基石投資導致香港殭屍股激增

Asenior equities banker received a call last week from a client whose company he helped float in Hong Kong last year.

一位資深股票銀行家上週接到一位客戶的電話，去年他曾幫助這位客戶的公司在香港上市。

How, asked the client, can we increase trading volume and interest in the company? The banker’s answer was simple although his solution was anything but: intensive pitching to potential investors all over again.

這位客戶在電話中問道，我們怎樣才能增加公司股票的交易量，提升市場交易該股票的興趣？銀行家的回答很簡單，雖然他的解決辦法無非一條：重頭向潛在投資者進行密集推介。

The company is in danger of becoming what Hong Kong bankers are dubbing a zombie, or Z-shares — that is, newish companies that trade little, relative to their size, because their so-called free float is held mostly by cornerstone investors.

該公司正面臨成爲香港銀行家所稱殭屍股的危險。殭屍股指的是成交量極少（相較公司規模）的一些上市不久的股票，成交量少的原因是，他們所謂自由流通的股票基本上由基石投資者持有。

Locked up for six months, these big shareholders at first cannot, and later do not, trade the shares.

半年的禁售期，令這些大股東一開始不能交易所持股票，解禁後也不交易這些股票。

The result is a collection of newish but illiquid stocks which do little to pique investor interest — and do even less for Hong Kong’s efforts to rank alongside London and New York, even though the territory is on course to host the most initial public offerings for a second year running.

結果是出現了一批非常新但流動性很差的股票，不僅無法吸引投資者的興趣，更是無益於香港爭取與倫敦、紐約市場齊名的努力——雖然香港將連續第二年成爲全球第一大首次公開發行(IPO)市場。

Hong Kong’s financial community has grumbled about cornerstones for years.

香港金融界對基石投資者已抱怨多年。

Indeed, a government advisory group called for action two years ago — to no avail.

事實上，兩年前一個政府顧問小組呼籲採取行動，卻無濟於事。

But the issues surrounding their use are growing rapidly.

但圍繞基石投資者的問題正迅速增長。

Cornerstones have this year taken up almost half the equity on offer — a record.

今年近半數新發行的股票都由基石投資者認購，創下紀錄。

Their share will jump above 50 per cent following next week’s $8bn IPO of Postal Savings Bank of China.

這些投資者所佔份額在中國郵政儲蓄銀行(Postal Savings Bank of China)下週進行80億美元的IPO後，將躍升至50%以上。

Up to three-quarters of PSBC’s shares are expected to be taken by cornerstones, who accept the half-year lock-ups and the publication of their names, in return for the full allocation they want.

預計中國郵政儲蓄銀行所發行股份有高達四分之三都將由基石投資者認購，他們接受半年禁售期，同意公開自己的名字，回報是可以得到他們想要的全部配額。

Mainland Chinese companies now provide 71 per cent of cornerstone money, up from 55 per cent two years ago, according to analysis of Dealogic data.

對Dealogic數據的分析顯示，中國內地企業現在提供了71%的基石資金，兩年前這個比例爲55%。

A lot of those investors are participating in so-called friends and family deals, in which state-owned enterprises back a fellow state-owned enterprise’s float.

這類投資者中許多人都參與了所謂的親友團交易，即一家國企上市，其他國企紛紛支持。

PSBC’s biggest cornerstone, taking about $2bn, is China State Shipbuilding.

中國郵政儲蓄最大的基石投資者是中國船舶工業(China State Shipbuilding)，認購了約20億美元的股份。

Bankers warn that the heavy use of cornerstones can inflate share prices because they commit to buying at the top of the range if needed, giving other investors less sway over pricing.

銀行家們警告大量使用基石投資會擡高股價，因爲這些投資者承諾必要時會在價值區間上限買入，令其他投資者更難爭取有利的價格。

Chinese company cornerstones have money but nothing else, says one banker.

一位銀行家表示：中國企業基石投資者除了有錢以外別的什麼都沒有。

They don’t have the sophistication to research, to come up with a price — they don’t care about that.

他們不會精明地去研究、拿出一個價格，他們不關心這個。

Hong Kong’s financial services advisory committee warned in 2014 that the practice — then running at less than 30 per cent of total equity raised — risked having a distortive effect on market pricing.

香港金融服務諮詢委員會在2014年曾警告這種做法有可能對市場定價產生扭曲作用，當時基石投資在IPO籌資總額中佔比還不足30%。

But the Hong Kong Exchange, the city’s for-profit equity trading monopoly, last year said its Listing Committee had found no conclusive evidence of this.

但香港交易所(HKEx)——營利性股票交易壟斷者——去年表示其上市委員會(Listing Committee)沒有（發現）確鑿的證據顯示存在這種情況。

The exchange says it continues to monitor developments.

港交所表示將繼續監測事態發展。

Bankers, however, say executives rely on cornerstones to make sure their companies get the top float price with no regard for its impact on liquidity later on.

但銀行家們表示企業高管仰仗於基石投資者，以確保他們的企業拿到最高發行價，他們並不考慮這對日後流動性的影響。

A lot of our clients here work for the government and if you stick a book of demand in front of a bureaucrat and it is in theory more than one-and-a-half times covered at the top of the range, where do you think he’s going to price that deal? asked a Hong Kong banker.

一位香港銀行家提出疑問：我們的很多客戶都爲政府工作，如果你把一本需求簿遞到一名官僚面前，需求簿顯示要發行的股票理論上在定價區間頂端獲1.5倍以上超額認購，你覺得他會爲這筆交易定價多少？

Bankers care about trading volumes because active markets mean more commission.

銀行家關心成交量，因爲活躍的市場意味着更多佣金。

There is an argument, too, that lower listing prices help produce that first-day price pop common in New York, which draws attention to the company and gives favoured institutional clients — who buy shares at the float price — a neat windfall.

還有一種說法是，較低的上市價格有助於製造紐約股市常見的那種首日價格暴漲，從而吸引市場注意到該公司，也讓受到偏愛、以發行價購買股票的機構客戶發一筆橫財。

But investors also want interesting, liquid, companies on which to take a view.

但投資者也想要值得交易的有趣、流動性高的股票。

In two years, institutional investors’ presence as cornerstones has dropped from almost a third to 11 per cent.

兩年時間裏，機構投資者在基石投資者中佔比從近三分之一下降至11%。

On average, trading in recent large Hong Kong IPOs — those that floated last year at more than $500m — reaches 4 per cent of the value of the freely floated shares per month and those with more cornerstones trade even less.

平均來說，近期香港那些大規模IPO——去年上市籌資超過5億美元的IPO——中上市的股票的成交額，佔每月自由流通股成交額的4%，而那些擁有更多基石投資的股票成交額更少。

In New York, daily trading hovers at the 13 per cent level.

在紐約市場，每日成交額在13%水平上下。

In a rising market, cornerstone issues would fade away as big investors eventually sold at a profit.

在一個股價不斷上揚的市場，隨着大投資者最終獲利出售，圍繞基石投資者的問題將逐漸消失。

The lack of interest in China, particularly its banks, makes that unlikely in the near term, while rehabilitating zombies will take a long time.

但由於市場對中國股——尤其是它的銀行股——缺乏興趣，這種情況短期內不太可能發生，而讓殭屍股復原還需要很長時間。

In the meantime, calls are growing for the Hong Kong Exchange to reconsider the rules for lock-ups.

在此期間，要求港交所重新考慮禁售規則的呼聲越來越高。

The likes of PSBC are too big to become zombies.

畢竟像中國郵政儲蓄銀行這樣的股票盤子太大，不能放任它變成殭屍股。