全球投資大勢與風險 Macro themes and risks for
Most investors have been able to muster only two cheers for the year that has just ended.
多數投資者可以爲剛剛過去的一年勉強叫兩聲好。
In 2015, the performance of the main asset classes just about managed to maintain the broad pattern that has been seen since the equity bull market started in March 2009 but there are now definite signs of market fatigue. And although some major trends were obvious in retrospect — weak oil prices, falling euro, rising dollar, tumbling emerging currencies – they recorded sharp reversals that many macro investors failed to navigate in real time.
2015年，主要資產類別差不多保持了自2009年3月股票牛市開始以來的總體趨勢，但現在明確出現了市場疲軟的跡象。儘管回過頭去看，一些主要趨勢很明顯：油價疲軟、歐元貶值、美元升值、新興市場貨幣大幅貶值——但對於這些趨勢中所表現出的急劇逆轉，許多宏觀投資者未能很好地即時把握住。
Global equities returned about 2 per cent in local currency terms [1], less than in recent years. In dollar terms, returns were slightly negative and market peaks in May 2015 have not yet been re-attained. A top may be forming, but as yet there is little sign that a major bear market trend has started.
全球股票回報率（以本幣計算）約爲2%[1]，低於最近幾年。以美元計算，回報率略呈負值。2015年5月達到的市場峯值未能再度企及。頂部可能正在形成，但目前幾乎沒有跡象表明，大規模熊市趨勢已經開始。
Government bonds returned about 1 per cent, defying widespread predictions of a trend reversal, and yields were almost exactly flat during the year. Commodity prices plummeted by 33 per cent, continuing the crash that started in mid 2014, and they eventually took credit markets down with them. US high yield securities, for example, returned -9 per cent in 2015. Emerging markets (with the perplexing exception of Chinese equities, the best performing of the major markets) were also hit by the commodity melt-down and generally continued to under-perform developed market assets, in equities, credit and currencies.
政府債券回報率爲1%左右，打破了趨勢逆轉的普遍預測，去年全年，收益率幾乎完全持平。大宗商品價格下挫33%，延續了2014年中期開始的暴跌行情，並最終帶動信貸市場隨之下跌。例如，美國高收益證券2015年的回報率爲-9%。新興市場（令人困惑的是，中國股市成爲例外，爲主要股市中表現最佳的）還受到大宗商品暴跌的影響，新興市場股票、信貸和外匯資產的表現總體上繼續遜於發達市場。
Overall, then, the magic mix of moderate gross domestic product growth combined with extremely easy monetary conditions has continued to work in the developed markets. However, overall global asset market returns (bonds plus equities in local currencies, equally weighted) were only about 1.5 per cent, suggesting that some of the magic is wearing thin.
總體而言，溫和的國內生產總值(GDP)增長和極爲寬鬆的貨幣狀況的魔力組合繼續在發達市場發揮效力。然而，全球資產市場總體回報率（債券和股票，以本幣計算，權重相等）只有約1.5%，這表明其中一些魔力正在逐漸消失。
Looking ahead, it seems likely that 2016 will, at best, see similarly low asset returns. That, anyway, is overwhelmingly the consensus central view among mainstream forecasters. But as the bull market matures, it seems inevitable that one year soon we will experience a major setback to asset prices. Will 2016 be that year?
展望未來，2016年的資產回報率充其量會與去年的低水平相當。至少這是主流預測機構壓倒性的核心共識。但隨着牛市成熟，我們很快將在某一年經歷資產價格的大幅下跌，這似乎是不可避免的。2016年會是那一年嗎？
The macro themes for 2016 identified by some of the major forecasting houses are summarised here. With a few outliers (notably, Citigroup, which expects a global recession in 2016), the themes are widely shared and increasingly familiar. This is not a new phenomenon: many themes work over time, even though they are well telegraphed in advance.
