阿里巴巴面臨的"敏感商品"難題

The high-strength carbon fibre made by Japan’s Toray Industries is eagerly sought aFTer by the makers of racing bikes and jet aircraft. It also happens to be perfect for supersonic centrifuges used to enrich the uranium in nuclear bombs.

日本東麗工業株式會社(Toray Industries)生產的高強度碳纖維深受競賽自行車和噴氣式飛機制造商喜愛，它們碰巧又是製造超聲離心機的絕佳材料，而超聲離心機被用於濃縮製造核彈所需的鈾。

For that reason, trade in the company’s high-strength T700 filament is carefully controlled by almost a dozen international bodies. To buy it directly from Tokyo-based Toray requires an export licence from Japan’s Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry and a two-page end-user certificate.

爲此，東麗高強度T700碳纖維的買賣受到十餘家國際機構的嚴格管制。要從這家東京公司直接採購這種碳纖維，需要有日本經產省(METI)下發的出口許可證以及兩頁長的最終用戶證明。

But for those who do not want the hassle, there is another place to find suppliers which will not ask so many questions: , the Chinese trade website owned by Alibaba Group, which listed in the US last week in the third-biggest initial public offering in history.

如果不想這麼麻煩，還有一個地方可以找到沒有這麼多要求的供應商：阿里巴巴集團(Alibaba Group)旗下的網站。阿里巴巴集團近日剛在美國上市，爲史上第三大首次公開招股(IPO)。

“Alibaba is a virtual supermarket for proliferation-sensitive items used in the process of producing nuclear weapons,” says Nick Gillard, a researcher at Project Alpha, a non-proliferation research centre at King’s College in London. High-strength aluminium, maraging steel rods (used to make centrifuge rotors), advanced vacuum pumps and gauges used in the enrichment process are all for sale on the site. “Virtually every dual-use item needed for a proliferator to produce nuclear weapons is advertised for sale on Alibaba.”

倫敦大學國王學院(King's College)防核擴散研究中心Project Alpha的研究員尼克•吉拉德(Nick Gillard)表示：“阿里巴巴好比一個核擴散敏感物品的虛擬超市，這些東西可用在生產核武器的過程中。”高強度鋁合金、馬氏體時效鋼（可用於生產離心機轉子）、高級真空泵以及濃縮過程中會用到的量規都可以通過該網站買到。“核擴散者生產核武器所需的幾乎所有軍民兩用物品都可以在阿里巴巴網站上找到。”

These items all have civilian uses as well, which makes their regulation complicated. These and dozens of other categories of “dual-use” goods are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group whose 48 members, including China, pledge to enforce export licences and end-user certificates detailing their ultimate destination, along with a commitment not to re-export or transfer ownership. Dual-use goods are also specifically prohibited for export to Iran by a long line of UN Security Council resolutions.

這些商品都可作爲民用，因此監管起來就更加困難。以上商品——還有另外幾十種軍民兩用商品——受到核供應國集團(NSG)的管制。核供應國集團由包括中國在內的48個國家組成，承諾實行出口許可和最終用戶證明制度，要求證書上列明商品最終目的地，並保證不會將商品轉出口或轉讓。聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)的多項決議也明令禁止向伊朗出口軍民兩用商品。

But China has become a hub for illicit nuclear procurement, according to Mr Gillard and other authorities on non-proliferation. This is partly due to the vast size of its manufacturing industry, they say, and because of what one western diplomat calls a “flexible” attitude towards regulation of the trade.

然而，吉拉德還有其他核不擴散方面的權威人士都說，中國已成爲一個非法核採購中心。他們指出，中國製造業極其龐大是造成這種局面的一部分原因。還有一個原因在於一名西方外交官所說的中國在相關交易監管上的“靈活”態度。

A report by the UN Iran Sanctions Committee panel of experts in June gave details of 30 recent interdictions in various countries of finished goods and raw materials bound for Iran or involving individuals known to be involved in the illicit trade of nuclear materials. Of those, 20 were of goods shipped from or originating in China, including high-strength aluminium, ovens, steel bellows, batteries and other items that could be used in Iran’s “prohibited activities”, according to the report.

