特朗普爲何無法離間中俄
The 2014 Russian military intervention inUkraine resulted in Western sanctions and strategic pressure that drove Moscowtoward greater cooperation with China. Since then, the mercurial Sino-Russian“marriage of convenience” has evolved into a genuine strategic partnershipbased on overlapping interests, and mutual antipathy toward the United ough Russia and China are unlikely to declare a formal alliance, it is notin America’s strategic interests to confront a de facto Sino-Russian entente.
Donald Trump’s election generated hope insome conservative foreign policy circles that U.S. rapprochement with Russiacould create distance between Moscow and Beijing. Proponents ofrapprochement hearken back to Nixon and Kissinger’s “triangulardiplomacy,” which exploited the Sino-Soviet split to achieve an opening toChina, and positioned Washington for better relations with both Communistgiants than they had with each other. Cato Institute fellow Doug Bandow espousesthis viewpoint in a piece entitled “A Nixon Strategy toBreak the Russia-China Axis.” He argues that improving relations with Russia“would have the salutary side effect of discouraging creation of a commonRusso-Chinese front against the United States.” America’s leading offensiverealist, John Mearsheimer, likewise claims that if “Washingtonhad a more positive attitude toward Moscow,” this would engender betterrelations that would eventually lead Russia to join “the balancing coalitionagainst China.”
特朗普的選舉團隊中有不少持有保守外交政策的人士，他們主張恢復美俄友好關係，拉大中俄間距離。重新採用尼克松基辛格的“三角外交”策略，“三角外交”是利用中蘇分裂來打造一個開放的中國，拉近華盛頓與共產主義巨人相互間關係，離間中蘇。卡託研究所研究員道格班多支持這一觀點，他在一篇題爲《尼克松策略打破中俄軸心》的文章表示，“改善與俄羅斯的關係”將會出現正面溢出效應，即阻礙中俄聯合對抗美國。”類似地美國鷹派代表人物，約翰米爾斯海默同樣主張，如果對莫斯科的態度更加積極，美蘇關係會變得更好，最後會導致俄羅斯加入“平衡聯盟”來對付中國。Bandow and Mearsheimer’s arguments arebased on a realist explanatory model, wherein relations between America,Russia, and China are conceived as a “strategic triangle.” According to thisframework, it is logical for Trump to pursue Kissinger-style triangulardiplomacy to seek an opening to the weaker power, Russia, in order to balanceand attain leverage over the stronger power, China.
班多和米爾斯海默的觀點是基於現實角度來進行解釋的，其中美國，俄羅斯，和中國被看作是一個“戰略三角”。根據這一構想，依照基辛格三角外交論，爲制衡中國，特朗普需聯合一個國力較弱的國家，因此最符合邏輯的非俄羅斯莫屬。
In the current international context, thisapproach is problematic for several reasons. First, the deep ideologicalfissures that drove the Soviet Union and China apart during the late 1950s and1960s are nonexistent today. Furthermore, Sino-Russian geopolitical competitionhas lessened because Russia, unlike its Soviet predecessor, is a secondarypower in Asia. As a result, there is little indication that Trump, despite hisrapport with Vladimir Putin, can drive a wedge between Russia and ainly there is room to improve U.S.-Russia relations from their currentnadir, which could yield selective cooperation on mutual challenges such as theIslamic State (ISIS). However, there is little indication that achieving themodest improvements in U.S.-Russia relations that are politically andpractically feasible would drive Moscow and Beijing apart.
