目標，兩國攔截電纜通訊並共享資源。

澳大利亞情報專家、澳大利亞國立大學教授德斯•波爾認爲，新加坡的信號情報能力“可能是南亞地區最爲先進的”。新加坡和澳大利亞的合作始於20世紀70年代中期，在過去15年裏，有權獲取經由SEA-ME-WE-3電纜傳輸的通訊信息成爲兩國情報及國防關係日趨密切重要推動因素，而印度尼西亞和馬來西亞是其主要監聽目標。

***韓澳保持逾30年情報合作

除新加坡外，韓國成爲“五眼”間諜聯盟設在亞洲的另外一個重要信息攔截據點。藉由鋪設在太平洋港口城市釜山附近海域的海底電纜，“五眼”間諜聯盟可獲取中國大陸、香港和臺灣等地的外部通訊信息。

長期以來，韓國國家情報院一直是美國中央情報局和國安局，以及澳大利亞情報機構的親密合作夥伴。

前不久，澳大利亞安全情報組織（ASIO）捲入一場法律糾紛，試圖阻止有關機構公開韓國在澳間諜行動。該組織負責人大衛•爾文在聯邦法院上辯稱，澳大利亞和韓國的情報合作已持續“超過30年”，任何公開披露韓國情報活動的行爲將“損害”澳大利亞的國家安全。但是，上述努力還是以失敗告終。