聯合國制裁伊朗委員會(UN Iran Sanctions Committee)的專家們在6月發佈了一份報告，詳細列出了近期在多個國家實施的30項禁令，這些禁令或者禁止將相關成品和原材料運往伊朗，或者涉及已知參與了非法核材料交易的個人。其中20項禁令涉及從中國發貨或原產於中國的商品，包括高強度鋁合金、乾燥爐、不鏽鋼波紋管、電池及其他可能被用於伊朗“被禁止的活動”的物品。

Most of these items are for sale on , which functions as a global Yellow Pages for wholesale manufactures, and also listed on , a Chinese version of the English site used for domestic business-to-business trade.

這些物品大多在和都有銷售，是批發製造品的全球黃頁，則是該英文網站的中文版，專注於國內b2b交易。

Alibaba is better known for its retail ecommerce websites Taobao and Tmall, but the business-to-business sites are also successful. In total Alibaba’s domestic platforms accounted for sales of almost $300bn in merchandise by Alibaba’s third-party sellers in the 12 months to June 30 – more than Amazon and Ebay combined. These huge sales numbers, which increased 63 per cent last year, explain why western investors are clamouring for the company’s shares.

阿里巴巴旗下最有名的是電子商務零售網站淘寶(Taobao)和天貓(Tmall)，不過其b2b網站也十分成功。在截至6月30日的12個月內，阿里巴巴第三方銷售商通過阿里巴巴國內平臺總共銷售了價值近3000億美元的商品，比亞馬遜(Amazon)和Ebay的總和都多。這樣巨大的銷售額——較上年增長了63%——解釋了西方投資者爲何對阿里巴巴股票趨之若鶩。

Analysts say Alibaba has done nothing illegal, noting that the availability of sensitive merchandise on its sites is similar to other third-party issues faced by internet companies, from pirated music on Google to drug precursors on eBay. The fact that dual-use items have legitimate applications makes policing difficult, especially when the problems appear to lie with lax regulatory enforcement by Chinese authorities.

分析師表示，阿里巴巴的行爲並無違法之處。他們指出，該公司網站上的敏感商品問題與其他互聯網企業存在的第三方問題類似，比如谷歌(Google)的盜版音樂問題，以及eBay上的易製毒化學品問題。軍民兩用物品具有合法民用用途的事實，令這類物品的管控十分困難。而在中國，由於相關主管部門在強制執法方面缺乏力度，問題尤爲突出。

“ is an open, user-generated-content platform which strongly supports and abides by all international laws and rules related to non-proliferation” the company said in a statement. “ has robust product listing policies in place and will co-operate with law enforcement authorities worldwide to remove problematic product listings promptly upon receipt of notice.”

阿里巴巴在一份聲明中表示：“是一個開放的、由用戶生成內容的平臺，該網站強烈支持並遵守國際上一切有關核不擴散的法律法規”。“擁有健全的產品上架制度，願意與世界各地執法機關合作，一收到通知就會移除問題產品信息。”

With its listing in the US last week, which raised $25bn, Alibaba became the second-largest web company in the world by market capitalisation, behind Google. This places it under US regulatory authority, which may mean it has to get tougher on a range of problems, from the availability of knock-off gifts or electronics to nuclear-sensitive materials.

阿里巴巴近日在美國上市並融資250億美元，按市值計算，其已成爲全球第二大互聯網企業，僅次於谷歌。上市後的阿里巴巴要接受美國監管機構的監督。這可能意味着阿里巴巴必須對其網站上存在的衆多問題商品——從仿冒禮品、盜版電子產品到核敏感材料——採取更加嚴厲的處理辦法。

“Having this type of interaction possible online clearly does make proliferation easier,” says Matthew Godsey, a researcher at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. “It makes it quicker for someone attempting to procure an item for a weapons programme to find someone able to supply it who either doesn’t know or doesn’t care what it will be used for.”