在目前國際形勢下，這種方法是有問題的，有幾個原因。首先，中蘇思想分裂是在50、60年代發生的，現在則不存在。此外中俄之間幾乎沒有地緣之爭，因爲俄羅斯不像前蘇聯，現在的俄羅斯成了亞洲第二大國。據目前來看，幾乎沒有跡象表明，特朗普與普京之間的關係（互動）會變成插入俄中間的楔子。但從目前已處於谷底的美俄間關係來看，雙方有着改善的空間，譬如在ISIS問題上雖有挑戰但又可以有合作。但無論如何，在當前的政治現實環境下，要想俄羅斯與北京決裂，實現美俄友好，幾乎沒有可能。The situation that Nixon confronted in Asiais not analogous to the one Trump deals with today. Unlike China and Russia atpresent, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were lockedin an intense ideological battle for leadership of the Communist world. As Lorenz M.Lüthi details inhis cogent book, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, theSoviet and Chinese Communist parties developed intractable ideologicaldifferences in the 1950s over which socialist development model to pursue. MaoZedong rejected the Khrushchev era model of Bureaucratic Stalinism in favor ofa Revolutionary Stalinist model with Chinese characteristics that produced thecatastrophic “Great Leap Forward.” Ideological rivalry contributed to an acute securitydilemma, particularly after China conducted a successful nuclear test in convulsions unleashed by radical Maoism during China’s Cultural Revolutionfurther exacerbated Sino-Soviet enmity and deeply unnerved the Kremlin, whichthrough 1970 deployed approximately 39 divisions along the Sino-Soviet existential threat of war with the Soviet Union drove Mao to seekrapprochement with America.
尼克松當時在亞洲面臨的情況與現在的這樁買賣生意不太相似，無法套用在目前的中俄，（之前）中蘇間問題實質是共產主義世界中的意識形態鬥爭。Lorenz M. Lüthi在他的著作中詳細描述道，中蘇分裂：在共產主義世界的冷戰中，蘇聯和中國共產黨在50年代形成了頑固的意識形態分歧，這是在追求社會主義發展模式所導致的。毛澤東拒絕了赫魯曉夫時期的斯大林模式，拒絕了一個帶有中國特色，產生災難性“大躍進”且有利於斯大林官僚主義的模式。“意識形態之爭導致了嚴重的安全困境，尤其是中國在1964成功進行了核試驗。毛下的文化大革命所引起的動盪進一步加劇了中蘇間敵意。深深焦慮的克林姆林宮，在1970年在中蘇邊界部署了約39個師。與蘇聯交惡，迫使毛與美國握手言和。Realists give short shrift to the roleideological factors play in fostering comity between Russia and China. Incontrast to the days of the Sino-Soviet split, ideology is now a unifyingfactor in relations. Both countries harbor intense authoritarian nationalistopposition to Western and globalist ideologies, but no longer share the common Marxist-Leninistpolitical orientation that produced the divisive ideological schisms of theCold War. Despite their distinctive brands of authoritarianism (personalistdictatorship versus one-party Leninist state), Putin and China’s rulingCommunist Party have similar views of the threat posed by Western “universalvalues” such as democracy and human rights. They see “foreign influences,”which they believe have penetrated their societies through globalization, theinternet/social media, and NGOs, as the primary threat to their domestic gripon power. For China and Russian governing elites, these influences are a Trojanhorse designed to spark destabilizing “color revolutions”that produce regimechange in “non-Western” (i.e. authoritarian) political systems.
現實主義者忽略了意識形態在後來中俄友好間所發揮的作用，與中蘇交惡時期來比，現在的思想意識具有一致性。中俄兩國都懷有強烈的專制意識、反對西方霸權，支持全球化，但雙方都不在傾向遵循導致發生冷戰、產生思想分裂的馬列主義。儘管他們各自具有獨特風格，但普京與中國的觀念已向貼近西方的“普世價值”，比如在民主和人權方面。他們看到了“外來影響”,他們認爲全球化，互聯網媒體以及非政府組織正滲入他們的社會，成爲影響國內的主要威脅。對於中俄精英，這些影響就像是木馬，容易讓“非西化”制度的國家發生“顏色革命”從而引發不穩定。Since the 2011 Arab Spring, Moscow andBeijing’s perception of this threat has only grown, as movements demandingdemocracy and reform have swept the globe and reached Russia and China’sdoorsteps through Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Maidan protests and Hong Kong’s 2014“Umbrella Revolution.” Western observers often discount Russian andChinese state media’s obsession with color revolution as authoritarianpropaganda. Nonetheless, as long as Russian and Chinese elites operateunder the assumption that the West is subverting their political systems anddomestic legitimacy, they will be reticent to put much distance between oneanother.
