中國會出現銀行業危機嗎

The extraordinarily rapid rise of debt in China, particularly in the corporate sector, has given rise to fears that the country may be unable to avoid a banking crisis that would slow its growth and have substantial negative spillovers on the global economy. This fear is based on recent estimates by the International Monetary Fund and some investment banks that a substantial portion of new lending in recent years has gone to state-owned companies producing oversupplied goods where profits have turned -negative.

中國債務水平、尤其是公司部門債務非同尋常的上升速度，令人擔心該國或許無法避免一場銀行業危機，進而減緩本國經濟增長，並對全球經濟產生重大負面溢出效應。這種擔憂是由國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)和一些投行近來的估算引發的。據它們估計，中國近年來新增貸款的很大一部分流向了生產過剩產品、利潤已變爲負值的國有企業。

In fact, while lending more to corporates unable to pay interest and principal on previous loans means financial risks are clearly rising, it is likely that China is years away from a potential banking crisis, providing it with a window to slow the growth of credit to a sustainable level. A key reason for this judgment is that while the ratio of debt to gross domestic product is quite elevated, China also enjoys a high rate of national savings. The level of debt a country can sustain depends significantly on the share of domestic savings in GDP.

事實上，儘管向無力償還之前貸款本息的企業發放更多貸款意味着金融風險顯然在上升，但中國距離一場潛在銀行業危機很可能還有多年時間，這讓中國獲得了把信貸增速降低到可持續水平的一段窗口期。作出這一判斷的一條關鍵理由是，儘管債務與國內生產總值(GDP)之比相當高，但中國的國民儲蓄率也非常高。一個國家可以支持的債務水平，在很大程度上取決於國內儲蓄與GDP之比。

Second, China’s debt build-up is almost entirely in domestic currency. Local companies have been paying down their foreign currency debt since the third quarter of 2014 and it now accounts for only 5 per cent of domestic debt. In contrast, a recent study of other emerging markets found that the median foreign currency debt as a share of total debt is four times the Chinese share. Moreover, China remains a large net creditor to the rest of the world. Thus, the country is not vulnerable to a financial crisis such as the one in Asia in 1997, which was precipitated by a refusal of foreign lenders to roll over their credit to Asian corporates.

第二，中國積累起來的債務幾乎全部是以本幣計價的債務。自從2014年第三季度以來，國內企業一直在償還外幣債務，如今外幣債務僅僅相當於國內債務的5%。相比之下，不久前一份對其他新興市場的研究發現，其外幣債務佔總債務的中值份額達到中國水平的4倍。此外，中國對世界其他地區仍是一個大型淨債權國。因此，中國不會輕易爆發1997年亞洲金融危機那樣的危機，那場危機是由外國銀行拒絕滾轉亞洲企業所欠債務而引發的。

Third, banking crises almost always begin with problems on the liability side of bank balance sheets. But Chinese banks’ liabilities are overwhelmingly deposits, which are very sticky. Bank reliance on wholesale funding is minimal. Thus, loans plus off-balance sheet assets are roughly equal to deposits, far from the 120-150 per cent ratios frequently seen in countries before the onset of banking crises. In any case, the central bank has substantial tools to deal with potential bank runs. For example, the required reserve ratio imposed on banks is currently 17 per cent. This could be cut with hugely positive effects on bank liquidity.

第三，銀行業危機幾乎總是源於銀行資產負債表的負債端問題。但在中國，銀行負債幾乎全部是粘性很大的存款。銀行對於批發融資的依賴是最低限度的。因此，貸款加上表外資產之和大致與存款水平相當，兩者之比遠未達到銀行業危機爆發前經常在一些國家見到的120%至150%的比例。無論如何，中國央行擁有大量工具去應對潛在的銀行擠兌。例如，當前商業銀行的存款準備金率爲17%。存準率可以降低，對銀行流動性產生巨大的正面影響。

Fears of an impending banking crisis are often based on the assertion that China’s banks are far weaker than advertised. Given the huge acceleration of credit growth beginning with the global financial crisis, non-performing loan ratios in the 1 to 2 per cent range are not credible on this view. But this argument does not recognise that some banks have been aggressively writing off NPLs, making low reported NPL ratios more plausible. For example, Citic Bank and Bank of Communications in the first half of 2015 disposed of 75 and 30 per cent, respectively, of their year-end 2014 non-performing loan balances. More generally, the average provision coverage ratio of Chinese banks is about 150 per cent of reported NPLs.