一些主要預測機構確認的2016年宏觀主題總結如下。除了個別例外（特別是花旗集團(Citigroup)，該銀行預計2016年會出現全球衰退），這些主題得到了普遍認同而且變得越來越爲人熟知。這並非一個新現象：儘管很多主題被提前清楚的透露了出來，但它們會隨着時間的流逝發揮作用。
Global GDP growth is expected to rise a little from the dip seen in mid 2015, but investors have now recognised the large decline in underlying productivity growth since the financial crash, and no longer expect any significant acceleration in the recovery.
預計全球GDP增速將從2015年年中的低點略微上揚，但投資者現在意識到了自金融危機以來潛在生產率增速的大幅下滑，他們不再指望復甦步伐會大幅加快。
The level of global output will remain just below trend in both the developed and emerging worlds, so there should be no immediate rise in underlying inflation. However, because commodity prices are expected to stabilise, forecasters confidently expect headline inflation rates to rise, taking bond yields up with them.
全球產出水平仍將低於趨勢水平，發達市場和新興市場都是如此，因此潛在通脹應不會很快上升。然而，由於大宗商品價格預計將企穩，預測機構相信整體通脹率將上升，這將帶動債券收益率上行。
On the central banks, two main themes are identified by almost everyone. Global monetary conditions are expected to remain highly accommodative in aggregate. But there is expected to be further divergence between central banks at the “leading edge” (the Federal Reserve and possibly the Bank of England) and the rest. The resulting rise in the dollar is an old and successful theme, but one that is still much loved.
至於央行，有兩大主題得到了幾乎所有人的認同。總體而言，預計全球貨幣狀況仍將極爲寬鬆。但預計處於最前沿地位的央行（美聯儲(Fed)，可能還包括英國央行(Bank of England)）與其他央行的政策將出現進一步分化。由此帶來的美元升值是一個古老且成功的主題，但仍備受喜愛。
Another widely anticipated theme is that growth in the emerging economies will continue to struggle, despite the fact that almost no one now expects a hard landing in China. Many point to the likelihood of credit deleveraging in the emerging world, but very few expect this to be powerful enough to cause a severe global downturn.
另一個人們普遍預期的主題是新興市場增長步伐仍將較爲艱難，儘管目前幾乎無人預測中國將遭遇硬着陸。很多人提到新興市場可能會出現信貸去槓桿化，但很少有人預測這種影響會強大到引發全球嚴重低迷。
These themes sketch an economic backdrop that would be moderately favourable to asset returns, a little like 2015 has been. But there are downside risks that could produce a much worse year. Three risks seem to be particularly worrying:
這些主題勾勒出的經濟背景將對資產回報率略微有利，與2015年有些類似。但下行風險可能會令今年的表現糟糕得多。有3種風險似乎尤爲令人擔憂：
1. A more hostile Fed
1.更不友好的美聯儲
Investors seem supremely unconcerned about this risk, believing that secular stagnation (still a widely held theme) will stop the Fed in its tracks. But is the balance of risk correctly priced in this respect? The Federal Open Market Committee repeatedly informs us that it expects to announce four 0.25 per cent rate rises in 2016, while the market expects only two. If the Fed announces its next move in March (having skipped the January meeting), the market may suddenly wake up and pay attention to the likely speed of tightening.
投資者似乎非常不在意這種風險，他們相信，長期化停滯（這一主題仍被普遍認可）將阻礙美聯儲的加息腳步。但相關的風險平衡是否被正確反映到了市場價格上？聯邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)多次提醒我們，預計2016年將宣佈4次25個基點的加息舉措，而市場預測只有兩次。如果美聯儲在今年3月宣佈下一次加息舉措（跳過1月會議），市場可能會突然清醒過來，關注可能的加息步伐。
The basic issue here is that the FOMC is far more sceptical than the markets about the secular stagnation hypothesis. The committee is more confident that economic headwinds will slacken in the next year or two, allowing them to shift interest rates upwards towards the rising equilibrium interest rate. If, as they expect, core inflation rises in coming months, they will be emboldened in this view. That would mean a bumpier ride for both bonds and equities.