以2011年的“阿拉伯之春”來看，莫斯科與北京認爲這種已席捲全球的“民主改革”威脅已既成現實。例如2013-14年間在俄羅斯家門口爆發的“廣場抗議”以及2014年中國香港的“雨傘革命”。西方媒體通常不相信俄中這樣的專制國家媒體熱衷顏色革命。雖然如此。只要俄中認爲西方國家是在（設計）顛覆政權體制與國內合法性，他們一定會拉大彼此間距離。Russia-China relations today aregeopolitically dissimilar to the relationship in the 1960s and ’70s. Duringthat time, Moscow and Beijing saw each other as major security threats. Bycontrast, Russia and China’s current strategic objectives are much more impededby the U.S. and its European and Asian allies than they are by one another. China’score strategic objectives are focused on East Asia, restoring control overTaiwan and favorably settling maritime territorial disputes in the East andSouth China Seas. Beijing’s primary obstacle is American naval power, and theweb of U.S. bilateral alliances (the “hub and spokes” system) with regionalpowers such as Japan and Australia. The main obstacle to Russia’s efforts tosecure spheres of interest on its Eastern European, and South Caucasianperipheries is the U.S.-led NATO alliance. The European Union Institute forSecurity Studies recently published a study of China-Russia relationscontaining an interview with a Chinese security expert that epitomizes thissharedthreat perception: “China feels pressure in the South China Sea, andRussia feels pressure from NATO in the Baltic Sea. Russia faces anti-ballisticmissiles systems in Romania and Poland, and China faces the same in South Koreaand Japan. While NATO expands to the East, the U.S. is strengthening itsmilitary presence in Asia.”
現在的俄中地緣關係與他們在6、70年代之間的關係不同。那時，莫斯科與北京相互視爲主要威脅。但相比之下，俄國的戰略目標比中國更能阻礙歐美與亞洲盟友間關係。中國核心戰略目標主要集中在東亞，即重新恢復對臺灣，中國東海，以及中國南海的控制權。北京面臨的挑戰主要是美國海軍以及美國盟友，譬如日本、澳大利亞等地區大國。俄國是以美國爲首的北約，既東歐，南高加索外圍利益的主要威脅。歐洲聯盟研究所最近公佈了中俄安全關係的研究，其中包含了一位中國安全專家的觀點，該專家表示，我們都面臨同種威脅，“中國感到的壓力是在南海，而俄羅斯感受到的則是來自波羅的海的北約壓力。俄羅斯面臨羅馬尼亞和波蘭的反導系統，同樣，中國面臨的是韓國和日本的反導。當北約東擴時，美國正加強其在亞洲的軍事存在。”Driven by ideological and geopolitical fearof the West, Russia-China alignment has engendered close collaboration inmutually beneficial areas. Cooperation intensified following Western impositionof sanctions on Russia in 2014. The most high-profile example came in May 2014,when after nearly a decade of negotiations, Moscow finally cut a deal withBeijing to export Siberian gas to China. This followed the 2013 announcement ofa joint venture between Russian oil conglomerate Rosneft and China NationalPetroleum Corporation (CNPC) to develop Eastern Siberian oil and gas fields. Inthe short to medium term, it will take time to overcome economic and logisticalchallenges to develop stronger energy linkages. However, over the longer term,the deals should prove mutually beneficial. Russia secures Chinese investmentand locks in comparatively high prices; China diversifies its energy mix andgains access to new overland energy supplies, which Beijing considers lessvulnerable to geopolitical turmoil and blockade than energyimported from theMiddle East via maritime routes（bluebit）.
