大千世界: 撒切爾反對者們的瘋癲狂歡
在大部分事務上瑪格麗特•撒切爾(Margaret Thatcher)都是正確的，雖然反對她的人還是很難認同這一點。
She was right that Britain’s trade unions had become much too powerful. She was right that nationalised industries had to be privatised. She was right that inflation has monetary causes.
她說得對，英國的工會已經變得過於強大。她說得對，國有化的產業必須私有化。她說得對，通脹有貨幣的成因。
She was also mostly right about foreign policy. She was right to drive the forces of Argentina’s junta out of the Falklands and she was right to exhort a “wobbly” George H.W. Bush to mete out the same treatment to Saddam Hussein’s forces in Kuwait.
在外交政策上她大多數時候也是正確的。她將阿根廷軍政府的部隊趕出福克蘭羣島(Falklands，即馬爾維納斯羣島)是正確之舉；她告誡“搖擺不定的”老布什(George H.W. Bush)對薩達姆•候賽因(Saddam Hussein)在科威特的軍隊採取同樣的措施也是正確的。
Though dubbed the “Iron Lady” by a Soviet magazine, her hawkishness in the cold war did not blind her to the possibilities of doing business with Mikhail Gorbachev. Like Ronald Reagan, she was quick to see the opportunity offered by his policies of glasnost and perestroika.
儘管被一家蘇聯雜誌稱爲“鐵娘子”，她在冷戰期間的鷹派立場並沒有使她無視與米哈伊爾•戈爾巴喬夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)打交道的可能性。與羅納德•里根(Ronald Reagan)一樣，她很快就從戈爾巴喬夫的開放與改革政策中看到了機會。
The outcome of the cold war seems inevitable with the benefit of hindsight. But for most of the 1980s, Thatcher had to endure a relentless stream of criticism from fellow travellers and useful idiots: believers in unilateral disarmament who would gladly have allowed the Soviets to establish dominance in intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe, as well as exponents of “convergence theory”, who insisted that the countries of Nato and the Warsaw Pact were gradually and peacefully growing alike (give or take the odd gulag).
事後來看，冷戰的結果似乎是不可避免的。但上世紀八十年代的大部分時間，撒切爾都需要忍受共產黨的同情者和“有用的白癡”們的指責：相信單邊裁軍的人，他們樂意看到蘇聯在歐洲主導中程核力量；倡導“趨同理論”(convergence theory)的人，他們堅持認爲北約國家和華約國家在漸漸地和平趨同（不管有沒有奇怪的古拉格勞改營）。
Above all, however, Thatcher was right about Europe. She was right to push Europe in the direction of real free trade by backing and signing the Single European Act of 1986. Yet she was equally right to oppose the idea of a single European currency.
然而，無論如何，撒切爾關於歐洲的看法是正確的。通過支持並簽署1986年《單一歐洲法案》切實推動歐洲走向貿易自由，她的做法是正確的。反對單一歐洲貨幣構想也同樣是正確的。
On this issue, the Financial Times, as well as a great many other respected publications, owes Thatcher not only the respect due to a great leader, but also an apology. Throughout the 1980s, many critics consistently heaped opprobrium on her for resisting the efforts of her own cabinet to get sterling into the European exchange rate mechanism.
在這個問題上，英國《金融時報》，以及其他很多受尊敬的出版物，不僅欠撒切爾這位偉大領導人應有的尊重，也欠她一聲道歉。整個八十年代，很多批評者都因爲她反對自己的內閣將英鎊納入歐洲匯率機制的努力，不斷地對她大加抨擊。
Consistently, Thatcher’s sceptics took the side of those, such as Nigel Lawson, Geoffrey Howe and John Major, who favoured “shadowing” the Deutschmark and then pegging the sterling-Mark exchange rate.
Having been dragged kicking and screaming into the ERM in October 1990, Thatcher denounced the Delors plan for a federal Europe with a defiant “No! No! No!” – one “no” apiece for the European parliament, government and senate he envisaged. Just weeks later, deserted by her cabinet colleagues, she was forced to resign.