對於中國即將發生銀行業危機的擔憂基於如下斷言：中國的銀行遠比對外宣傳的更爲虛弱。鑑於自全球金融危機以來信貸增長達到極高加速度，1%至2%的不良貸款率並不可信。但這一觀點沒有意識到，一些銀行一直在積極註銷不良貸款，使得報告的較低不良貸款率更爲可信。例如，2015年上半年，中信銀行(Citic Bank)和交通銀行(Bank of Communications)處置的不良資產分別佔到其2014年底不良貸款餘額的75%和30%。總體而言，中國銀行業的平均撥備覆蓋率大約相當於報告的不良貸款的150%。

Is it likely that weakened banks will ultimately be forced dramatically to slow their extension of credit, leading to a lengthy period of slow growth? This was the pattern in Japan, which some argue China is doomed to follow. But in the 1990s, when excess lending to poorly performing state-owned enterprises led Chinese banks to the brink of insolvency, the government initiated a massive recapitalisation programme that allowed the institutions to continue to lend, supporting the strong growth achieved in the first decade of this century. This was very unlike the situation in Japan, where the authorities for a decade refused to recognise weak bank balance sheets.

實力變弱的銀行最終將被迫大幅放緩信貸擴張速度，導致經濟進入漫長的低增長時期，這種情況可能發生嗎？那正是日本的軌跡，有些人辯稱，中國註定會跟日本一樣。但在1990年代，當對績差國企放貸過度導致中國銀行業瀕臨破產時，中國政府啓動了一個大規模的資本重組項目，使銀行得以繼續放貸，支撐了中國在本世紀前十年的強勁增長。這種情況不太可能在日本發生，因爲在長達十年期間，日本當局拒絕承認銀行資產負債表疲弱。

In addition, Chinese banks have far less exposure to poorly performing state-owned corporates than in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, before the recapitalisation of the banking system, loans to SOEs accounted for 62 per cent of all renminbi loans of banks and other financial institutions. Today, that share has fallen to 30 per cent, largely because banks have increasingly lent to private companies and to households. The former earn an average return on assets that is two to three times that of state companies and the latter have relatively strong balance sheets.

此外，中國銀行業現在對績差國企的敞口遠低於1990年代。1990年代中期，在銀行系統資本重組之前，對國企的貸款佔到了銀行及非銀行金融機構人民幣貸款總額的62%。如今，這個比例已降到了30%，主要是因爲銀行一直不斷增加對民企和家庭的貸款。民企的平均資產回報率是國企的兩至三倍，而中國家庭有着相對強勁的資產負債表。

To reduce the risks that are accumulating in the financial sector, the authorities must move aggressively to curtail the flow of credit to chronically unprofitable, mostly state-owned corporates. The central government’s campaign to close down these so-called zombie companies is already under way, but not surprisingly it is meeting resistance at the local level.

爲了降低金融業正在積累的風險，中國當局必須積極採取行動，遏止信貸流向長期不盈利的企業、主要是國企。中央政府發起的關停殭屍企業的行動正在進行中，但意料中的是，該行動在地方層面遭遇了阻力。

This resistance must be overcome and the central government must also deal with the existing stock of bad assets by some combination of accelerated write-offs and securitisation of under-performing bank assets and even partial recapitalisation of the weakest financial institutions.

中國必須克服這種阻力，中央政府也必須綜合運用加快銀行不良資產的註銷與證券化、甚至對最弱金融機構實施局部資本重組等手段，處置好存量不良資產。