受西方的意識形態的影響以及對地緣的憂慮，驅使俄中相互抱團取暖。2014年西方制裁俄羅斯後，中俄雙方合作加速。最引人注意的例子是，2014年5月莫斯科與北京經歷近十年談判，莫斯科最終同北京達成協議。該協議由俄羅斯巨頭ROSENT與中國天然氣總公司在2013年簽署並向外宣告，協議內容爲在中短期內共同開發西伯利亞的天然氣與石油。若要加強能源合作，這份協議需要時間來克服經濟與行政支持上的挑戰。然而，從長遠來看，交易是互利共贏的。俄羅斯保護中國投資，並鎖定相對較高的（投資）價格；中國能源變得多樣化且獲得新的陸上能源供應，比起中東海上石油路線，北京人爲不會輕易受到地緣政治動盪和封鎖的影響。The arms trade provides another example ofsymbiosis in Russia-China relations. The trade helps Russia ameliorate itsbiggest weakness — a feeble and energy export-dependent economy — while helpingChina sustain its ongoing military modernization efforts. Historically, a majorimpediment to this trade was Chinese reverse-engineering of Russian/Sovietarmaments, most notoriously Chinese development of the J-11B fighter, whichis “a direct copy of the Su-27, aone-seat fighter that was developed by the Soviets through the 1970s and 1980sas a match for the U.S. F-15 and F-16.” The problem of Chinesereverse-engineering was so severe that Moscow placed an informal ban on exportsof high technology military equipment to China in 2004. However, Putin’s recentapproval of advanced weaponry sales to China such as the Su-35 fighter and theS-400 Surface-to-Air Missile system indicates the moratorium has been bly, both parties agreed not to include technology transfer licenses inthese deals, which should reduce the feasibility (and resultant friction) ofChinese reverse engineering. The trade will remain mutually beneficial so longas Russia’s economy leans on arms exports (defense manufacturing employs 2.5-3million workers, around 20 percent of Russian manufacturing jobs), and China’smilitary industrial complex remain suboptimal at indigenously producing keytechnologies such as high performance jet engines and advanced conventionalattack submarines. Russia will also increasingly rely on China as a keycustomer, as India, long the biggest buyer of Soviet/Russian arms, diversifies itssuppliers and develops its domestic defense industry. China’s dependence onRussia for advanced military technology is further reinforced by lack of accessto European and American technology due to a Western arms embargo on China inplace since 1989.
俄中關係中武器貿易也成了另一項例證。這種貿易對國力虛弱依靠能源出口的俄羅斯有很大的助益，同時也有利於中國軍事現代化的發展。從歷史來看，貿易面臨的主要問題是中國對俄羅斯或前蘇聯軍備的工程仿製，比如臭名遠揚的殲-11B戰機，這就是對“SU-27戰鬥機的直接複製，SU-27是單座戰機，是上世紀7、80年代前蘇聯爲對抗美國F-15、16而研製的戰機。”由於中國的逆向工程如此強悍，莫斯科曾在2004年頒佈了（專門）針對中國高技術軍事裝備出口的非正式禁令。然而，普京最近向中國銷售了不少先進武器，比如SU-35戰機與S-400地空導彈，這說明禁令已經解除。但值得注意的是，雙方都同意不包括技術轉移，這將大大減小中國逆向工程的可行性（由此雙方可能會產生摩擦）。雙方貿易將保持互利，俄羅斯經濟只需依靠武器出口（國防制造工人若有2.5-3萬，俄羅斯製造業既有20%的就業機會），因爲中國軍事工業複合體對自行生產高性能噴氣發動機和先進常規潛艇攻擊的關鍵技術總是不滿意。俄羅斯也將越來越把中國視作與印度相同的重要客戶，至於印度，一直是蘇/俄製武器的最大買家，儲備多種武器並發展其國內的國防工業。由於歐美在1989年對中國實施先進武器禁運，中國對俄羅斯的先進武器技術愈發依賴。Western observers often highlight thetensions lurking below the surface of Sino-Russian relations, particularlyChinese economic expansion into Central Asia, and Russian arms sales to China’sregional rivals, primarily India and Vietnam. Nonetheless, these sources offriction are manageable, and, furthermore, the United States has limitedability to exploit them. For example, it would not be in U.S. interests forSino-Russian competition to intensify in Central Asia, as this would contributeto regional instability and hamstring regional cooperation against Islamistextremism. If the U.S. and Europe succeed in breaking Russian dominance of thearms trade with India and Vietnam, this would actually have the effect ofreducing a source of tension between Moscow and Beijing（bluebit）.