根本問題是FOMC遠比市場懷疑長期停滯假設。該委員會更相信，未來一兩年，經濟不利因素將減弱，使他們能夠將利率上調到與逐漸上升的均衡利率一致的水平。如果就像他們所預測的那樣，核心通脹在未來幾個月上升，那麼他們就會更加相信這種觀點。這將意味着債券和股票市場都將經歷更多起伏。
2. A Chinese devaluation
2.人民幣貶值
This was the risk that really spooked markets in August 2015, especially when combined with the onset of Fed tightening. The fear that China would decide to export its deflation by devaluing the renminbi at precisely the same moment that US monetary policy was changing direction was enough to cause severe tremors. As the new year starts, investors have become more confident that they understand China’s new exchange rate strategy. This seems to involve greater flexibility for the renminbi against the (likely) rising dollar, but broad stability for China’s effective rate against a basket of currencies. In retrospect, it seems that this policy has been followed throughout 2015.
這種風險曾在2015年8月引起市場恐慌，特別是當時美聯儲啓動了加息週期。投資者擔心，在美國貨幣政策轉向的同時，中國決心通過人民幣貶值來輸出通縮。這種擔憂足以引發強震。新年伊始，投資者更加相信，他們理解中國的新匯率戰略。這似乎表現爲人民幣在參考（可能）日益升值的美元方面保持更大靈活性，但人民幣兌一籃子貨幣的有效匯率水平基本穩定。回過頭來看，整個2015年，中國似乎一直在遵循這種政策。
The People’s Bank of China has now persuaded markets that it has no intention of devaluing the effective rate very far from the stable range that operated last year. But deflation remains rampant in the Chinese manufacturing sector, and over capacity is far from eradicated. A large renminbi devaluation would only be be used as an option of the last resort. But it represents a huge tail risk that would be the final nail in the coffin of the equity bull market.
中國央行現在讓市場相信，其無意將人民幣有效匯率下調到遠離去年運行的穩定區間的水平。但通縮仍然在中國製造業普遍存在，產能過剩遠未消除。人民幣大幅貶值只會作爲最後的選擇。但這代表着一種巨大的尾部風險，它將對股票牛市造成最後的致命一擊。
3. A credit meltdown in the emerging economies
3. 新興經濟體信貸危機
Credit growth is now slowing throughout the emerging world, and the cold turkey phase of the credit cycle could be very prolonged. JPMorgan economists have estimated that credit deleveraging could reduce GDP growth in the emerging world by 2 to 3 percentage points over the next three years, or even more if there are severe crises of financial confidence. This would be enough to slow global GDP growth by 1 to 1.5 percentage points. At the lowest end of that range, a global recession would become likely.
整個新興世界的信貸增速現在都在放緩，信貸週期的停止增長階段可能會相當長。摩根大通(JPMorgan)經濟學家估計，未來3年，信貸去槓桿化可能會令新興市場的GDP增速下滑2到3個百分點，如果出現嚴重的金融信心危機，下滑幅度可能會更大。這足以將全球GDP增速放緩1到1.5個百分點。在最壞情況下，發生全球衰退也是有可能的。
After 2008, macro-economists were shocked by the severity and persistence of the contractionary effects from the bursting of the credit bubble in the developed world. The relatively comfortable assumptions that are now being made to drive central forecasts for economies and markets in 2016 could easily be blown out of the water by a similar debacle in the emerging world.
2008年以後，宏觀經濟學家對發達世界信貸泡沫破裂所產生收縮效應的嚴重性和持久性感到震驚。現在爲形成2016年經濟和市場核心預測而做出的讓人相對安心的假設，可能會因爲新興市場爆發類似危機而輕易化爲泡影。