威斯康星核武管制研究項目(Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control)研究員馬修•戈德西(Matthew Godsey)表示：“在網上能夠進行這種互動顯然讓核擴散變得更爲容易。通過網絡，想爲某個武器項目採購材料的人可以很便捷地找到能提供該物品的人，而後者不知道或者不關心買家採購該物品的用途。”

Uncontrolled Chinese exports of carbon fibre gained attention after the revelation that a shipment of 7,600kg of Toray T700 carbon filament was seized by Singapore customs officials en route from China to Iran in December 2012. The seizure was revealed this summer in a UN report.

今年夏季聯合國發佈的一份報告披露，2012年12月，一批總重7600公斤的東麗T700碳纖維在從中國運往伊朗的途中被新加坡海關截獲。碳纖維在未受管制情況下從中國流出的問題由此引起了公衆注意。

The shipment contained carbon fibre in sufficient quantities to make centrifuges for a nuclear enrichment facility the size of Fordow , according to a study by Project Alpha .

Project Alpha的研究表明，這批碳纖維的數量足夠爲一座像福爾多(Fordow)一樣大的核濃縮設施製造所需的離心機。

Toray said it was aiding the UN investigation and could not discuss the details of the case, and declined to name the Chinese counterparty. Toray said it is aware of the grey market in its products in China, some which are resold by the original importers with labels torn off. “When we see our product online we do our best to inform the merchant and they usually remove it,” said Toray. It never does repeat business with sellers caught violating end-user certificates.

東麗表示正在協助聯合國調查，詳細案情無可奉告，並拒絕透露涉事中國企業名字。東麗表示瞭解自身產品在中國存在灰色市場，其中一些商品是原進口商撕掉商標後再進行轉賣。東麗表示：“一旦在網上看到我們的產品，我們會盡全力設法知會商家，他們通常會將該商品下架。”對於被發現違反最終用戶證明規定的銷售商，東麗將永遠與其斷絕商務往來。

The FT contacted multiple sellers of proliferation-sensitive technologies in China found via and , and all said they were willing to sell without licences and end-user certificates normally demanded of such transactions. Many said they were not aware that their products were controlled or restricted for export, adding that China does not control their products or require export licences. China’s customs service declined to respond to written questions from the FT

FT記者通過和找到中國多個銷售核擴散敏感材料的賣家，並與他們聯絡。這些賣家都表示，願意在沒有許可和最終用戶證明的情況下銷售商品——正常來說這類交易是需要這些證書的。許多商家表示，他們並不知道這些商品受到出口管制或限制。他們還表示中國並未對他們的商品進行管制，也未要求辦理出口許可。中國海關沒有答覆FT記者以書面形式提出的問題。

Three factories which advertised Toray T700 high-strength carbon fibre on were contacted by an FT reporter posing as a buyer seeking 4,000kg of the controlled filament – over half the amount seized in Singapore. All said they were willing to sell domestically without documentation – a violation of end-user certificates. One also expressed willingness to help avoid export controls. “[Toray T700 carbon fibre] is harder to import than to export,” said the seller, reached by phone in Shandong province. “Japan imposes restrictions on exports, but when we export from China, it depends on what we report it as to the customs.” He said “there should be no problems” if the material is reported as textile fibre instead of carbon fibre.

一名FT記者裝做買家，想購買4000公斤東麗T700高強度碳纖維——這一購買量超過了新加坡截獲量的一半——並與網站上推銷這種受管制商品的三家廠商取得了聯繫。三家都表示願意在沒有相關文件的情況下在國內銷售該產品——這其實違反了需辦理最終用戶證明的規定。其中一家還表示願意幫助買家規避出口管制。這位山東省的賣家在電話中表示：“（東麗T700碳纖維）進口比出口難。日本對這種產品有出口限制，而從中國出口時，就看我們怎麼向海關申報了。”他說，只要把產品申報爲紡織纖維而不是碳纖維，“就不會有問題”。

Other Chinese factories manufacturing dual-use goods advertised on said export controls were not an issue. Shanghai Cixi Instrument Company and Shanghai Changjin Metal Products Company, both of which make products controlled by the nuclear suppliers group regulations, said in interviews that there are no restrictions on the items’ exports by Chinese customs.