1990年10月不情願地加入歐洲匯率機制(ERM)之後，撒切爾堅決對德洛爾(Delors)的歐洲聯邦計劃說“不，不，不”——這三個“不”，分別是對德洛爾設想的歐洲議會、政府以及參議院說的。就在幾周之後，由於被內閣同僚捨棄，撒切爾被迫辭職。
Yet subsequent events have largely vindicated Thatcher’s view. Sterling’s entry into the ERM was an unmitigated economic policy disaster. Tying Britain’s fortunes to the decisions of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, ERM membership led to an unnecessarily severe recession in 1990-1992, which ended only when – with some help from George Soros – the pound left the ERM.
然而，接下來的事件大體上證明了撒切爾的觀點。英鎊加入歐洲匯率機制是一個全然的經濟政策災難。通過將英國的命運與法蘭克福德國央行的決策綁在一起，歐洲匯率機制的成員國地位導致英國在1990年至1992年期間不必要地陷入嚴重衰退，最終還是在喬治•索羅斯(George Soros)的幫助下，英鎊撤出歐洲匯率機制，衰退才告終結。
There were those who argued that the ERM fiasco illustrated the even greater advantages of a full monetary union over a system of fixed exchange rates. But once again subsequent events have confirmed the Thatcherite view that an independent monetary policy is an essential part of a nation’s sovereignty. Just ask yourself how Britain would have fared if we had been inside the eurozone when the financial crisis struck. I shudder even to think of it.
也有人認爲，歐洲匯率機制的失敗，說明全面貨幣聯盟相對於固定匯率體系具有更大的優勢。但接下來的事件再次證明了撒切爾的觀點是正確的，她認爲，獨立貨幣政策是一個國家主權的關鍵組成部分。想象一下，如果金融危機爆發的時候英國是歐元區成員國，英國會出現什麼情況。我連想都不敢想。
It has long been conventional wisdom that Thatcher was wrong about one thing above all. She was wrong, so the argument goes, to oppose German reunification.
傳統觀點一直都認爲，在一件事上撒切爾是錯的。這種觀點認爲，撒切爾反對德國統一是錯誤的。
Indeed, most recent accounts of the events of 1989-1990 portray her as a kind of female Basil Fawlty, stuck in some kind of second world war time-warp.
實際上，最近關於1989年到1990年事件的敘述大都將她描述爲類似於女貝塞爾•弗爾蒂(Basil Fawlty)的人物，認爲她陷入了二戰的時間隧道。
Yet future historians may look back on negative reaction to German reunification with more sympathy than most commentators felt at the time. In an internal memorandum, written on February 2, 1990, Thatcher offered a shrewd commentary on West Germany’s position that reunification would pose no strategic threat if it was accompanied by increased European integration. “The problems will not be overcome by strengthening the E[uropean] C[ommunity],” she wrote. “Germany’s ambitions would then become the dominant and active factor.”
然而，未來的歷史學家在回顧對德國統一的消極反應時，可能會比當時的大多數評論家帶有更多的同情感。1990年2月2日的一份內部備忘錄上記載，關於西德認爲如果兩德統一是在歐洲融合加深的情況下完成就不會構成戰略威脅的立場，撒切爾做出了一個明智的評價。她寫道：“強化歐洲共同體解決不了問題。德國的雄心將會成爲主導的、積極的因素。”
There are rather a large number of people in southern Europe today – and perhaps also in Paris – who would acknowledge that here, too, Thatcher was right. Only last year the Italian prime minister complained of being treated as if Italy was in a “semicolonial” relationship with Germany.
今天的南歐甚至是巴黎都有很多人承認，撒切爾在上述問題上是正確的。就在去年，意大利總理還抱怨意大利與德國的關係就像一種“半殖民”的關係。
Like many great leaders, Margaret Thatcher has come to be more respected abroad than she ever was at home. Left-leaning Brits who opposed her during the 1980s find it especially hard to admit that she was mostly right and they were wrong.
與很多偉大的領導人一樣，瑪格麗特•撒切爾在海外受到的敬重要多於在國內。上世紀八十年代反對她的左傾的英國人發現，要承認她大部分時候都是正確的、而他們自己是錯誤的，確實很難。
The writer is Laurence A. Tisch professor of history at Harvard
本文作者是美國哈佛大學勞倫斯•A•蒂什(Laurence A. Tisch)歷史學教授
