孤立主義會席捲新興市場嗎

Political systems in the developed world are processing the economic challenges of globalisation and technology in dangerous ways.

發達世界的政治體系正在以危險的方式處理全球化和技術帶來的經濟挑戰。

Although it’s happening with distinct local flavors, the recent phenomena of fringe parties and extreme personalities rising to power (or getting close) in places like Greece, France, Spain and even the US are all part of the same global trend.

儘管地方特色各有不同，但最近希臘、法國、西班牙乃至美國等國的邊緣黨派和極端人士攀上（或者接近）權力頂峯的現象，全都是這種相同全球趨勢的一部分。

It is nothing new to the world that inward-looking populism and confrontational nationalism become a growing force after episodes of economic disruption.

在當今世界，這不是什麼新鮮事——每當爆發經濟危機之後，內向的民粹主義和對抗性民族主義就會日益崛起。

While Brexit may be the most important global political event since the fall of the Soviet Union, it’s also a reminder of the popular mood in sophisticated and prosperous places like the UK.

英國退歐可能是自蘇聯解體以來最重要的全球政治事件，它還提醒人們，在英國這樣成熟和富裕的地方同樣存在民粹主義情緒。

In this context, the question has to be asked: When and how will this political tsunami hit emerging economies? And why haven’t emerging markets (EM) yet experienced the type of neo-populism seen in developed markets (DM) in a serious way?

在這種背景下，我們必須要問，這種政治海嘯什麼時候以及將如何衝擊新興經濟體？爲什麼新興市場迄今仍未真正遭遇發達市場的那種新民粹主義？

Unlike traditional EM populism, most notorious in Latin America, the recent wave in the developed world is different in that it may be more ideological, more prosperous, more sophisticated and less cyclical.

發達世界最近興起的民粹主義浪潮與過去的新興市場民粹主義（名聲最差的是拉美）不同，它們的意識形態色彩可能更爲濃厚、它們所處的經濟更爲富足、它們本身更爲複雜而週期性更弱。

A big part of this trend is explained by the xenophobic reaction to growing migration but it is also driven fundamentally by an economic agenda: instead of being about poor people, as has been the case traditionally in EM, it is more about middle-income citizens feeling left out or disappointed by falling income levels.

這種趨勢在很大程度上源於對日益增多的移民的排外情緒，但它的根本原因也在於一個經濟因素：它更多的與因收入水平下降而感覺被遺忘或者失望的中等收入民衆有關，而不是像過去新興市場那樣與窮人有關。

Traditionally in EM we’ve seen populist movements that gain power to achieve justice for the poor.

過去，我們在新興市場看到民粹主義運動獲得權力，爲窮人實現正義。

This may be a reason why populism traditionally has come hand in hand with fiscal irresponsibility and, because of that, populism has been a cyclical factor in EM.

這可能是民粹主義傳統上與財政失責密切相關的一個原因，而且正因此，民粹主義一直是新興市場的一個週期性因素。

Whenever money has been available there has also been a messianic politician with a plan.

只要有錢，總會出現一個有所謀劃的救世主政客。

Of course, it may just be a matter of time before neo-populism finds its way to EM.

當然，新民粹主義抵達新興市場可能只是時間問題。

But one has to consider that the initial conditions, in terms of GDP per capita, are very different in EM compared with DM.

但人們應該考慮，就人均GDP而言，新興市場和發達市場的初始情況截然不同。

Over the last 20 years the EM citizen has had a great run towards prosperity and therefore the potential to accommodate lower per capita GDP growth rates or even a decline may be significant (think of the resilience of Ireland through the European crisis).

在過去20年裏，新興市場民衆富裕程度大大提高，從而有很大的潛力適應人均GDP增長率減緩乃至下降的局面（想想愛爾蘭在歐洲危機期間的適應能力吧）。

In a sense, while growing inequality within countries may be at the core of the neo-populist wave in DM, global inequality has been trending down, as the GDP per capita of EM economies has been catching up to their DM counterparts.

從某種意義上來說，儘管各國不平等程度日益加劇可能是發達市場新民粹主義浪潮的核心因素，但全球不平等正逐漸下降，因爲新興經濟體的人均GDP已經在追上發達市場。

Along the same lines, immigration has not been a generalised challenge for emerging economies, which implies that the potential for extremist, isolationist behaviour should be limited.

同樣，移民並非新興經濟體普遍面臨的挑戰，這意味着極端主義、孤立主義行爲發生的可能性應該是有限的。

To be fair, one could argue that there is already some sort of neo-populism going on in EM, most notably in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia, driven by ideology but mostly by fiscally conservative governments.

誠然，人們可以辯稱，新興市場（尤其是匈牙利、波蘭、斯洛伐克和俄羅斯）已經出現了某種新民粹主義，它一定程度上是由意識形態驅動，但主要是由財政上保守的政府造成。

After its failed coup, Turkey appears also to be moving in the same direction.

在未遂政變之後，土耳其似乎也在轉向相同方向。

Can this be a sign of a more generalised trend developing?

但這是更爲普遍的趨勢正在發展的跡象嗎？

Maybe.

或許吧。

But it will be very difficult for it to become widespread because of one major factor: China.

但這種新民粹主義很難廣泛傳播，一個主要因素是中國。

Many years ago China made an important strategic decision to engage with the world as part of its economic and political model.

許多年前，中國做出重要的戰略決定，將與世界接觸作爲其經濟和政治模式的一部分。

First, as a way to generate prosperity through manufacturing exports when it entered the WTO in 2000.

最初中國在2001年加入世貿組織(WTO)的時候，是爲了通過製造業出口來創造繁榮。

And more recently, taking a proactive role to reshape the global order by creating new multilateral institutions and support programs such as the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank and China’s One Belt, One Road initiative.

最近中國則積極重塑全球秩序，創建新的多邊機構並支持亞洲基礎設施投資銀行(AIIB)和一帶一路等項目。

It is unclear how deeply Chinese authorities believe in open markets and cooperation.

目前尚不清楚中國當局在多大程度上相信開放市場和合作。

So far they have benefited tremendously from global trade and the ability to be the factory of the world.

迄今中國極大地受益於全球貿易和成功成爲世界工廠。

While doing that, they have also pursued other isolationist and confrontational policies, most recently through their gunboat diplomacy in the South China Sea.

與此同時，中國當局也出臺了孤立主義和對抗政策，最近則是在南中國海上奉行炮艇外交。

It remains to be seen if their embracing of global trade will withstand growing pressures from technology to middle income wages.

他們對全球貿易的支持是否會經受住從技術到中等收入薪資等日益增長的壓力，還有待觀察。

But it could be that in the context of the declining power of major developed economies, China may become a major force for cooperation and multilateralism at a time of divisiveness and isolationism in the west: the world turned upside-down.

但在主要發達經濟體影響力日益下降的背景下，在西方盛行分裂和孤立主義之時，中國可能成爲合作和多邊主義的主要倡導者：世界顛倒了。