西方觀察家經常突出中俄表面下潛藏的緊張關係，尤其是對中國的中亞經濟擴張，以及俄羅斯向中國區域競爭對手如印度越南出售武器。無論怎樣，這些衍生摩擦是可控的，但進一步來看，美國可以利用它們。例如，在中亞加強對抗俄國，不符合美國的利益，因爲這有利於地區不穩定，在聯合對抗伊斯蘭極端主義時會產生障礙。如果美歐成功打破俄羅斯對印度、越南的武器貿易主導，這實際上將削弱了莫斯科和北京間的緊張關係。Since Washington will have difficultyexploiting divisions between China and Russia, it makes little sense to “freezeout” one party and pursue rapprochement with the other in the hopes ofachieving the sort of realignment that Nixon pulled off in the early is evidenced by previous President Barack Obama’s experience with Russiaand China. Although relations with both Moscow and Beijing became strainedunder Obama, the U.S.-China relationship, despite a growing rivalry in the Asia-Pacificregion, remained more functional. It could even be said that Washington andBeijing have developed a peculiar sort of “special relationship.” This is bestexemplified by continuing high-level engagement through the annual Strategicand Economic Dialogue (S&ED), an intensive, routinized series of bilateralsummits, where American and Chinese leaders engage on an array of internationalissues. Despite many disagreements, Beijing has a working relationship withWashington, and Moscow does not. As a result, China now occupies the positionthat Nixon’s America enjoyed during the 1970s: Beijing enjoys closer relationswith the two other powers in the strategic triangle than they have with oneanother.
由於華盛頓很難利用中俄間隙分裂彼此，因此利用“離間”以及70年代尼克松爲追求和解實現重組的方法毫無意義。早前奧巴馬在俄中間既已體驗過。儘管在奧巴馬時期內莫斯科與北京出現不和，美中在亞太地區競爭愈發激烈，但（美中）還保持着交流。甚至可以說，美中之間發展出一種“特殊關係”。美中年度戰略與經濟對話峯會，美中高層持續密集接觸，共同探討一系列國際話題，便是最好的例證。北京與華盛頓間儘管既有分歧但又有合作，而與莫斯科則不是。因此，中國目前所居位置就好比70年代尼克松的美國：在戰略三角中，北京與其他兩國的關係比起另兩國間的關係，更爲緊密。An effective strategy for Trump toforestall consolidation of a Sino-Russian bloc would be to opt for selectiveengagement with both Beijing and Moscow. Obviously, engagement would have to becoupled with continued hedging against intensifying security competition withRussia in Europe, and China in Asia. Nevertheless, the Trump administrationshould also recognize that the shared perception in Beijing and Moscow thatWashington aims to subvert and internally weaken its non-democratic rivals isdetrimental to relations with both Russia and China, and strengthensSino-Russian cooperation. Consequently, special efforts should be made toassure Moscow and Beijing that Washington has no interest in interfering intheir internal politics. This, rather than tilting toward Moscow, would go along way toward assuaging the anxiety that Russian and Chinese elites feelabout the United States. If Beijing and Moscow begin to see the United Statesas a normal state with its own interests and goals, rather than a fadinghegemon bent onideological dominance, it would help make triangular diplomacypossible once again.
特朗普的一種有效阻止中俄靠近的策略是，選擇性地與北京、莫斯科接觸。顯然，在與日俱增的安全競爭中，對待歐洲的俄羅斯以及亞洲的中國，既要接觸又必須保持反制。然而，特朗普政府也應該注意到北京、莫斯科的看法，華盛頓顛覆對方、瓦解對方內部的方法，會損害俄中關係，阻礙中俄合作。因此，華盛頓應特別注意，不要去幹涉莫斯科、北京的內政。因此，即使對付莫斯科，也應該讓用很長一段時間讓他們放下警惕，也不要影響俄中精英對美國的感覺。如果北京和莫斯科人平常開始認爲美國是爲了他們自身的利益，而不是一個一心想奪回支配權的衰落霸主，這將有助於使三角外交成爲再次可能。