其他在網站上推銷軍民兩用商品的中國廠商也表示，出口管制根本不成問題。上海瓷熙儀器儀表有限公司(Shanghai Cixi Instrument Company)和上海長進金屬製品有限公司(Shanghai Changjin Metal Products Company)都在生產受到核供應國集團相關規定管制的產品，但他們在訪談中卻都表示，中國海關並未對這些產品的出口實施限制。

Alibaba is not the only site selling nuclear sensitive items. In May, King’s College researchers were able to buy a controlled MKS pressure transducer from a distributor in China using eBay.

阿里巴巴並不是唯一銷售核敏感物品的網站。今年5月，國王學院的研究人員就通過eBay從一家中國經銷商購買了一部MKS壓力傳感器。

Ian Stewart, one of the researchers, said the merchant did not request an end-user certificate, nor did the merchant have an export licence for the product. Pressure transducers can be used to control uranium centrifuge enrichment, and thousands are thought to have been procured illicitly by Iran’s nuclear programme since the early 2000s.

其中的一名研究員伊恩•斯圖爾特(Ian Stewart)表示，商家並未要求提供最終用戶證明，而且商家也沒有該產品的出口許可證。壓力傳感器可用於控制鈾離心濃縮，自本世紀初以來，伊朗核計劃據信已非法採購了幾千部壓力傳感器。

Some factories that have been targeted by sanctions for procuring and producing nuclear-sensitive materials have listings on Alibaba. Machine Sazi Arak, a company that has been sanctioned by the EU, the US and other countries for its work at Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor, is listed as a supplier of boilers, heat exchangers and petrochemical equipment.

某些因採購、生產核敏感材料而受到制裁的工廠也出現在阿里巴巴網站的賣家名錄。曾因在伊朗阿拉克(Arak)重水反應堆的工作而受到歐盟(EU)、美國及其他國家制裁的Machine Sazi Arak公司也在該網站的供應商列表之中，顯示爲鍋爐、熱交換設備及石化設備供應商。

“When it comes to Alibaba’s responsibility, I think this is a tricky one. It would be very hard for Alibaba to monitor all the interactions that take place on its site,” said Mr Godsey. “However, it would be reasonable to expect the company to block companies that have been sanctioned by the UN, the EU, or others for proliferation from using the site to conduct business and procure goods.”

戈德西表示：“說到阿里巴巴的責任，我認爲這是個很棘手的問題。阿里巴巴很難監控其網站上的所有交易。不過，對於那些因爲核擴散活動受到聯合國、歐盟或其他方面制裁的企業，阿里巴巴理應禁止它們利用其網站開展業務和採購商品。”

Alibaba’s popularity as a place for sellers of sensitive technology to advertise has prompted tougher efforts to crack down on listings that fall afoul of the company’s guidelines prohibiting “weapons of mass destruction [WMD] or its known associated agents”. A series of advertisements for uranium and gallium, which is used in the production of plutonium warheads for nuclear bombs, was taken down or changed to emphasise non-nuclear applications this year. However, one seller of uranium was still advertising on as of Thursday, but within limits. The Hao Thai Lingshou mineral processing plant said it was willing to sell only domestically – not for export.

阿里巴巴網站規定，禁止銷售“生化、化學、核武器、其他大規模殺傷性武器，及任何爲其提供服務、使用說明、諮詢、生產、助劑以及違反國際法相關規定的信息”。敏感技術賣家喜歡在阿里巴巴網站推銷產品，促使阿里巴巴採取更大力舉措取締違背其規定的商品信息。今年以來，一系列鈾和鎵（後者可用於生產核彈的鈈彈頭）的廣告被撤下，或者被修改以突出非核用途。然而，在9月25日，一家銷售鈾的賣家仍然在網站上打廣告，但限制了銷售範圍。這家名爲靈壽縣浩泰礦產品加工廠(Lingshou Hao Thai minerals processing plant)的企業表示，只接受國內訂單，不對外出口。