中國銀行業改革面臨倒退危險

While Western governments debate how to reform their banking sectors, Beijing is now facing a different problem: how to keep from gutting the last decade of banking reform it's already been through. There's a very real danger that policy makers will undo their earlier efforts in the name of short-term stimulus.
眼下，在西方國家政府爭論應如何改革它們的銀行體系之際，中國政府卻面臨着一個不同的問題：如何避免讓它過去10年來已獲得的改革成果前功盡棄。現在的確存在着一種危險，即：決策者有可能在短期刺激計劃的名義下毀掉他們早些時候做出的努力。

The central problem is the Chinese government's strategy of stimulating the economy through an enormous expansion of bank lending. The government has turned to the banks to finance half of its four trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package. In addition to that, the government has set high targets for commercial lending to support businesses. China's lenders pumped out more than 4.5 trillion yuan in new loans in the first quarter of 2009, 8% more than in all of 2008.
問題的核心是中國政府正在實行的通過大規模擴大銀行信貸來刺激經濟的策略。政府4萬億元人民幣(合5,860億美元)經濟刺激計劃的一半資金都有賴銀行提供。除此之外，政府還爲支持企業的商業借貸制定了高目標。今年一季度，中國銀行業新增貸款超過4.5萬億元，較2008年全年的數字還高出8%。

This is eerily reminiscient of an earlier era when the government leaned heavily on banks to finance economic growth, and especially large state-owned enterprises. In the 1980s and '90s, Chinese banks piled up a colossal tangle of politically directed bad debts that either could not be repaid, or were never meant to be repaid in the first place. In 2003 nonperforming loans made up 20.4% of banks' total loan books, a face value equivalent to 16.5% of GDP. This threatened to swamp the entire economy.
這種局面會令人不禁回想起前些年的情形，當時中國政府嚴重依賴銀行資金來支撐經濟增長，特別是大型國有企業的發展。上世紀八、九十年代，中國銀行業積累了大量行政指令導致的呆壞帳，這些債務要麼沒法得到償還，要麼當初就根本沒打算償還。2003年，不良貸款佔中國銀行業貸款總額的20.4%，相當於中國國內生產總值(GDP)的16.5%。如此之高的壞帳讓整個中國經濟面臨着陷入困境的危險。

Beijing managed to clean up that problem with the help of the new China Banking Regulatory Commission, $100 billion in new government capital, and foreign 'strategic partners' to train banks in global best practices. Nonperforming loans were brought down to 2.5% by the end of 2008. This was accompanied by a deeper change in corporate culture, as bank staff started thinking like bankers instead of like agents of government policy. A decade of difficult reform culminated in Hong Kong stock listings for three of the big four -- Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank -- with the fourth, Agricultural Bank of China, on the way. Yet despite this hard-won progress, Beijing is now in danger of backsliding.
中國政府後來設法扭轉了這種局面，當時，中國新成立了銀行業監督管理委員會(China Banking Regulatory Commission)，政府又拿出1,000億美元資金注入銀行業，此外，還通過外國“戰略合作伙伴”向中國銀行業傳授全球最佳經營管理規範。到 2008年末，不良貸款比率降到了2.5%。與此同時，中國銀行業在企業文化方面也發生着更深層的變化。銀行業人士開始像銀行家而不是像政府官員那樣來考慮問題。經過十年的艱苦改革，中國四大國有銀行中的三家──中國銀行(Bank of China)、中國工商銀行(Industrial and Commercial Bank of China)和中國建設銀行(China Construction Bank)──先後在香港掛牌上市，中國農業銀行(Agricultural Bank of China)的上市工作也在進行中。然而，在取得這番來之不易的進步之後，中國的銀行業改革現在面臨着倒退的危險。

On the surface, China's banks appear to be remarkably healthy. The CBRC reports that this year, despite the economic slowdown, nonperforming loans have continued falling, not only as a percentage of the rapidly expanding base but in absolute terms. China's banks, the story goes, are a well-tuned engine capable of lifting the Chinese economy up.
從表面上看，中國銀行業似乎已經相當健康。據銀監會稱，儘管經濟出現下滑，但今年銀行業不良貸款將繼續下降，不論是絕對規模，還是佔貸款總額的比例。看上去，中國銀行業儼然是一臺運轉良好、有能力繼續推動中國經濟前行的發動機。

A closer look, however, raises several red flags that regulators haven't been able to address satisfactorily. Take existing loan portfolios even before the rash of new stimulus lending. Given the severe drop-off in Chinese exports, along with the worldwide widening of credit spreads (reflecting increased risk of defaults), it strains credulity to believe that the health of these portfolios could be improving. In reality, the CBRC recently allowed Chinese banks to minimize the recognition of nonperforming loans by rescheduling loans before maturity and 'evergreening' troubled loans by rolling them over into new ones. In contrast, NPLs recognized by foreign banks operating in China -- which generally follow the stricter rules of their home regulators -- have more than doubled since the start of 2008.
不過，進一步研究會發現，中國銀行業還存在幾個監管機構尚未能妥善解決的問題。就以銀行業大規模發放新的刺激性貸款之前已存在的貸款組合來說。鑑於中國出口的大幅下滑，還有全世界範圍內信用價差的擴大（這意味着違約風險的上升），人們很難輕易相信這些貸款組合的質量還能不斷改善。事實上，銀監會最近已允許中國銀行業對未到期貸款重新安排償債條款，將不良貸款展期成爲不到期的新貸款，從而降低列爲不良貸款的貸款額。相比之下，在華經營的外資銀行認定的不良貸款自2008年初以來已經增加了一倍多。這些銀行一般都會遵守他們本國監管機構的嚴格規定。